FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE SUBMARINE WAR

By George Fielding Eliot

THE present basic strategy of the United Nations appears to have two chief goals. It aims to contain Japan — that is, to hold her in check so that she cannot overwhelm the Chinese or launch an offensive against Russia, India or Australia, meanwhile preventing her from recouping her dwindling economic strength by drawing on the resources of territories she has occupied. And it aims, while doing this with the minimum force required, to concentrate all remaining forces for the destruction of the armed power of Germany. This strategy is dictated by the fact that by far the largest single force on the side of the United Nations, the Red Army, is committed to the struggle against Germany and cannot be shifted elsewhere. That being so, sound military judgment demands that all additional strength be concentrated to bring the fight with Germany to a conclusion, leaving Japan to be dealt with later, or as opportunity may offer.

In our operations against Japan, the submarine is a most important weapon, if indeed it is not the most important one in our armory. In our fight to bring the war with Germany to an immediate decision, it is probably the strongest and most dangerous weapon at the disposal of the enemy.

I think it may fairly be said that Hitler and his High Command now have little if any hope of being able to achieve victory in this war — victory, that is, in the sense of conquering any one of their principal foes, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Soviet Union or the United States. They now center their hopes on a very different objective. They hope to drag out the war until we all sicken of the strain and the slaughter, and then make peace with us on terms which will allow them to retain some modicum of power, some modicum of prestige and standing with the German people. The Nazi leaders and the Prussian military caste, as

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joint custodians of the "sacred" ideals of German world domination, are well aware that for the time being the game is up. Their remaining hope is to be left in such a position, however enfeebled they may be temporarily, that later on when opportunity smiles again, when their opponents have gone back to sleep, they can resume the game. Let us not make the mistake of supposing that these German leaders are fools. They know perfectly well that the blitzkrieg phase of the war is over. They are now waging a war of attrition — of moral and psychological as well as physical attrition. To such a war, to such a purpose, no weapon could be better adapted than the submarine.

In these circumstances, the immediate objectives of the United Nations may be very simply stated: to bring to bear against the vital centers of Germany, and against Germany's armed forces wherever found, a crushing weight of superior armament, and to do this as quickly as possible, not only to end the war, but because Japan cannot be contained forever with minimum forces. Only one of the United Nations has an army in the field on the Continent of Europe — Russia. Hence, the United States and Britain must give Russia all possible support. The Germans must be driven out of Africa, in order that its whole north shore may become a base of Allied operations against Europe and in order that the Mediterranean short-cut may be available for Allied shipping. The air offensive against Germany's communications and production centers must be intensified. Finally, the "fortress of Europe" must be directly assaulted by American and British armies, working in close coördination with their Russian allies. For the accomplishment of these objectives, Russian power alone, or Russian power plus British power, is insufficient. The full weight of America is demanded in addition. The greater the American strength, and the quicker it comes, the quicker the decision will be attained. This is mainly a matter of shipping, of sea power.

The United States is, to all intents and purposes, fully mobilized. If we could suddenly be moved to the geographical position of France, the German case would be instantly hopeless. But we must make a 3,000-mile sea passage to reach Europe or Africa. Britain is an island and must likewise use ships to move men and supplies to Europe or Africa, save within the very definite limitations of air transport. All Anglo-American help to Russia must go by sea.

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Germany cannot strike directly at the United States. She has struck directly at Russia, and been worsted. She cannot invade Britain; and she has been soundly beaten in an attempt to subdue that indomitable island from the air. But Germany can still strike at the lines of communication by which American and British power is distributed to the various theaters of war, by which British power is itself sustained and the British people fed, by which in the end the United States will put its decisive weight into the European battle. The more ships Germany can destroy, the longer she can defer the day of reckoning. That is the significance of the U-boat campaign.

Quite different were the conditions at the time of the great submarine crisis of the last war. In the early months of 1917, Germany was seemingly in the full tide of victory. Actually, she was feeling the strain of war, though Russia was slowly crumbling and the Western Front held fast. Germany's leaders deliberately assumed the risk of American entry into the war in order to gamble on the U-boat being able to starve out the British before unprepared America could make her weight felt. The German hope that the U-boat might bring complete and decisive victory came within an ace of fulfilment. Germany was beaten by the introduction, at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour, of the convoy system. In all probability it will be the convoy system, on modern lines, which will deny her in this war the lesser but still considerable advantages which she hopes to obtain from her submarines.

The situation in the Atlantic may be described as a double blockade. The British and American navies, commanding the surface of the sea, are able to deny that surface to German merchant vessels. Germany can receive nothing from any transoceanic source save by means of an occasional lucky blockade runner. This has an increasingly serious effect on Germany's economy, and therefore on her ability to wage war. On the other hand, by means of submarines and long-range aircraft Germany seeks to deny the movement of troops and supplies to and from the island of Great Britain, which not only is a springboard for American power to be launched against Europe, but possesses great fighting power of its own. Likewise, Germany seeks to stop the movement of American and British ships to and from Africa, now to become another base for attack on Europe. This undersea blockade cannot be as effective as the surface blockade because

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of the nature of the chief instrument it employs, the submarine, whose tactics must always be those of stealth and evasion rather than of the forthright exercise of power. But if the submarine can destroy a sufficiently high percentage of United Nations ships in transit across the Atlantic, it can so reduce the margin of available fighting power and supplies reaching Britain and Africa that, when minimum defensive needs and minimum rations for the British people have been taken care of, there will not be enough left over to permit the accumulation of sufficient forces for an offensive against Germany.

Strategically, Germany of 1943 has many advantages which Germany of 1917 did not possess. Chief among these is the possession of the French and Norwegian bases on the open Atlantic. In 1914 all her submarine bases were within the North Sea. To reach their ocean hunting grounds, the U-boats leaving Wilhelmshaven, Emden or Zeebrugge either had to pass through the netted and mined and patrolled bottleneck of the English Channel or had to make the long voyage around Scotland, passing out to sea through the narrow waters between the coasts of Scotland and Norway. Today all the Norwegian and French coasts are in German hands, while much of the coast of Ireland and all the coast of Portugal, as well as the Portuguese islands, are denied to the Allies. This gives the Germans a tremendous advantage in economy of operation and freedom of action. Moreover, it makes coöperation between German aircraft and submarines much easier.

In the technical field, the German U-boat of today is a much more formidable vessel than its predecessor of 1917. In the first place, it is tougher, harder to kill. The 1917 U-boat could hardly dive to depths of over 200 feet; below that, the pressure became dangerous. Today, pressure hulls are strong enough to withstand submersion to 600 or 700 feet. This enables the modern submarine to lie on the bottom, engines stopped, in many places where this would have been impossible a few years ago. It also complicates immensely the problem of the destroyer attacking with depth charges. The depth charge must be aimed in two dimensions; it must take the right direction, and it must be set to explode at the right depth. When the latter factor was limited to 200 feet, the task of laying a "pattern" which was sure to bag a given submarine was much simpler than it is now when the depth factor is extended to 700 feet. Moreover, in 1917 a depth charge or a mine

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needed only to explode within 100 or 150 feet of a submarine to be reasonably certain of doing it fatal injury; whereas today 15 to 25 feet is none too close.

Next, the 1943 submarine is much faster than its predecessor. Built on sleeker lines, and with more powerful engines, it is capable of attaining speeds of 20–22 knots on the surface, whereas 12–14 knots was good speed in 1917. The average speed of merchant convoys is not much over 10 knots. This means that when a scouting submarine or an airplane locates a convoy it can call other submarines in the vicinity; these can run ahead of the convoy, on parallel or converging courses, take up position, and waylay the convoy at a moment when conditions of sea, visibility and weather are most favorable for attack. Moreover, the submarine can run away from many types of escort vessels, especially converted yachts and the old-style sub-chasers. As a result, more expensive and powerful engines, taking longer to build, must be installed in the new escort ships.

The modern submarine also carries more dangerous weapons than did that of 1917. Its principal sting is still the torpedo; but the torpedo of today is more accurate, has longer range, and has greater destructive power than in former times. Some German torpedoes are propelled by electric batteries, eliminating the telltale trail of bubbles which used to arise on the surface from the old compressed air propulsion. This was one of the best means of locating the submarine when it attacked a convoy. The Germans also use torpedoes which are directed to their targets by magnetic and acoustic devices, thus insuring a greater degree of accuracy. The magnetic type has been in part discounted by the invention of the "de-gaussing" gear, but this is expensive and requires highly skilled personnel both for its manufacture and installation. Submarines no longer always have to raise their periscopes before firing torpedoes. The course of a torpedo may be directed by the use of sound devices, though visual bearings still are more accurate if they can be taken without undue risk.

Improvements in Diesel engines have given the modern submarine enormous radius of action. Most of the present larger German U-boats can cruise 15,000 miles without refueling. Indeed, their endurance is limited less by fuel capacity than by the human factor — the ability of the crew to stand up under the gruelling trials of a war cruise. This is mitigated by the fact that there are more comforts and more living space in the modern

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U-boats than in the older ones. Moreover, submarine supply ships now bring out fresh food and mail as well as fuel and torpedoes to the cruising subs.

At best, however, a submarine must return to base at regular periods in order to give the crew a run on shore and a change from the cramped and wearing conditions under which they live at sea. A submarine crew is a highly trained fighting team. Each man has specific duties which he must learn to perform with accuracy and dispatch; he must know what to do, how to do it, and why he is doing it. The lives of every officer and man are in the hands of every other. The submarine service is one service where mistakes are not condoned. At sea in hostile waters there is no letup from the constant strain. An enemy airplane may dive out of any passing cloud; every vessel sighted may be an armed foe; every channel may be mined. There is never a moment on the surface when it may not be necessary to send the ship down in a "crash dive" to avoid sudden attack; and when submerged there is never a moment when it is assuredly safe to show the periscope. Human nerves can stand this sort of thing for a time, but only for a time; then there must come either rest or a collapse.

The heaviest burden of all rests upon the commanding officer. His personal responsibility is greater than in any other branch of the naval service. He it is who must make every decision, meet every emergency; hour by hour and minute by minute, the safety of the ship and the lives of all on board are in his hands. His officers and men must have the utmost confidence in his skill, courage and ability, and he in turn must have complete confidence in every one of his subordinates. Otherwise there will be disaster, born of hesitation and uncertainty in the split seconds of decision and action upon which may hang a submarine's success or her destruction. The commanding officer must personally conduct his ship to the best position for attacking her prey; he must choose the course, lay off the torpedo heading, and fire the torpedoes. When this is done, he must make the decision whether to dive and withdraw in order to avoid counterattack or attempt to attack another victim. In time of trouble he must be steadfast and cool, calculating chances, taking wise action, inspiring all by his bearing and good judgment. The ideal submarine captain is a composite of character, ability and experience. No navy has any surplus of such men; even a large navy cannot have very many submarine captains of the first rank. Such leaders, with the

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special qualities required by the submarine service, are not to be made out of every graduated midshipman. That this is true is attested by the fact that in the last war nearly two-thirds of the total British shipping sunk by German submarines fell prey to 25 submarine captains, each of whom averaged about 160,000 tons. The Germans used a total of about 250 submarine captains during the war. The average "kill" of the other nine-tenths of these officers was only about 12,000 tons.

Here is one great weakness of the submarine which the Germans have not been able to overcome, and never will be able to overcome. When one of their good captains goes down with his ship, he is gone forever, and it may take years to replace him. Moreover, the crew he has trained is gone too. The gradual dilution of submarine crews with green men, the weeding out of key petty officers to train new crews, produces, in any rapid expansion of submarine strength such as is now taking place in Germany, a general decrease in the average quality of the crews which can be made good only by experience under active war conditions. And in the submarine service an inexpert crew is likely to pay for experience with their lives.

There are two other inherent weaknesses of the submarine which the Germans have not been able to eliminate. The first is vulnerability. A submarine on the surface, holed by a single shell, cannot dive; if it is any distance from base, it is done for. The second is the submarine's low speed and low endurance when submerged. On the surface, it uses Diesel engines for the most part; but submerged it is propelled by electric motors, which draw their current from storage batteries. These batteries have a sufficient capacity to keep the submarine moving at two or three knots for a day and a half, perhaps a little more; but at any higher speed the batteries are much more quickly exhausted. The top speed, submerged, is ten or eleven knots, and this can be maintained for just about one hour. This means that a submarine manœuvring to attack a convoy must move to its position on the surface; it may dive to attack, but if it misses it has no chance of overtaking its victim without again coming to the surface.

All these characteristics of submarines must be kept in mind if one is to understand the problem now facing the United Nations in combatting this menace. We must determine where and how the submarine can best be attacked, and what means out

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of our total resources we can afford to apportion to this task. In considering the priorities to be assigned to anti-submarine measures, we must apply the principle of "first things first." It is of little avail to train soldiers and produce tanks and artillery and machine guns unless we have the means to transport them to the places where they can be used against the enemy. Nor is it much use trying to build ships faster than the enemy can sink them, without at the same time providing adequate protection for the ships already afloat. Experience has shown that it is far more efficient, from the point of view of tonnage continuously in service, to build eighty merchant ships and twenty high-seas escort vessels rather than a hundred merchant ships and no escort vessels. One finds patience with difficulty for the current discussions in which certain of the disputants seek higher priorities for valves, fittings, small motors and electrical appliances for the production of synthetic rubber, high-octane gasoline and other things, at the expense of escort ships. As Admiral Lord Jellicoe remarked at the height of the crisis of 1917, military history is replete with examples of the disastrous consequences of attempting large-scale operations at the farther end of insecure lines of communication. The Germans have just had a lesson in that respect at Stalingrad, and another in Libya. It does seem that we might learn from experience, and not have to be taught the hard way, at the price of the blood of our bravest and best.

The German submarine can be attacked in four general areas:

It may be attacked, first, at the plants which manufacture engines and appliances and in the shipyards where the hulls are fabricated. This task lies, for the present, entirely in the hands of our bombing squadrons, and they are performing it well; but it is idle to hope that they can do more than cut down the output.

Secondly, it may be attacked at the operating bases where it goes to be refueled and overhauled and where damages are repaired. At the larger German bases, such as Lorient, the submarines are kept in covered pens, with roofs of concrete a number of feet thick. Thus it is difficult to injure the submarines themselves even by direct hits from bombs; but damage can be done to the workshops, oil storage tanks, warehouses, barracks and approaches. Much greater damage could be done by commando raids which might afford opportunities for the systematic demolition of all facilities. If trained engineer troops could be given full freedom of action in a base area for only three or four hours, they

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could do more damage than is likely to be accomplished in a dozen air raids.

Thirdly, it may be attacked while it journeys to and from its allotted cruising grounds. Here the principal weapons at our disposal are aircraft and mines. Aircraft can now patrol wide areas of ocean, and the German submarine bases are so located that no U-boat can leave a base either in France or Norway, let alone Germany, and reach a station in the open Atlantic without passing through a patrol area of Allied aircraft. The most difficult area to patrol is the Bay of Biscay, because of German fighter opposition and because the patrolling aircraft in the farther reaches of the Bay are in the outer zone of their radius of action. German U-boats leaving Lorient at nightfall and steering a generally southwesterly course have a good chance of escaping observation, especially in the long winter nights. Their chances will grow less as the nights shorten; on the other hand, the chances of the patrol planes evading attack by German fighters will be similarly affected. Our ability to use bases in Southern Ireland would substantially improve this situation; an Allied air base in the northwestern corner of Spain would probably put an end to the usefulness of Lorient and Saint Nazaire as German submarine bases for good and all. But the chances of obtaining bases in either of these localities seem, at this writing, remote. As for mining operations, the chief difficulty is the enormous amount of material required to obtain really worthwhile effects. In the last war, both sides laid extensive minefields, but it was not until the industrial resources of the United States could be called upon that it was found possible to lay the great North Sea mine barrage between Norway and Scotland. Even so, the mine destroyed more German submarines than any other weapon in World War I. Now that we have acoustic and magnetic mines, and are able to lay mines from airplanes, the idea of "mining in" the German submarine bases is, in theory, highly attractive; but before we adopted it there would have to be evidence to show that the material and labor necessary for such an effort could not be better expended on escort craft or air bombing. Vast areas of the North Sea were closed off by mines in the last war, but the Germans contrived to keep channels swept clear in most cases. It is always possible for the enemy to sweep channels in minefields laid close to his bases, though the very fact that he is required to expend resources in men and material to do so is something of a gain.

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Other means of attacking submarines in waters through which they must pass to reach their hunting grounds are nets (sometimes equipped with explosive charges) and surface patrols.

But when all is said and done, these three methods combined are not as likely to produce casualties amongst the enemy's U-boat fleet (and at the same time directly protect the merchant shipping he is seeking to attack) as the convoy system. The aim of the convoy system is to insure that no submarine can attack a merchant vessel without itself encountering the attack of an armed escort craft fitted to deal with it. The convoy system places these submarine-killers where the submarine must come if it is to fulfil its mission — in the vicinity of the prey.

As I have already remarked, it was the convoy system which beat the submarine in the last war. Yet for a long time the British naval authorities resisted its introduction, partly from innate conservatism, partly because certain well-reasoned objections seemed to more than offset the advantages to be obtained. It was urged that deliveries would be reduced because of delays in assembling convoys, because the speed of a convoy is necessarily that of the slowest ship, and because of congestion in ports of arrival. Doubts were entertained as to whether merchant ships could "keep station" in the manner required for the orderly handling of a convoy. It was further argued that to bring so many ships together in one place afforded the U-boats a larger target.

None of these objections, as the event proved, had much real substance. The question of speed was disposed of by forming convoys of ships possessing relatively similar speeds. Thus at one period there were five convoy sailings from New York during each eight-day "cycle," two being 8-knot convoys, two being composed of ships capable of doing 10 knots, and one of faster ships which could do 12½ knots. Still faster ships usually sailed without escort and depended on their speed to bring them safe to port. Port congestion was cared for by a better organization of port facilities, by the formation of movable battalions of dock workers who could be hurried from one port to another as need arose, and by dispersing convoys to several ports when well within waters protected by coastal patrol flotillas. Practice showed that merchant officers had no difficulty in keeping station; and as for the "larger target" argument, it was really somewhat ludicrous to contend that a given submarine would be more likely to find a close-packed convoy of, say, twenty ships than to find at least

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one of them if they were scattered over hundreds of miles of ocean. In fact, when convoys were introduced, the U-boat captains actually supposed for many days that all British shipping had been re-routed around the North of Ireland and that none was entering the Channel at all. From an area of sea formerly swarming with fat prey, all shipping seemed to them to have disappeared.

The immediate success of the first convoys must have been a revelation to those who opposed the system. Yet opposed it was until continuance of the situation was plainly bringing Britain and the Allied cause face-to-face with defeat. Even then, the naval chiefs did not give way until Prime Minister Lloyd George announced his intention of paying a personal visit to the Admiralty for a full-dress investigation of the whole problem.

The immediate falling off in the rate of destruction is the best index of the convoy system's success. In February, March and April of 1917 each operating U-boat accounted for over 800 tons of shipping per day of operation. In May, with the introduction of convoys, the figure fell to 717 tons; in June it fell to 669; by December it had reached 284, and the submarine was beaten.

The method used in convoying was simple. Merchant ships were generally organized in convoys of 20 or 24 ships, and sailed at stated intervals from the assembly ports — New York, Hampton Roads, Sydney (Nova Scotia), Gibraltar and Dakar. For the first part of the voyage they were accompanied by the so-called "ocean escort," usually an old cruiser, whose duty it was to keep off attacks by the roving surface raiders which occasionally slipped out to sea. About two days out from a British port the destroyer escort met the convoy. The predetermined rendezvous was the outer limit of the danger zone, fixed by the known radius of action of existing submarines from German bases. Normally the destroyer escort consisted of from 8 to 14 destroyers, though it sometimes included patrol-boats and sloops. The proportion of escort ships to merchant ships thus was between one to three and one to two, or better. When the destroyer escort had brought the convoy well within coastal waters, the ships dispersed to their various ports of destination under the escort of trawlers and small patrol craft, while the destroyer escort turned about and took under its protection an outward-bound convoy of ships returning to the United States or other places. In those days there was no air problem; and the submarine problem did not exist outside the

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"danger zone," except in the form of a comparatively few German cruiser-submarines of long range.

The results speak for themselves. Of 9,354 ships in homeward convoys, 9,250 arrived safely; only 61 were lost while actually under escort, the others being attacked after parting company, or being lost as a result of marine perils. Of 7,339 ships in outward convoys, 7,289 made port safely, and only 41 were torpedoed while under escort. Thus the convoy system delivered safely no less than 99.08 percent of the ships committed to its care; and only .62 percent were torpedoed while in convoy. It would be difficult indeed to find a better record for any military plan or system in all the long history of warfare. If we could do as well today, we could finish off Germany before snow flies this coming winter.

But it should be emphasized again that in those days there was no air peril, and especially that the escorts were sufficient in number from the very beginning in proportion to the number of ships to be protected.

The situation in 1943 is very different in detail, though the solution to be applied is undoubtedly the same in principle. First of all, escort must be provided over the whole distance, but particularly in areas where we cannot maintain a constant air patrol (roughly speaking, beyond a 500-mile radius from established bases on one side or other of the Atlantic). The middle of the ocean is therefore the real danger zone in this war. The vigilance of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force, commanded by Air Marshal J. C. Slessor (under whom are placed all anti-submarine operations in British coastal waters) is such that no German U-boat has dared operate within 300 miles of the island of Great Britain for many months. Our own Eastern Sea Frontier Command, under Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, has now made American coastal waters similarly dangerous for enemy submarines. But the increased radius of action of the U-boats enables them to evade these dangers by operating far out at sea.

The air factor must also be taken into account. Within the radius of operations of German aircraft, the U-boat captain enjoys the enormous advantage of having an "eye in the air" to help him locate his prey. But this is becoming rarer due to the growth of Allied air superiority. Where aircraft assistance is lacking, the signal to gather for an attack on a convoy is given by any one of the patrolling submarines which spots it first. The best

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defense against this "wolf pack" system is vigilant air patrol around each convoy for a distance of 200 miles in all directions. If no U-boat can come to the surface by daylight within this distance of the convoy, there can be no catching up with it by night. Such a system would require either that all convoys sail only through waters patrolled by land-based aircraft, which is at present impossible, or that each convoy be accompanied, beyond the patrolling range of land-based aircraft, by a converted carrier equipped with enough planes to maintain the daily patrol. How many carriers this would require is a point on which I can offer no opinion, but certainly it is a number which we do not yet possess.

Next as to surface escort. The surface escort, composed of destroyers, special escort ships and corvettes, comes into action as a rule only after the convoy is actually attacked. The job of the air escort is to prevent an attack from taking place at all; the job of the surface escort is to punish the enemy submarines after the attack has taken place, and so in the end to make attacks too expensive for the enemy to keep them up. For escort duties, there is required a type of ship faster than any submarine at its surface speed. It must have good sea-keeping qualities, be highly manœuvrable, be well armed with guns and depth charges, and be fitted with all the various radio and sound devices known to science for detecting the presence and following the course of hostile submarines. These have been vastly improved since the last war.

When the submarines of a German "wolf pack" are notified of the approach of a convoy they run at full speed, on the surface, to get ahead of it, and then lie in wait to attack at a favorable time and place. Most attacks now take place at night. The day is spent in manœuvring for position. The usual procedure is for one or two submarines to attack on one side of the convoy; having fired their torpedoes, they do their best to get away, hoping to draw off the bulk of the escort in pursuit. The convoy is then attacked by all the remaining submarines. The advantages of the method are obvious. By day, the track of the torpedoes or at any rate the "impulse bubble" of escaping air from the torpedo tube may disclose the position of the submarine to a vigilant escort; at night, the submarines operate largely on the surface, can use their high speed to get away in the darkness, and can always submerge if too closely pressed. The answers are more aircraft, to prevent

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surface runs and scouting in the daytime and to provide more complete air observation, and more escorts to deal with attackers at night.

The tactics of the escort must be based on the careful group training of the escort as a whole, including the air component. The escorting surface ships must be numerous enough to permit a certain number to be left permanently with the convoy, while others are detached in pursuit of any enemy which may appear. One of our main troubles so far has been that we have not had enough escorts to give proper protection. As a result, convoys have been larger, and escort groups smaller, than in the last war.

When an attack is delivered, the ships told off by the escort commander for the purpose must immediately make it their job to locate each submarine and stay with it until it is destroyed or has definitely made its escape. At the least it must be driven below the surface and compelled to stay there. The devices now at the disposal of escort-ship commanders for locating and tracking submarines are usually adequate for this purpose, if the submarine can be located approximately well at the start. In case of "wolf-pack" attacks, several hunting ships may have to be detached, yet the convoy must not be left unprotected. This emphasizes the need for a numerous escort. The ideal situation is attained when every enemy submarine captain has learned by experience that to attack one of our convoys means beyond question that he must immediately submerge and prepare to dodge depth charges; also that he will not have a chance to surface again during the night, and that there will be hostile aircraft overhead when daylight comes. It is when this point is reached that the U-boat game begins to be no longer worth the candle. It is then that the rate of submarine losses begins to go up and of merchant ships down. It is then that the morale of the crews begins to crack, as it did in the German submarine service toward the end of the last war.

In addition, experience has shown the necessity for organizing special "killer groups," composed ideally of large destroyers with great radius of action, based at convenient points from which they can quickly reach all parts of the submarine-infested zone. As concentrations of enemy submarines are detected by our aircraft or surface patrols, or are made manifest by attacks in a given locality, a killer group proceeds to the indicated area, accompanied by long-range patrol planes, and systematically hunts down the "wolf pack."

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The arming of merchant vessels is not of great importance in the actual destruction of submarines, yet it is a useful part of an anti-submarine system. An armed ship can add a certain volume of gunfire to the efforts of the escort in case a submarine can be located on the surface; and the possession of a gun gives at least a fighting chance to a ship which becomes separated from her convoy or is proceeding without escort. The provision of anti-aircraft armament for merchant shipping is also of importance, especially in the case of ships operating on the Murmansk run, where long days are at hand again and where the ice will soon be creeping south to narrow the available channel.

The various measures outlined above must be coördinated and controlled according to a master plan. This plan must be devised by men with the technical experience to know what they are doing but with a sufficiently open mind toward new and even radical suggestions. Scope must be given to the full resources of American ingenuity; conservatism must stand aside.

All this can be achieved, in time. It will take time to turn out the escorts and the aircraft; it will take time to provide additional bases; [1] it will take time to train officers and crews; it will take time to develop our bombing of enemy bases and factories, our commando raids, our mining operations, our patrol of inshore waters; it will take time to work out new ideas and devices. All these things can be done. Indeed, they must be done if the war is to be won, if the enemy is to be defeated in his last hope of wearing us down. We have learned in the North African expedition, and otherwise, that when there is complete protection of the modern type, which means both in the air and on the surface of the sea, convoys can get through submarine infested zones with little or no loss. Our problem is to provide this full protection to every convoy at the same time that we keep up and intensify all the other phases of our anti-submarine effort.

We must be prepared for the most desperate and savage efforts on the part of the enemy. In the last war, the Germans never had more than 175 submarines at any given time, and the number in actual operation at sea rarely exceeded 50. This spring they will probably have in the neighborhood of 400, of which perhaps 125 or 150 can be operating at once; and these will have the advantage of operating from Atlantic bases. When the last war closed, the Allies possessed over 700 destroyers and literally

[1] If we could use the Azores, we could cover a vast area of sea now closed to our planes.

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thousands of patrol craft. Today we may doubt whether, in the Atlantic Ocean, the British and American Navies together have more than 250 destroyers, though the number of corvettes is possibly greater than this. Deliveries on our new escort craft program have been much delayed; they must be accelerated. Nor must we forget the danger that the enemy, in desperation, may cut loose all his remaining battleships and cruisers in a final attempt to smash our shipping.

The protection of our shipping is our first need, our first responsibility. It should have number one priority in all our efforts. It is good to know that special study is being given to all phases of the problems involved by a joint Anglo-American committee of experienced officers. It is greatly to be hoped that from this will evolve a joint anti-submarine command under a single capable head. But just as civilian pressure was needed to force the adoption of the convoy system in 1917, so now the pressure of an aroused and vigilant public opinion ought to be brought to bear on all concerned to speed up the production and perfection of anti-submarine weapons and measures. The crystallization of such a public opinion both here and in Great Britain is being retarded by what I believe is the unwise refusal of the authorities to permit the publication of tonnage figures of ships lost. The contention is that this would give useful information to the enemy. It is hard to see how this can be so, since the enemy knows what his submarines do with approximate accuracy; whereas the one sure means of bringing the anti-submarine program to an early state of high efficiency is to arouse the people and get them behind it.

The quicker the public realizes the seriousness of the submarine problem the quicker we shall solve it. The enemy's motto is, "While there's life there's hope." Our purpose must be to shorten both his hope and his life. Every day the war is prolonged is a day in which American men must die. The submarine can be beaten, just as it was beaten before. No *guerre de course* directed against merchant shipping has ever been decisively victorious, though it has often been attempted. The blitzkrieg has failed. Attrition must not be allowed to serve the enemy any better, nor as well.

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INDIA IN THE MODERN WORLD

A British View

By Lord Hailey

THOSE who have devoted themselves to studying the attitude of the American people towards the issues now generally described as "imperialism" and "colonialism" will agree on the difficulty of estimating the strength of the interest which they actually possess for the public at large. But no one could avoid the conclusion that in many quarters they do arouse a serious concern. This may at times find expression in an idealism which appears to overlook the realities of the situation, or in terms which suggest that prejudices born of a distant past are being unnecessarily revived. There are occasions when it may be proper to give to arguments so based the answer they invite and indeed deserve. But those are the dialectics of the market place. They do not touch the substance of the problem. That it arouses a genuine concern among many thinking people, who are neither unduly idealistic nor unreasonably prejudiced, is a matter which cannot be disregarded by those who seek a better understanding between the United States and Great Britain — for it is, of course, the British who fill for Americans the most significant rôle as an "imperialistic" people, and it is Britain which in their view occupies the most conspicuous position as a colonial power.

Though Britain may feel that it is not entirely reasonable that she should be singled out for this rôle, she would be illogical if she failed to appreciate the real cause for America's interest in the matter. The merits of "internationalism" have before now been an issue of purely domestic politics in America; they may become so again; and American party politics is a field from which the British are well advised to stand studiously aloof. But whatever may be the play of domestic forces which will in the end influence America's attitude on the issue of internationalism, there clearly exists today an almost universal feeling that world security can only be achieved in the future by some form of collective action among its more enlightened peoples. It is immaterial at this stage whether this is to be sought through an organization which will provide the force needed to curb aggression, or through mutual understandings as to the precautions to be taken against

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its recurrence. It is more important that many do not limit their view of security merely to the provision of measures against disorder. They feel that it is essential to attack the causes of insecurity — the internal tensions arising from disabilities and inequalities within the nations themselves, and the differences in national status which have subjected weaker peoples to the political control or economic pressure of stronger or better organized nations.

The ambition to readjust these conditions takes a range so wide that it may need to be corrected by a more realistic appreciation of the problems involved. But whatever the measure of success which it may be expected to achieve, collaboration will have to be sought first and foremost from Great Britain. It is the sense of the importance of the contribution which she can make that is the fundamental cause of such anxiety as may be felt about her outlook on world affairs. The people of America are more conservative in some of their own habits of thought than they perhaps appreciate. Because Britain still retains institutions which have a "feudalistic" form, she is assumed to be controlled by ruling classes which must inevitably have a predatory outlook not only in domestic but in foreign policy. Because she has large overseas dependencies, it is assumed that alike in the desire to maintain her control over them, and in the policy of their administration, she must be swayed mainly by her economic interest in them. If all this is true, then it may affect the quality of her collaboration in the more far-reaching measures by which world security is to be achieved. The case is sometimes put in terms which would seem to assume that America herself has always been in the highest degree coöperative in world affairs, and that her foreign policy has invariably been conducted on a plane of the highest moral rectitude. But the best thought in America does not take that attitude; its anxiety regarding the coöperation of Britain in postwar policy is genuine; and it is not too much to say that it would welcome anything which would dispel it.

It is unfortunate that the American public has been unable to see the realities of British life behind the historic forms which some of its political institutions still retain. So long, however, as there is a House of Lords the mass of the people in the United States will not easily be persuaded that British policy is not controlled by "ruling classes." Yet the substance of the anxiety about the outlook of Britain does not in fact lie in the impressions

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formed of her domestic policies. It is even doubtful whether her attitude towards weaker but independent peoples comes into the account. With the example of Egypt and China before them, Americans find it difficult to argue that in modern times British policy has failed to show due respect to the status of such peoples. True, the position of Hong Kong still presents a difficulty; but that is a point regarding which Britain has not yet declared her final policy. India and the colonies constitute the real stumbling block.

Of the two, the relations with the colonies now appear to count less in the argument. The claim once made for the "instant liberation" of all dependencies has given place to a recognition that this would in fact be injurious to many of them. It is now more usual to find the demand that they must be given a "graded political education" which will fit them for self-government. But it is added that this must be given under a form of trusteeship in which the trustees will be free from the temptation to prolong political control by the fact that they can draw any economic advantage from its retention. The doctrine of trusteeship has long been the accepted watchword of British colonial policy, and whatever the shortcomings in the manner in which it may have been implemented, there can be no doubt that it supplied a moral standard which has had great value in humanizing administrative policy. But in the British conception, trusteeship was mainly directed to the protection of the native from abuse or exploitation. It has today a different meaning for Americans. It suggests for them a stewardship, for the conduct of which the steward must hold himself accountable to some other tribunal than his own conscience or judgment.

Whether this is to be best secured by placing the colonies under some form of direct international administration, or subjecting the controlling Powers to outside supervision, or requiring from them an undertaking as to the policy they should follow in administration, is not a point on which there seems any general agreement in America. It is probable that the British would not be averse from accepting the principle of "accountability," in so far as it is represented by the institution of Regional Councils, which would by joint deliberation seek to coördinate economic and other policies, and would make periodical reviews of the political and social progress attained by each unit. But it may be said that one of the reasons why the colonies appear to attract less general in-

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terest than India lies in the difficulty of reducing to any simple issue the problems which they present.

There are in the world some 120 units under colonial governments. They present a great diversity of physical and social conditions. They are in the hands of at least nine controlling Powers, who have differing aims for their future and follow different systems of rule. Out of a total population of over 250 millions, Britain is responsible for only some 67 millions. The British have admittedly followed the principle of promoting self-government in their colonies, and some of the more advanced areas have made very considerable progress toward attaining it. But those who feel that the *tempo* of advance has not been sufficiently rapid have to recognize that the introduction of the institutions of self-government presents unusual difficulties in communities which may have no common ties, no political experience, and a social organization very different from that which has elsewhere supported the structure of democracy. That the British, like any other colonial Power, derive some economic advantages from the possession of their colonies is not open to question. But in their case the advantage derived must be seen in its true perspective. With the exception of a small military contribution by three of the colonies, they make no direct payments to the British Treasury. Only about 12 percent of Britain's overseas trade is with her colonies. For over fifty years her free trade system involved the maintenance of the Open Door in colonial trade, and the introduction of a system of preferences after the last war did not mean that she created an exclusive market for her own trade with them. Only 24½ percent of the total imports into the colonies comes from the United Kingdom. That her colonies present some advantages as a field for private investment is also obvious. But here again, the extent of the investment proves to be less than had been commonly believed. The amount of the "listed" investment is estimated at $1,044 million dollars, or only from 6 to 8 percent of the total overseas British investment before the present war. None of these considerations are decisive, but they suggest complexities which make the disposal of dependencies far from a simple issue.

India, on the other hand, seems to present a relatively simple problem. The British have, indeed, themselves gone far to simplify it for the American public. As Americans view the situation, Britain announced in March 1942 her intention to give India her independence, if she so desires it, after the war, subject to an

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agreement between her major political groups as to the form which her constitution is to assume. But the political groups are ranged in strongly antagonistic camps, and it may be foreseen that they will have great difficulty in reaching any decision as to the form which the constitution shall take. Many Americans are therefore inclined to ask whether the more straightforward course would not be for Britain to announce now that she will withdraw from India after the war, and leave the contesting groups to find their own solution of their problem. They are, it is said, unlikely to do so, so long as Britain remains and "keeps the ring." Or is it not the fact that she expects that the dissensions between the Indian political groups will enable her to maintain her political control for a prolonged if not an indefinite period? Is not her economic interest in India so considerable that she cannot contemplate withdrawing her control over the country?

These questions may appear to take an unduly simple form, yet they are not illogical. In approaching them, the British must face one initial difficulty. Most Americans have little knowledge of the background against which Britain carried out the administrative reorganization of India in the nineteenth century, or of the stage actually reached by the political achievements of the twentieth. The significance of the administrative record lies in the extent to which it has secured the financial and economic independence of India, and has given some conception of unity to her, as a necessary preliminary to the grant of political independence. Something needs to be said, therefore, on this point. Americans are not unaware of the history of the Mogul Empire, of its stately Court, its flourishing arts, and of the great monuments which record its past glories. But they do not know so well that when the East India Company began to extend its commercial activity in India the Mogul Empire was already in disruption. Its capital, Delhi, was sacked by Afghan invaders; large parts of lower India were devastated by marauding bands of Marathas; captains of fortune were carving out principalities for themselves; on all sides there was disorder, plunder and pillage. Macaulay hardly exaggerated when he said that the task of the British in the nineteenth century was the "reconstruction of a decomposed society which knew nothing of government but its exactions."

To bring order into this scene of chaos did not involve merely the preservation of peace. There existed few of those private or non-official agencies for organizing the social or economic life of

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the community which have been the chief instrument of progress in European countries. There was no agency other than the British administration for the provision of systems of education, of medical and agricultural services, for the extension of communications and of irrigation, or for relieving scarcity. Courts of justice had to be created, and adapted to the usages of personal law among a great variety of peoples. It fell to the administration to survey the innumerable cultivated holdings of India, to define the titles of the individual holders, and to assess the value of their outturn for the purpose of land revenue, the main basis of taxation. The work of the administration was therefore all-pervading; and the country became largely dependent on it for much of the advance made in the organization of its life.

But such success as it met with could only be attained by securing the coöperation of Indians themselves. The military force was never large; and since its main task was to deal with the warlike tribes across the northwest frontier, the rest of India saw little of it. The European official establishment was also inconsiderable, in view of the size of the country. The superior administrative service — the Indian Civil Service — numbered only about 1,300, and though the technical officers were more numerous, the scale was much the same. Obviously this system could not have worked had there not been a general acceptance of its benefits and an acquiescence in the authority of the government. As independent observers have agreed, this was largely the result of two features of the system, both of which were new to India. The introduction of the "rule of law" prescribed not only that a judiciary should be created which was fully independent of the executive, but that the executive itself should be in all its official actions amenable to the Courts of Justice. Further, the administrative services were recruited on a basis which secured not only their competence, but their freedom from corruption.

But it is more important to examine the results, as seen in the India of today, than to detail the process by which they were achieved. The most significant fact is the growth of the population. It is believed to have stood between 150 and 170 millions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but the first accurate figure is that of the census of 1872. The number was then 206 millions. It is today 388 millions. That India has been able to absorb so large an addition to its population is due partly to the increase of cultivation, and to the improved methods introduced

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by the department of agriculture, and partly to the extension of irrigation. Today she has the largest irrigation system in the world; her irrigated acreage is more than 22 times that under Federal projects in the United States and 10 times that of Egypt. India's outturn of wheat is about the same as that of Canada; she is the largest producer of cane sugar in the world; she ranks as one of the two largest producers of rice; and she is second only to the United States in the production of cotton.

Though some 85 percent of her population is still agricultural, she has also had of late years a notable expansion of industry. She now ranks among the eight leading industrial countries of the world. She produces over 90 percent of the cotton textiles and nearly all the steel consumed in the country, and the same is true of cement and a variety of other commodities. There are over 10,000 factories of all grades, over 80 percent of which must be owned and managed by Indians. It is even more important that this is due largely to the fact that she has since 1921 been empowered to introduce her own system of protective tariffs, and has used this power to foster the growth of her own industrial development. She has thus gained the substance of economic independence. This has been accompanied by an equal measure of financial independence. Like many other countries in similar conditions, she depended at the outset on external capital for the public works constructed by the state, and on European enterprise for the introduction of some of her major industries. The public loans raised by the government have been expended mainly on providing her 41,000 miles of railway and her irrigation systems. These are not only self-supporting but return a profit to the state, with the result that India is now in the unusual and enviable position of having practically no "unproductive" debt. As her own internal finances improved, the sterling loans raised in Britain were supplemented by rupee loans raised in India, and of late years there has been a gradual repatriation of the sterling portion of the debt by transfer to Indian investors. Today the external debt has been so far reduced that it carries an interest of only 8 million dollars, and a further reduction is in sight. British investors will no longer have any lien on the profitable assets constructed by the aid of the public loans, and India has become a creditor instead of a debtor country.

There has been a similar development in regard to investment in private enterprise. It has been recently stated that the total

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British private investments, both industrial and commercial, now amount only to about 1,000 million dollars, as against a total foreign investment of 12,960 million dollars before the war. In that case, the investment in India is no more than the total British investment in Argentine rails alone. Some "unlisted" investments by private firms may not find a place in this estimate, but their amount is known to have been greatly reduced by sale of shares to Indian investors. India is reaching her financial maturity far more rapidly than many independent countries.

It would not be proper to close the story here, for it has some other features which are less favorable. Though India has 18 universities and 14 million scholars in her schools, the proportion of literacy is still below 10 percent of the population. Considerable sections of the people are living on the margin of subsistence, and in times of scarcity below it. The expansion of the medical services has done much to curb epidemic disease, but the general standards of health are low. Housing conditions are bad and insanitary in many urban areas. If the upper and middle classes have standards of life which are increasingly comparable with those of some European countries, there are large masses of the population whose conditions fall very far below them.

But not all these things can be laid to the charge of the administration. Its activity has been limited by its resources. In spite of the increases made during the present war, the per capita central taxation is only $1.20; the sums available to provincial administrations for meeting expenditures of all kinds are on an average less than one dollar per head of the population. Agriculture is subjected to the caprices of the monsoon rainfall. The rapid growth of the population has brought its own problems. There is in some parts a congestion of rural population which is only comparable with that of China; and Indian custom has, moreover, led to an almost fantastic fragmentation into scattered holdings of even the smallest properties. The use of credit for the purpose of meeting extravagant expenditure on religious and social ceremonies has placed large numbers of cultivators in economic serfdom to money lenders. There is again much in Indian social habit which is an obstacle to progress. It is difficult to estimate the economic loss caused by the seclusion of women, or the physical results of the practice of infant marriage. The caste system has been as prejudicial to enterprise as it has to the attainment of social equality. No legislation can deal with the

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unhygienic practices based on custom, or observances which prevent a large part of the people from making use of foodstuffs available for a more balanced diet. These are matters in which reform must come from within Indian society itself.

Much that has been claimed for the administrative record of Britain in India may be admitted; but America is now interested mainly in the question of political status. It is therefore worthwhile to note how far India has already advanced toward self-government, as the result of the series of constitutional reforms which began in 1909. In the central executive, the Governor General's Council, 11 of the 14 members are Indians. The legislative assembly consists of 141 members, of whom 102 are elected by Indians. Its authority extends over all subjects which would elsewhere be described as "federal," except defense and foreign affairs. It has not final responsibility, since it is subject to the veto, but by a well-established convention the veto does not extend to legislation on tariffs or taxation. It is this convention which has enabled India to introduce the system of protective tariffs already referred to.

The 11 provinces into which British India is divided are autonomous in their own internal affairs. They have legislatures based on a franchise of about 30 million Indian voters, including women. Indian Ministers, responsible to the majority parties in the legislatures, control the executive departments of government, including those in which European officers may still be employed. The official services have now been largely Indianized. In the Indian Civil Service there are 632 Indians to 575 British. In the general administrative service the proportion is 8 Indians to one British; in the "qualified" ranks in civil medical departments, 13 Indians to one British, and in the higher grades of engineering departments, 14 to one; and in the higher judiciary the proportion is 10 Indians to one British.

Here there is a near approach to self-government, though it is admittedly not complete. The veto remains, and the Governor General and Governors have certain "reserved" powers for the protection of minorities, the final preservation of order and the like. Nor does this system apply to the whole of India. The Indian States, comprising some 23 percent of the population of India, have control in their own territories. They are in treaty relations with the Crown, and in their internal affairs are not subject to Indian legislation.

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It is doubtless to the continuation of this political system, or to a logical projection of it, that the British would look in the event of a failure by the Indian political groups to arrive at the agreement envisaged by the declaration of March 1942. How far is it possible that economic considerations will lead Britain to desire to retain the measure of political control which this system gives her? India makes no payment to the British Treasury. The sterling debt contracted by her has practically been liquidated; the private investments of the British in India now make but a small part of their total overseas investment. The convention which allows India to fix tariffs for the protection of her own industries has already borne heavily on the British manufacturer, and in particular on the textile industry, once the mainstay of Lancashire. In the years 1909–14, some 63 percent of Indian imports came from Britain; they stood at only 30 percent in 1938. In the same year the British trade with the Union of South Africa exceeded that with India by 12 million dollars and that with Australia by 8 million. Clearly the economic stake of Britain in India is less than has been supposed, and the retention of political control would do little to improve the position.

The connection with India has undoubtedly been profitable to Britain in the past. It is still of value today, though not of that dominant value which has been supposed. But the British can claim on their part to have given to India an ordered administration, a sense of national consciousness, the substance of economic and financial maturity. They have brought her within a measurable distance of full self-government. They may now legitimately ask whether it is not to the advantage of India that they should give the political groups an opportunity to combine in some form of constitution which promises a stable government, rather than that they should leave India in the state of dissension and instability, and probably of armed conflict, which would follow their immediate withdrawal.

The gulf between the contesting groups is now admittedly far more pronounced than in the past. There always has been a latent antagonism between the great religious communities, and in the past this at times took the form of violent disturbances. These, however, were local and sporadic. That the communities are now openly ranged in opposing camps is largely due to the substitution of a political for an administrative régime, in which the British held the dominant part and kept the peace. The introduc-

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tion of democratic institutions, which place a minority under the legislative and administrative control of a majority, has found India still preoccupied by sectarian divisions which are an obstacle to the working of democracy. Yet the position is not necessarily intractable. The educated men of this generation are showing themselves far more interested in the amelioration of social conditions than in making politics the battlefield of sectarian issues. Industrial labor is organizing itself on lines which do not acknowledge religious divisions. India, no less than China, has proved to be capable of rapid change, and the adjustment of the communal differences which now stand in the way of her attainment of political independence may be nearer than many are inclined to believe.

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ITALY AFTER MUSSOLINI

By Luigi Sturzo

NOW that the armies of the United Nations are distributed along the southern shore of the Mediterranean it does not seem farfetched to assume that sooner or later Sicily will come within the scope of their operations. Some of the programs of action which one hears discussed might postpone the day; but in view of Sicily's dominating position in the center of the Mediterranean, I hardly think it will be excluded permanently and entirely from the reckoning of American and British military leaders.

In Sicily there is not a village, whether it be lost among the mountains of the interior or sprawled along the slopes of Etna, which has not sent whole families to work and live in the United States. Up to the outbreak of war, a steady correspondence was always maintained between those at home and their American relatives. There also were many "Americans" (as they are called in Sicily) who went back to the old country and bought houses and farms with their dollars. Often the street where they settled or built is called "the street of the Americans." All through the island, then, the starred flag of the United States is known and loved as a friendly flag.

This seems to me an important psychological consideration, and when the time comes for the occupation of Sicily I think it should lead to the use of American troops for the purpose in preference to any others. The Sicilian people would understand that they were not coming to Sicily to conquer her, to keep her in pawn, to develop permanent naval bases there (as has sometimes been alleged), but instead to bring about the liberation of Sicily, as of the whole of Italy, from both Nazi and Fascist domination.[1]

Many Italians are fighting the present war reluctantly and only because they cannot do otherwise. They are deeply worried over their national future. They ask themselves anxiously whether the United Nations will respect the territorial integrity of the country after victory. In this connection, some of the sug-

[1] Sicily, though *regionalist*, is not at all *separatist*, as is sometimes thought. After 1860, Sicily accepted reorganization under Piedmontese influence rather unwillingly, but 83 years of national unity have confirmed its necessity. Fascism has not changed the Italian national feelings of the Sicilians. Sicilian "autonomists" are such only within the national framework.

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gestions of British publicists like Wickham Steed and Stephen King-Hall are not reassuring. For example, King-Hall suggests [2] that the United Nations should guarantee to Italy, upon her withdrawal from the Axis, the boundaries of 1914. This would mean the loss of the Trentino, the Alto Adige and Istria. When with these one considers the Jugoslav claim to Trieste and Istria, and the propaganda carried on in the United States on behalf of Otto of Habsburg, which includes a demand for the return of the Trentino to Austria, the worry which I have mentioned is seen not to spring solely from Nazi propaganda.[3]

Under such circumstances, it seems necessary that some clarification of the political aims of the United Nations precede the arrival of armies of occupation — that is, if the United Nations want to win the friendship and have the coöperation of that part of the Italian population which hates Fascism and would welcome intervention as a decisive step toward freedom. If no attempt is made to silence the rumors that Italy will suffer territorial mutilation, will lose her old colonies, and will be forever disarmed and subjected to a foreign process of "reëducation," then fear of the unknown future will paralyze Italians of good will.

The mutilation of Italian territory would also have moral and political effects long after the war was over. It would prove very difficult for Italy to dispel the Fascist ideology if the postwar government had been compelled, as the Weimar democracy was in Germany, to shoulder the blame for a national humiliation at the hands of the United Nations. The Fascists and Fascist sympathizers will in any case disappear underground during the period of the armistice. But they would then emerge later to accuse their opponents of having weakened national unity and caused everlasting injury to the country. And since the people — any people — is influenced more by sentiment than by complicated logic, it would develop feelings of hatred and revenge which would offer a good basis for an early rebirth of Fascism.

[2] *Picture Post*, November 21, 1942.

[3] In contrast to the above statements was the speech made in New York on November 14, 1942, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. He applied the Atlantic Charter to Italy and declared that "no American seeks to destroy or impair the nationhood of Italy." The Atlantic Charter, signed by 30 states, disclaims any aim of territorial aggrandizement. Certain serious doubts nevertheless persist with regard to the position, for instance, of Poland, the Baltic States and Italy herself. One difficulty with an attempt to give juridical value to the Atlantic Charter is that neither the House of Commons nor Congress have expressed themselves on it. Senator Guy M. Gillette's recent proposal that the basic principles of the Charter be embodied in treaties is, however, a hopeful move.

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One of the catchwords of Fascism in 1919 was that Italy had "won the war but lost the peace," referring thereby to the series of rebuffs which the Italian representatives met with at the Paris Conference. The psychological reaction of the German people to the contrast between the promises of Wilson's Fourteen Points and the reality of Versailles contributed to the rise of Nazism in Germany. In the same way, if Italy were mutilated after this war, the Italians would recall the Atlantic Charter as an unfulfilled promise, and they would fix the responsibility upon the anti-Fascists and the democrats.

II

In order to indicate clearly the various territorial issues which will arise in connection with Italy after the war I shall review them briefly, one by one.

Trento and *Trieste*. These two cities and the provinces of which they are the centers were objects of Italian aspirations from the days of the Risorgimento. The war of 1848–1849 against Austria was fought for the independence of Lombardy and of all the Venetian provinces subject to the foreigner. Even during the life of the Triple Alliance there was persistent agitation for the return of the *terre irredente*, as Trento and Trieste were called, and in 1915 when Italy went into the World War she did so in order to achieve that aim. The Treaty of London was written with that specific aim in view. To take away Trento and Trieste after the present war would produce a new surge of irredentism in Italy; they are to Italy what Alsace and Lorraine are to France.

Italy has been accused of maltreating her Slovene and German minorities. The accusation is well founded. Many abuses have been committed, and the recent war atrocities about which the bishops of Istria have protested to the Vatican are particularly repulsive. They are to be attributed to the mentality and methods of Fascism. It is true that some of the Italian misdeeds occurred in the period preceding Fascism, during the administrations of Giolitti, Bonomi and Facta. But they can still be attributed to the Fascist mentality, which at that time was already strong in northern and central Italy. The problem of European minorities cannot be solved by shifting territories back and forth or — a worse method still — by uprooting populations and deporting them from one region to another as though they were cattle. There are too many racial mixtures in Europe to make such a

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drastic course practicable. We must learn to live together and to afford small national groups better juridical protection than was provided, for instance, in the minorities treaties after the last war.

Fiume. The status of Fiume and the position of the Italo-Jugoslav boundary were fixed in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920. After the advent of Fascism, Fiume was annexed by Italy. If the status quo of 1922 be taken as a starting point, Fiume should be considered an autonomous city. If a new arrangement is deemed opportune, the interested parties should try to devise one on a friendly basis.

Dodecanese. At the termination of the Libyan War, Italy retained the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea as a provisional guarantee; then Turkey lost them definitely in the World War. Italy first agreed that they should go to Greece; but the Fascist Government denounced the agreement and proclaimed the annexation of the islands to Italy. Going back again to the 1922 status quo, I would say that friendly negotiations should be reopened with Greece, whose moral right to the islands cannot be denied.

Albania. In a memorandum at Paris on December 9, 1919, Messrs. Clemenceau, Polk and Crowe, in the name of France, the United States and England respectively, offered Italy a mandate over Albania. In June 1920 Premier Giolitti declared that Italy was giving up the mandate and withdrawing her troops from Albania. In reality, Albania remained under Italian influence. These events are mentioned here with two purposes in mind. First, I wish to disprove any claim deriving from the Fascist occupation which might endanger the independence of Albania. Second, I would like to stress the importance of the problem of the Adriatic; it cannot be solved by turning it over to conflicting local interests, but only by considering it within the framework of a general European settlement.

Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland. These colonies were not acquired in the Fascist cycle but in the period of the formation of the French and British African empires. It is strange to read in the American press that the loss of Tripoli marks the fall of "the Mussolini empire." Libya was conquered long before Mussolini came to power; as a matter of fact, Mussolini first displayed his demagogic abilities in 1911 by inciting mobs to interfere with the movement of troops leaving for Africa. By Fascist legislation, Libya became part of the metropolitan territory of Italy, just as

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Algeria is part of France. The Fascist "empire" consisted only of Ethiopia, which has already recovered her independence and has become the thirtieth signatory of the Washington Declaration. Thus Ethiopia has emerged not only from the Fascist interlude, but also from the arrangement set up by Britain, France and Italy in the Tripartite Agreement of 1925. Sir Austen Chamberlain promoted that arrangement, let us remember, at a time when Ethiopia had already been accepted as a member of the League of Nations.

The African problem will have to be dealt with sooner or later and the solution of it will have to be reached on a basis common to all the European colonial Powers. The writer agrees fully with the declaration made on January 17, 1943, by Herbert Morrison, a member of the British War Cabinet, looking to a colonial policy which "can combine progressive policies of education with opportunities for native peoples to take an increasing part in the forms of self-government."[4]

This short review of territorial questions in which Italy is concerned was necessary to establish what the rights of Italy are under the Atlantic Charter and to indicate the general opinion of Italians who are not blinded by Fascist propaganda.

III

We come now to the problem of how to liberate Italy politically from Fascism.

The Atlantic Charter speaks only of *Nazi tyranny*, but subsequent interpretations lead to the belief that *Fascist tyranny* is also implied. Mr. Churchill's assertion that one man, and one man only, Mussolini, should be held responsible for the Italian tragedy, is, however, clearly incorrect. This is shown by the fact that the Fascist Government is still strongly organized, that the Gestapo is active in Italy by permission of that government, that German generals have been granted some authority over the Italian army, and that even today new pacts, such as the economic agreement of January 1943, are signed by Italy and her partner. Many other individuals besides Mussolini have been led by greed or weakness — and some by sentiment and conviction — into a position where they must share their leader's re-

[4] It may be recalled here that early in 1922 the late Signor Amendola, Minister for Colonies in the Facta Cabinet, and his Undersecretary, Signor Pecoraro, were working out just such policies for Libya.

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sponsibility. In his address of February 11, Mr. Churchill made his position clearer when he said: "No vestige of Nazi or Fascist power or of the Japanese war-plotting machine will be left by us when the work is done, as done it certainly will be."

To free Italy from the Fascist Government, the Fascist Party and Fascist ideology is precisely one of the chief war aims and aspirations of a majority of the Italian people. To say this is not to say that they can be asked now to revolt. That would be premature and useless. Further, to think that the Italian people can be led to revolt out of fear of Allied bombings, however "scientific" they may be, is to show a lack of both psychological insight and realistic understanding. They cannot revolt against the united might of the Nazi and Fascist armies and police forces; any attempt to do so would be suppressed bloodily and quickly, as recent events in Marseilles show. Not Allied bombings, but the appearance of United Nations armies in Italy, and Italian popular confidence in the purposes of those armies, are the conditions precedent to revolt. We return, then, to the fundamental political problem raised by the possibility of a military occupation by the United Nations: Will such confidence exist? There would seem to be a need for clear and unequivocal statements by the leaders of the United Nations and for straight directives to all those who communicate over the radio or through other means with the Italian people.

To sum up, the Italian people must feel certain that after the Allied occupation is over they will not have to face some new variety or modification of Fascism which will continue to tyrannize over them. And they must be told, and believe, that in an earlier stage they will have an opportunity to decide freely, as the third point of the Atlantic Charter provides, what form of government they wish to organize.

Will the future Italy be monarchical or republican? This question was not created by the present war. The issue appeared to be settled during the Risorgimento, when Cavour and luck led the House of Savoy through the wars of liberation and unity. It was raised again, however, soon after the advent of Fascism. Between 1860 and 1922 the republican tradition was kept alive mainly by Mazzinian idealists, a few radicals, the pioneers of Socialism (who gradually, however, put their emphasis more on social than on political questions) and a group of Christian democrats. Yet the feeling was fairly widespread even among members of other par-

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ties that Italy would never know true democracy under the monarchy, given the coalition formed around the throne by powerful forces representing the upper bourgeoisie, the old aristocracy, the army and the bureaucracy.

The social question rapidly was identified with the political question; the basis of suffrage was broadened, but not sufficiently to inject popular forces into the stream of democratic legality. The Sicilian uprisings of 1893, and the risings of 1898 which spread from Milan to the whole of Italy, marked the experimental stage of the political activity of popular forces. To deal with them, the Government had recourse to a state of siege and other exceptional laws. After the assassination of King Humbert and the advent of the present king, Victor Emmanuel III, the new forces finally entered into the constitutional life of the country. The new King's background gave many persons fresh confidence in the monarchy, and even the Socialists did not insist upon their usual formal objection to the monarchical régime. But just as under Humbert the monarchy had become a debatable issue because of its recourse to martial law, so under Humbert's son it again became an issue. This time the reason was much stronger — Victor Emmanuel's acquiescence in the March on Rome.

It is difficult to guess how many people in Italy today would stand by the monarchy as an institution, even though they did not condone the guilt of the present sovereign, and how many would favor a republic. We may surmise, however, that a good many would incline toward the abdication of Victor Emmanuel in favor of the Crown Prince in order to eliminate irritating discussion and dissension over the King's past rôle from the postwar political atmosphere. Indeed, the abdication might have taken place some time ago if Mussolini had not given the Fascist Grand Council the right to pass on all questions bearing upon the succession to the throne. Did he conceive of this provision as a kind of veto power to be exercised against any possible anti-Fascist successor to Victor Emmanuel? Or did he merely wish to hold a threat over the heads of the present King and Crown Prince, so as to force them to remain in step with Fascism? Probably both. Victor Emmanuel gave his approval to the Grand Council legislation, just as he has to every other Fascist law, including the declarations of war. Perhaps it was his secret belief that Fascism is a passing phenomenon but that the monarchy will endure.

Before the war, upholders of the monarchy were wont to say

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that the Prince of Piedmont was not a Fascist, even though sometimes he wore the Black Shirt. During the course of the war the Prince has been promoted, on the recommendation of Mussolini as Head of the Government, to the rank of Marshal. The Fascist radio has recently applied to him the unprecedented title of "hereditary prince." Under a totalitarian régime, changes in the prestige and power of individuals can be noted only by portents.

In the United States the possibility of a regency has sometimes been advanced as a solution which would eliminate both Victor Emmanuel and the Crown Prince in favor of the Crown Prince's young son, born in 1937. Rumors have been reaching the United States that in Italy there is some backing for Maria José, the Crown Princess, as a Queen Regent. Fascist-minded members of the capitalistic bourgeoisie might favor this solution, as promising to aid their attempt to retain or regain the upper hand. So might the Communists, in the knowledge that a period of transition and equivocal power always favors revolutionary movements.

In any case, the question of the monarchy is not urgent. Let us, then, leave monarchists and republicans to prepare for the inevitable test of strength between them after the war. Any sort of accurate forecast as to the outcome is impossible. We not only lack certain elements of judgment but we also are dealing with those imponderables which play such a great part in history. Between 1871 and 1875, for example, France just happened to become a republic. Luckily the question is not one to be solved by the chiefs of the Allied troops of occupation or by their governments. That will have to be done by the Italian people.

Various hypotheses upon the course of the war are possible. It is idle to hope that Italy will be knocked out so long as Hitler determines to offer resistance upon Italian soil. As the armies of the United Nations move forward in the occupation of Italy, and indeed until they reach Rome, the first task of their generals will be to facilitate the setting up of civilian administrations in the occupied cities and provinces, making use for that purpose of the best local elements and avoiding as far as possible any former Quislings or Lavals.

The local governments set up in this way in the occupied zones will not be able to assert that they derive their powers from the King, for he will still be on the other side. Instead, they will derive their provisional powers from the people. The precedent of a Darlan who recognized Pétain's authority at the same time that

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Pétain was depriving him of his citizenship as a traitor cannot be repeated in Italy. As long as Victor Emmanuel remains with the Axis, he will be in Allied eyes the chief representative of an enemy power. The people that are being liberated will have a historical connection with him, but not a juridical or political one.

When the Allies reach Rome (this is not a military plan but a political hypothesis), one of three things will happen: either the King will abandon the capital, to continue the war together with his Government and his German ally; or he will give himself up, while his armies continue the struggle alongside the Germans; or he will give himself up, order the cessation of hostilities and ask for an armistice. In the first case we shall have still further confirmation of the fact that we are dealing with an unyielding enemy. In the second case, the King will become an illustrious prisoner, without authority over either his armies or the people of the occupied territory. In the third case, Hitler will supplant him in the provinces still under German control until he himself is expelled or withdraws.

These various hypotheses help to demonstrate the proposition that the problem of the monarchy was not created by the anti-Fascist Italians living abroad but was inevitably posed on the day the King signed the declaration of war and thereby assumed responsibility for what was to happen as a result of that act. When an armistice is signed, Mussolini and the Fascist leaders will be fugitives or prisoners; perhaps Victor Emmanuel will have abdicated. The generals and the admirals will be there to sign the capitulation, and after them a provisional government will become heir to all the burdens of the past. It is necessary, however, that such a government be free of any responsibility for that past.

IV

Many Americans believe that the Vatican favors the Italian monarchy, and indeed not much imagination is required to arrive at that conclusion. In the Lateran Treaty of 1929 the Papacy gave up all its temporal rights in Rome and in the former territories of the Papal States. In the eyes of the Vatican, the House of Savoy is not any longer the usurper of the Pope's rights nor are the kings which it furnishes to Italy any longer subject to excommunication. An anti-monarchical attitude on the part of the Vatican would therefore not only be out of place, it would represent a violation of the spirit of the 1929 treaty.

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This does not mean, on the other hand, that the Vatican would take up the defense of the monarchy if the Italian people decided in favor of a republic. For if we may presume that the conservative leanings of the Italian hierarchy incline them toward the monarchy, we also know that there is a diversity of political opinions within the ranks of the clergy. This is a matter which lies outside the borders both of religious discipline and of faith.[5] But if the monarchical question should come to be linked somehow to the question of the Concordat between the Church and the State, or if the republicans should be designated as anti-clericals, then the situation would be more complicated and might become dangerous.

Anti-Fascists abroad have made several pronouncements with regard to the relationships between Church and State. Thus a report prepared for the Mazzini Society says: "The democratic Italian republic will have to respect faithfully the freedom of the Pope as the head of the international Catholic Church and will therefore have to refrain from any intervention whatsoever in the activities of the Holy See, or from hindering the relations between the Holy See and the Catholics in Italy or outside Italy. The rights of Vatican City shall also be confirmed. But the members of the Mazzini Society affirm that all the privileges of a civil or political order conceded by the Concordat of the Lateran must be abolished without exception; that a régime of separation of Church and State must be adopted in Italy; and that all religious beliefs must have equal rights and equal duties under the protection of a common law."[6]

Generally speaking, anti-Fascist Italians exclude any idea of religious persecution and do not envisage any infringement of the position of the Pope as head of the Catholic Church. On the other hand, they often suggest the abolition of the Concordat. This would create a gap which would have to be filled by unilateral action, as the Liberals filled the gap which existed in Italian life between 1870 and 1922. It will be remembered that after protracted struggles a *de facto* condition of toleration was established, and eventually there grew up rather friendly unofficial ties between Church and State. The abolition of the Concordat now

[5] The Italian clergy is probably persuaded that if Mussolini had decided to inaugurate a movement of open religious persecution (and a beginning was actually made in the spring of 1931), the King would have signed the necessary decrees without objection, in accordance with his unvarying rule.

[6] *Nazioni Unite*, December 10, 1942.

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would destroy the major part of the traditional economic and juridical structure of the local churches, which dates back to the time before the Risorgimento and which has been gradually modified by successive laws. For example, the contributions for the support of the parish priests which are today a charge on the state budget would cease.

This is not the place to discuss these questions in detail, but their political significance must nevertheless be underlined. A concordat is a contract between two parties. If one of the parties feels itself injured, it should, according to juridical principles as well as in its own political interest, apply for a revision. This should be negotiated between the two parties. If this type of contract is no longer acceptable to public opinion — which in the present case remains to be proved — and if it seems desirable either to find a *modus vivendi* on special matters, such as was arranged in Czechoslovakia, or to make a friendly separation, liquidating the past and providing for a transitional period, then the preferable course is a diplomatic negotiation rather than a unilateral denunciation. Unilateral denunciation of a concordat is always a hostile act. The Holy See could of course suffer such an offense and face its consequences, as Pius X did in the case of France; but no one can foresee what would be the reactions either of Italian Catholics, who are not a negligible political factor, or of Catholics in the various United Nations.

Certainly such a struggle would not be conducive to the pacification of Italy, which in any case will be weakened and crippled by defeat and by twenty years of Fascist dictatorship. Nor does it seem called for on any grounds. The religious problem in Italy is not complicated today as it was during the Risorgimento either by the question of the ecclesiastical mortmain or by that of the temporal power of the Popes, two issues which then seemed hard to solve by processes of negotiation.

Some anti-Fascists, even though they are not on the whole anti-religious, nevertheless suspect the "political" action of the Papacy; they may be termed "Ghibellines." They fight the Concordat in the name of the separation of Church and State, and quote the example of the United States to show how well that system operates. But the United States never had a concordat; its government did not have to assume any ecclesiastical financial burden as a result of the expropriation of church property; and it never was called upon to abolish religious orders. On the contrary,

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the United States moved from several different colonial régimes, based in some cases on civil and political discrimination against Catholicism, to a system based on religious freedom. Past history conditions the present and marks the ways of the future. The interest of all Italians, including the "Ghibellines," is to avoid complicating the political problem by adding a religious one; to prevent a religious division among the people on the institutional issue; and to refrain from forcing the Vatican to assume, in order to defend its rights, a position on the conflicting issues of the postwar period.

V

Second only to their desire to be free from German and Fascist tyranny is the Italian people's desire to see some sort of normal life restored as quickly and fully as possible, with the possibility of attaining eventually the means of economic welfare. Socially speaking, Italy is a sick body which will recover only if it receives prompt care. I think it especially needs psychological and economic care.

In the psychological field, a way must be found to eliminate the fear of the people of Italy that they will again fall into Fascist or crypto-Fascist hands. Similarly, local vengeance against a thousand petty tyrants will have to be avoided. We must show no weakness toward those who are really responsible for the crimes of the past and the present, but we should stop short of hunting down average Fascists, some of whom joined the movement not out of any evil inclination but because they lacked strong convictions or simply because they wanted to survive. The heroes of the prisons, of the concentration camps and of the long, sad period of exile cannot set up any puritanical standards of anti-Fascism. A good deal will have to be understood and forgiven.

The points which will have to be firmly established, once and for all, are these: (1) No head of a Fascist organization must be allowed in future to fill a responsible post of any sort. (2) Common crimes committed under political pretexts will be punished according to law. (3) All the real Fascist leaders will have to stand with the Nazi leaders before the bar of international justice.

Pope Pius XII expressed the essence of the social aspirations of the Italian people in his 1942 Christmas address, when he said that we must look toward "a social order which will make possible an assured, even if modest, private property for all classes of so-

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ciety," and that we must work for the day when workers will be freed from their modern slavery, "whether this slavery arises from the exploitation of private capital or from the power of the state."

Immediate, large-scale and profitable industrial development is less likely in Italy than in any other country, because of the lack of natural resources. The nation's economic life will continue to be based chiefly on agriculture and its related industries — fishing, shipping and handicrafts. Private property is basic to such an economic system, coöperative property is complementary, while socialized property is exceptional. When Premier Salandra coined the slogan, "The land to the peasants!", during the First World War, he was not indulging in a vague demagogic appeal but rather was expressing the common aspiration of the Italian peasantry and rural artisans and at the same time a need of the Italian economy. Now to give the land to the peasants does not mean to impoverish one class in order to enrich another, or to break up the large estates (where they still exist), as was done in the past, without regard to the elementary needs of an agrarian economy. The process is a complex one, involving a real attempt at internal colonization with all necessary reclamation work. This was undertaken in the province of Ferrara before Fascism and was outlined in the agrarian program of the Christian Democratic Popular Party, approved by the Chamber of Deputies in July 1922 but later suppressed by the Fascist Government.[7]

Let it be recalled that the advent of Fascism in Italy was closely linked to the struggle of the big landowners against the reform measures which were demanded by the peasant masses and which were upheld, for different political and economic reasons, by both the Popular and Socialist Parties. That explains in part the strong appeal which plans for agrarian reform make to the popular imagination. European revolutions are nearly always linked to the agrarian problem; in it, for example, the Spanish Civil War originated. Every effort must therefore be made to appeal to the sense of responsibility of the future leaders of Italy, so that they may not divide on the agrarian problem and make a party issue of it. They must agree on a short-run practical plan which will not disturb normal production in a period of extreme

[7] The reclamation work of the Pontine marshes was started before Fascism, but by a private group. The Fascist Government took it up and made it one of its chief subjects of propaganda.

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crisis, and they must agree on a long-range program of gradual but well-defined steps toward a general solution.

At the same time it will be necessary to foster measures which will provide other forms of work, to regulate demobilization and to maintain the highest possible level of employment. In this connection, we shall do well to recall what happened in 1919 and 1920, when the middle-class unemployed swelled the ranks of Fascism and nationalism while the jobless workers streamed into the Socialist and Communist Parties. The Beveridge Plan, which aims to meet the most urgent needs of all classes, can be a useful guide.

Some fear that Italy's economic structure will collapse under the terrific burden of public and private debts, especially since the banking system has been so much weakened by Fascist interference. My own belief is that Italy is still strong enough to weather the political and economic crisis which will follow the war, that is, unless the collapse is deliberately fostered by concealed interests, as happened when the mark was devalued in Germany in 1920 and 1921. Quick and sufficient help from the United Nations and rigorous internal discipline enforced by capable and trustworthy leaders will be necessary.

Who will these leaders be, once all the Fascists, big and small alike, have been swept away? My answer cannot be precise but it is full of faith. Let us not toy with the idea that generals can be useful for civilian government: Italians of my generation recall the government of General Pelloux and the governorship of General Bava-Beccaris as calamities. As for the expert civil servants, they can be useful if they are carefully controlled and excluded from any exercise of political responsibility.

The men who were thirty or forty years old at the time of the March on Rome are now fifty or sixty years old. This is a ripe age, well suited to assuming the responsibilities of public service. The men who were youths when Fascism seized power, and who have grown up under it, began to realize long ago, in spite of their false education, that Italy had been betrayed. Their spiritual crisis — and this is especially true of university students and other intellectual groups — has now reached its peak. The tragedy is that their lack of comprehension of the world outside of Fascism and their ignorance of the true history of Italy have quite unfitted them to face the problems of the postwar period. However, the average Italian is not only intelligent and intui-

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tive, but has an unusual ability to reorient himself rapidly. There will be many persons available, then, who although they are not educated will be capable of rapid self-education.

Chief reliance will have to be put on the middle class. Even though it is not so strong in Italy as it should be in a modern country of 45 million people, and even though a part of it (though not the major part) has formed the backbone of Fascism, it still constitutes a sound and vital nucleus. The middle class in Italy contains many groups of intelligent, cultured, hard-working, enterprising people, who, in a free régime, will be able to mediate between the extremes of right and left and neutralize mass excesses. The industrial workers, the city artisans, the *métayers* of central and southern Italy, who constitute the real core of the Italian economy, will all lend strength and measure to the future Italian democracy. I think one need have no fear of the soundness of the industrial and agricultural working masses of Italy, even after their experience with Fascism and all their sufferings and disillusionments past and present.

Those who for twenty years have fought Fascism, either openly, risking imprisonment and the concentration camp, or secretly and indirectly, will be in a position to make a fresh start and to put their administrative and political capabilities to work again. The same will be true of the political exiles. If they are not too rash or too proud — and very many are not — they will be able to join forces with their brothers at home.

The names of the leaders in all these various groups and strata? Nobody knows them. They will be revealed only when the flag of freedom is unfurled on Italian soil.

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FUTURE CONTROLS OVER GERMAN AVIATION

By Edward Warner

THE United Nations will have to determine before long what controls are to be imposed upon German aeronautical activities under the terms of peace. The problems involved will not be wholly unfamiliar. The twenty years between the two world wars brought us a great deal of experience about how to handle such problems, and how not to. The record of the past must be applied to the future with some reservations, however, in view of the enormous changes in aeronautical science and in the art of aircraft operation which have taken place since 1918.

There are two groups for whom the determination of the future status of German aeronautics will present no difficulty. They are the extremists who favor all-out repressive action and the extremists who favor no action at all.

For those who would treat defeated Germany as Carthage was finally treated, or who foresee the enforced destruction of German industry and the reversion of Germany to an agricultural society, it must be axiomatic that no aircraft shall be built, acquired, controlled or flown by a German.

Almost equally free from doubt should be the opposite sort of extremists, those who look forward to a postwar world in which political and economic relations remain virtually unchanged but in which the United States, and perhaps other United Nations as well, maintain a permanent and overwhelming military establishment. They would maintain peace by keeping in the hands of one or more of the victorious nations such preponderant strength that not even the most tremendous efforts of a prospective aggressor could hope to match it, rather than by imposing upon potential aggressors such restrictions and controls that a comparatively modest policing force will suffice to maintain order. They assume that a German aeronautical industry will exist, even though a German military air force is temporarily excluded. They look to a renewed struggle between the aircraft manufacturers of Germany and those of the various United Nations for export markets in military aircraft; and they expect to see *Lufthansa* again a competitor on the great air routes of the world.

Both these views exist, but I believe that neither has any

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great number of adherents at the moment. Between the two extremes lies a range of more moderate courses of action. These all are based on the general assumption that we should keep the defeated enemy states militarily impotent during a very protracted period following their defeat, but that at the same time we should allow a healthy development of their economy and the maximum freedom for their individual citizens outside the range of proscribed activities. Such a policy conforms to the important objective of securing general acquiescence in the peace terms. It also paves the way for a non-military Germany gradually to demonstrate her good faith and peaceful intentions so that in due course she may safely be allowed to take a normal place in the international community.

For those whose postwar goal is to make Germany militarily impotent, while at the same time establishing economic and political conditions designed to make the military impotence a matter of the least possible concern to the great majority of the German people, the aeronautical terms of the peace will present a problem in balance. The airplane is the most important single instrument of present-day war. In the future, no Power can be expected to launch an attack on another unless it possesses an air force at least of the same order of strength as that of its prospective victim. At the same time, the airplane is an instrument of commerce of growing importance. Restrictions upon its use in that capacity will handicap the normal development of a nation's peacetime economy. The problem we face in dealing with German aviation after the war is to guarantee that Germany shall not be able to make an aerial attack on a neighbor, so that her neighbors shall have no reasonable occasion for fearing such an attack, while at the same time to avoid restrictions on her use of civil aircraft so drastic as to make great numbers of Germans feel that they are unreasonably handicapped in the ordinary conduct of their commercial and personal affairs.

Whatever form the restrictions take — even if German aviation is prohibited entirely — we must reckon with the possibility of their being evaded. The suspicion of evasion in the minds of Germany's neighbors would defeat the aim of gradually restoring healthy international relations. Therefore, before we consider in detail the extent to which Germany may reasonably be allowed to participate (if at all) in future aerial activity, we should examine the likelihood of evasion in general terms.

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II

There is a rather common impression that the air force with which Hitler threatened the British in 1938 and which he used in his all-out assault on Europe in 1939 and 1940 was the product of twenty years of furtive scheming and secret production, and that it finally burst upon the intended victims as a total surprise. There is a further impression that German activity in air transport was covertly military in purpose, and that the operations of *Lufthansa* were employed to lay the foundations of German air power and to assemble its equipment and personnel.

These are important points and deserve careful examination. If it is really true that Germany built an air force in secret, and unveiled it to the view of the world as a completed instrument, there is a presumption that the same thing might happen again in spite of all the precautions that could be taken. And even though no such secret development really occurred, a widespread belief that it did occur and might occur again could be almost as damaging, for it would prevent the adoption of any program envisaging the simultaneous strict and complete disarmament of Germany and her gradual economic and political rehabilitation and eventual reconciliation with her neighbors.

German aeronautical activities in the twenty years between the two wars have been the subject of widely varied interpretations. But it is an error to think Germany had rearmed on any considerable scale before the advent of Hitler, or that there was any important degree of secrecy about the progress which Hitler made once he came to power and seriously turned to rearmament.

In Germany from 1918 onwards there always existed a substantial number of ex-pilots of the German Air Force who bitterly resented the treaty provisions which denied their country any military aviation. The nucleus of an Air Staff existed, and undoubtedly there was planning, both in Nazi party circles and among ex-officers without active political affiliations, against the day when the nation might feel free to rebuild an air force. After the present war, there will again be such a group of men who will not only have lost the war but also the opportunity of practising their own profession. Their ambitions, and the appeal they can make to the imagination of postwar youth, will be difficulties in the way of establishing and maintaining aerial control over Germany; but it need not be an insuperable difficulty.

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After the last war, German aircraft manufacturers sought to remain active in the development of aircraft of military types, and since they were forbidden to develop them in Germany they set up branches for the purpose in adjoining countries. Young Germans, like the youth of other lands, succumbed to the fascination of flight and sought opportunities to practise it. They had some organized backing in doing so. The development of air transport was lavishly supported. But between all that and actual progress towards the creation of a military air force there remained a great gap which was never bridged until the Nazis secured effective control.

German aircraft factories and laboratories were open to foreign visitors, as were German air transport bases and glider camps. Neither in German factories, where *Junkers* built considerable numbers of commercial aircraft and *Dornier* and others much smaller numbers, nor in the branches established in Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Russia, where military machines were constructed for export sale, has there ever been reason to suspect any great amount of secret activity. The operations of *Lufthansa* were on a considerable scale, by the standards of that time. As in the case of other European air transport companies, it was largely influenced by considerations of politics and national prestige. In many respects the organization was an extravagant one, with lavish personnel, flying equipment and ground facilities; but the extravagance was in the traffic departments and other purely commercial sections, as well as in the technical and training departments, and seemed to represent the organization's preparation to share in an anticipated enormous expansion of world air transportation. At no time prior to 1935 did *Lufthansa* muster more than 300 aircraft, and a large proportion of those were small and slow.

I do not suggest that a will to evade the treaty limitations was absent. Undoubtedly there were many Germans both in the aircraft industry and among former military pilots who would have been delighted to build a secret air force if they had known any way of doing it; but no such secret could have been kept for any appreciable length of time, or until such a force grew to appreciable dimensions, in a country which was not then subject to totalitarian rule and to which visitors from other lands had reasonably free access.

It is an even greater fallacy to suppose that when the German

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air force was finally created it took anyone by surprise except those who had been determined to be so taken. Under Nazi rule, indeed, there would have been a better chance of maintaining a certain amount of secret development than under the Weimar Republic; but even the Nazis would have had difficulties in following such a course successfully for any considerable length of time.

The German Government formally proclaimed the reconstitution of the German air force in March 1935. Between 1933 and 1935 there had certainly been a considerable amount of secret activity, mainly in connection with the design of new types of aircraft. But the production during that period was relatively small, and when the new air force was announced and started operations, it had what appeared to be a very limited number of aircraft, by air force standards, and those of very limited military value. Intensive development really started from that point.

Thereafter, far from attempting to conceal the existence and activities of the German aircraft industry, the Germans boasted about it and offered inducements to professionally competent foreign visitors to come and look it over for themselves. At a gathering of aeronautical technicians held in Berlin in 1935, American and British engineers were invited as speakers; and they were regularly invited thereafter to attend subsequent annual meetings of the same sort. Representatives of the foreign aeronautical press were equally welcome. When I was invited to make such a trip in 1935, I was urged to go about freely and see as much of the German industry as possible. A number of American and British engineers made such visits, or traveled independently in accordance with their own plans, to see for themselves what was being done. Colonel Lindbergh's visit has been the best publicized, but he was only one of many to cover the same general ground. Most of the visitors placed a high rating upon the efficiency of the German aviation industry and the quality of its products, and, with the exception of a very small minority who suspected a large element of bluff, they estimated German productive capacity in imposing figures. Some of them gave their reports to the world;[1] others reported their observations and

[1] *Cf.* "New Wings for a New Germany," by Edmund T. Allen, *Aviation*, December 1935 and January and February 1936; and "Hitler Wasn't Bluffing," by S. Paul Johnston, *Saturday Evening Post*, February 18, 1939.

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interpretations to their governments. In addition, all the major Powers had both military and air attachés in Berlin, and until very nearly the time of the attack on Poland they had substantial freedom of movement in German factories and aeronautical laboratories, although they did not have so much opportunity to become familiar with the training of pilots and with the tactical exercises of the air force.

The estimates arrived at by such visitors in 1938 commonly placed German productive capacity at about 1,000 aircraft per month. The figure was a fabulous one by the standards of any production of military aircraft that had existed elsewhere (save perhaps in Russia) at any time since 1918. Among the visitors were eminent figures of the British aircraft industry. Their reports went to a government which discredited or disdained them. They also went to Winston Churchill, then in opposition, who found in them the factual content for the philippics with which he belabored the policies of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.

What happened in 1939 was not that we were taken by surprise with an unknown or hidden weapon, but that our original determination to keep Germany disarmed in the air, like so many other determinations of the twenties, had lapsed. The Nine Rules to which Germany had been made subject in 1919, as the means of preventing the development of military aircraft in civil guise, had disappeared. Even so, an observer had no need of technical formulas in order to discover that a military air force was being built in Germany within a couple of years after the Nazis came into power. The Allies could have stopped the building then, by prompt and drastic action, just as they could have checked the German Army that entered the Rhineland. But by the time Chamberlain flew to Godesberg and Munich in quest of peace the simple remedies that would have served three years earlier were no longer available. The *Luftwaffe* was by then beyond the reach of simple punitive action.

The same situation will present itself again in connection with any measures of control attempted at the end of the present war. Constant readiness for action, and the clearest possible understanding as to the form of such action and the conditions under which it is to be taken, will be essential to the maintenance of any control. Uncertainty, hesitation and prolonged debate among the governments which undertake to police the restrictions would

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again give time for the problem to reach such magnitude that no orderly solution would be possible.

Military occupation of Germany by the victors, and systematic inspection of German factories, would of course reduce the chance of secret preparations. We cannot know at present, however, how long such an occupation will continue. I therefore deal here with the development of a policy which would not depend upon that for its effectiveness.

III

Although the difference between a military airplane and an air transport is substantial, they may have many parts in common, and the technique of manufacturing each and the qualifications of the personnel using each are the same. Thus any aircraft factory is the potential source of lethal instruments.

There will be general agreement that a nation which has once unleashed its air power against its neighbors, thereby occasioning the vast loss and suffering which Germany has caused in this war, must be debarred from any possibility of repeating its crime. The edifice of security which we must seek to build against all possibility of a renewed German assault will have as its cornerstone a complete prohibition against the manufacture in Germany, or elsewhere under German domination, of any aircraft, military or civil, large or small, or of any of the major components of an aircraft. This will be virtually sufficient in itself as a security device. A nation does not win through to victory with the air force equipment which it has on hand at the beginning, even if it is of the most modern military type. If the aircraft is handicapped by being disguised, however thinly, as having a civil function, the possibility that such a hermaphroditic fleet can carry on a campaign of aggression against neighbors possessing even modest armaments is still further removed. If, moreover, the number of such aircraft that Germany could keep on hand were restricted to the number she legitimately needed in civil flying, the hazard would diminish to the vanishing point.

If the manufacture of aircraft is to be prohibited while operation of imported equipment is allowed to continue, then the maintenance shops for the latter might present a risk and would have to be regularly inspected. A well-organized shop capable of keeping a fleet of large aircraft in condition contains much of the equipment of an aircraft factory; but the vital distinctions are

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readily apparent to technically competent observers. The idea of military airplanes being built regularly in important quantities in airline shops belongs to the realm of imaginative fiction.

A greater source of danger would lie in the German operation of aircraft factories outside, but close to, German territory. Here the form of protection to be devised will need to be political more than technical.

I have already commented on the extent to which Germany established branch aircraft factories in neighboring countries between 1920 and 1930. The direct prohibitions to be imposed on Germany in future ought to be supplemented by the exaction of guarantees from all Germany's neighbors, if not indeed from all the states of Europe, that they will not offer a haven to industrial establishments that could function as part of a German system that would be illicit if established on German soil. The mood of most of Europe at the end of the war will be such that governments and peoples will feel little disposition to welcome the establishment of German arms factories in their midst; but as the years pass, with new and different sources of international irritation appearing and with the remembrance of past sufferings fading, a firm agreement prohibiting such action will be needed. The neutral states will present a special problem. The necessity of inducing them to collaborate must be kept constantly in mind when we are studying the postwar settlement.

All the aircraft industries of the world will face sharp contraction at the end of the war, and many of their workers will have to seek new employment. To force Germany to contract to zero and to throw all her workers in aviation industries out of employment will impose on her a special burden of economic readjustment. But the security of the rest of the world will require it.

How long is the prohibition to last? Some time in the future, say 20 years hence, or 50 or 100, Germany presumably will be restored to a coöperative place in a peaceful European community. So, at least, one must hope. We can scarcely imagine that any special prohibitions on particular industrial activities will endure eternally. This is especially true in the case of the airplane, which will necessarily play so great a commercial rôle in the future. No great industrial nation will be held back from creating its own aircraft manufacturing industry except by compulsion. We do not know the length of time that must elapse be-

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fore Germany can win her neighbors to confidence in her good intentions. We do not know how quickly an international system of mutual support for policing and security can be developed and can prove its reliability. This seems to make it undesirable to set any fixed term for the prohibitions and limitations to be laid upon German aviation at the end of the war. On the other hand, if we are wholly indefinite the aircraft industries of other countries will acquire a vested interest in supplying the whole world's needs and will oppose the termination of the prohibition on Germany and will stir up public fears about the consequences of abandoning it. The first of these drawbacks seems the graver. On the whole it would appear desirable that the term of the prohibition be left indefinite.

I have already implied my own belief that although Germany should not be allowed to have an air force or to manufacture aircraft, she should be permitted a reasonable amount of air operation for civil purposes. There is sure to be strong sentiment against this, on the theory that Germany's need for air transport, both internal and external, will be met by non-German airlines. If we are to allow the Germans to conduct their own operations with imported aircraft we should do so on the basis that while we propose to make rigorous and unhesitating use of all controls necessary to prevent the restoration of German military power, we are limiting our choice of controls to those which are in fact important for the prevention of aggression.[2] If that be the general objective of the peace settlement, it is appropriate to allow Germany a limited amount of air transport under such restrictions as will insure that its operation would present no threat to world security.

The previous paragraph assumes that postwar air transport operations in Europe will be conducted as before 1939, by companies possessing a single definite nationality. But there is an alternative possibility — that air transportation may to some extent be internationalized, especially within Europe. Internationalization had some support, mainly French, during the thirties. At that time, it was advocated largely as a measure of security against the threat inherent in uncontrolled national air transport operations. Accumulated experience and added knowledge of what the preparation of an air force actually entails has

[2] Apart, of course, from appropriate measures for the restoration of wartime plunder, punishment of war criminals, etc.

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abated concern on that account to a considerable degree, and internationalization is likely to be urged at the end of the present war primarily as a matter of administrative convenience and as a means of avoiding wasteful international duplications of service and the heightening of commercial rivalries.

Internationalization would have obvious practical advantages in Europe, where there are more than 20 completely distinct and sovereign states (excluding Scandinavia and Russia) in a total area barely half that of the United States. The practical difficulties of forming and operating international enterprises would of course be great. If they were created, Germany should be allowed to participate, even though initially on a token scale, with the prospect of a gradual increase later. In that event the problem of independent and purely national operation of German air transport of course would not arise.

IV

The problem of aircraft operation under German auspices may be subdivided under the three headings: (a) transport operations; (b) non-transport flight (industrial and private); (c) training of personnel.

There are various guarantees against the use of civil aviation for military purposes. One is the difference between combat and transport aircraft. Another is the enormous difference between the size of even the largest transport fleet and the size of the air forces which major Powers are apt to use in waging war. Even allowing for the growth which air transport is certainly destined to have following this war, a fleet of 5,000 transport aircraft would blanket the earth with airlines. Yet that figure represents no more units than the United States produces in a single month at wartime tempo, and only a few months' production at the rate which Germany was supposed to have attained before the attack on Poland. We certainly have no reason to sanction the blanketing of the earth by German transport undertakings, nor to allow her to do more than furnish her own internal transportation and the appropriate connections along the major trade routes linking her to neighboring countries. Very intensive transport operations limited to that geographical scope could be carried on with not more than 300 airplanes averaging 20-passenger capacity. There would appear to be no reason for allowing Germany more than that number of aircraft for transport purposes, at least for some

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years after the war, nor replacements except as machines already on hand are actually scrapped.

The quantitative limitation should be rigid; but within those limits there should be no limitation on quality. If the purpose is to allow Germany a free economic development, she should not be handicapped by being compelled to use an inferior grade of transportation. A restriction of that sort would provide a real grievance of a wholly non-military order. Limits as to the aggregate number and aggregate carrying capacity for the German air fleet should be fixed and maintained. Within those limits Germany should be able to purchase the best transports which the aircraft industries of other nations produce.

The second problem is whether or not Germany shall have aircraft for industrial and private operation. In all countries there are corporations and other private organizations, as well as agencies of government, which constantly need air transportation for urgent purposes. The desire for the necessary equipment is legitimate, within limits; and in Germany's case we reasonably could let her secure that equipment, on the assumption that we have decided on the general desirability of permitting her economic progress as a means of developing a peaceful spirit among the German people. However, a hundred transport aircraft averaging 10- or 12-passenger capacity should meet all her reasonable requirements for this type of service.

The private use of aircraft in Germany, if it is to be allowed at all, should be limited both quantitatively and qualitatively. I shall not attempt to describe here the detailed technical means of applying qualitative limitations.[3] Their effect ought to be to restrict privately-owned aircraft to not more than 4-passenger capacity with engines of not more than about 200 horsepower.

It does not seem to me either necessary or wise, however, to allow the private operation of any type of airplane in Germany after this war. Like every other important belligerent country, Germany will possess many thousands of highly trained military pilots, many of them filled with enthusiasm for aviation and eager to keep up their flying by any means available. But it will be healthier for the rest of the world if German aeronautical careers which have been specifically military in purpose, and which

[3] For those particularly interested in such matters, however, I might mention my belief that the total piston displacement of the engines installed in an aircraft is the best simple and specific technical criterion of the value of the aircraft from the point of view of its possible conversion to military employment.

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have been founded on military training, be completely interrupted, at any rate during the initial period of postwar settlement. The only exception would be for the very limited number of trained personnel that may properly find employment in the German transport service described above.

To allow Germany any private aircraft in the period immediately after the war would almost surely lead to the formation of flying clubs in which each individual aircraft would be kept in continuous and intensive service in order to give practice for the largest possible number of pilots. A large section of the pilots remaining to the *Luftwaffe* at the end of hostilities would thereby "keep their hands in" in the manual technique of piloting and would have an additional incentive to keep up their aeronautical studies. The prohibition on the manufacture of airplanes and the restriction on the amount of equipment to be imported would be the primary safeguards against a renewal of the German air threat. But we should supplement them by preventing Germany from maintaining any large force of pilots who have had military training and experience and who keep their aeronautical skills refreshed.

It is hard to say how rapidly or how far private flying will develop after the war in countries subject to no restriction whatever. It is correspondingly difficult to lay down in advance, in absolute terms, an appropriate limitation on the number of Germany's privately-owned aircraft, supposing such aircraft were to be allowed in spite of the considerations just mentioned. The best method might be to adopt a relative standard, conditioned on the rapidity with which private ownership of airplanes developed in other European countries. This would prevent the German authorities from surreptitiously sponsoring the use of nominally private aircraft to expand the practice of the aeronautical art beyond what is done spontaneously and naturally in neighboring countries.

Finally, there is the question of training. There seems to me an overwhelming case for rigidly prohibiting flight training in postwar Germany and for training abroad such German personnel as are required in transport operations. The German airlines should not become a refuge for a group of reactionary former fighting pilots, working together, living over together the great days of their victories, and plotting together for a renewal of German military power. However small such a group might be, it

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would be a focus of infection for the whole nation. If we allow the Germans to have their own domestic transport services, we should proceed on the theory that it is done in the interests of attaining a true peace. That means the development in Germany, for domestic German needs, of an organization staffed with men whose personal enthusiasm is for Germany's peaceful collaboration, in aviation as in other forms of business, with other nations of the international community. It implies the gradual replacement of the *Luftwaffe* veterans by new pilots drawn from politically reliable groups and trained and indoctrinated abroad, in only such numbers as the German transport system would really require for routine operations — say some 300 new pilots a year at the most.

If the proposal that the United Nations should actually undertake to train even a small number of Germans as pilots in the postwar period seems startling, it must be judged as the alternative to the establishment within Germany of flying schools which certainly would be capable of training a very much larger number. The fundamental decision will be on the question of whether any operation of aircraft by Germans should be allowed. If that question is answered in the affirmative, some personnel trained for air transport duties will obviously be required; and it will be better, at least for a number of years after the war, that they be trained outside of Germany rather than inside.

By devices such as those described briefly here, German aeronautics, first a nightmare to the world, and then a menace of horrible reality, can be rendered innocuous after the present war. The controls suggested, provided they are maintained with vigilance and vigor, seem to me to leave no opportunity for German aviation to renew its threat to the peace of the world. Instead, German aviation can gradually be made a positive factor in the development of peaceful coöperation in Europe.

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BRITAIN'S AIR EFFORT

By Oliver Stewart

FIGHTING efficiency in war is partly determined by the speed with which experience in the field can be interpreted and utilized. Practical achievements in the employment of the results of experience during the year 1942 fall into three main groups — strategical, tactical and technical. Obviously, technical progress is interwoven with, and has a direct influence on, strategy and tactics. This is nowhere more true than in aviation. Indeed, an outstanding example of the fact was provided during the opening phase of the North African campaign when bombers based in England were employed to attack supply ports in northern Italy that were feeding Field Marshal Rommel's forces and that were being got ready to feed Axis forces in Tunisia. But although this close linkage plainly exists between technology and strategy and tactics, we here shall consider each separately and only occasionally shall note striking instances of collaboration.

I. AIR STRATEGY

Right from the beginning of the war, the proper employment of heavy bomber forces has headed the list of strategical problems. The Royal Air Force always regarded the heavy bomber as an important weapon, and has steadily built up its heavy bomber strength. In this it has been proved to be right. But experience has caused it to modify its views as to its use.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard always was a powerful champion of independent air action. Indeed, he was advocating such action before the brilliant Italian writer General Douhet, although Douhet's name is more widely known than his in this connection. In its extreme form, the theory of an independent air force rests upon the power of strategic bombing. If it be true that a nation can be knocked out by bombing alone, it follows that an air force ought to be independent. But the hard school of war has taught that there is a fallacy, or rather an incompleteness, in this argument. Experience has emphasized that air power is as much dependent on supplies as all other forms of power, and that the idea of an independent air force is and will be an illusion until such time as all supplies for that force can be carried by air. That stage certainly was not reached in 1942.

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There are no signs that it will be reached during the present war (outside such special cases as the Burma Road), though everywhere we see that we are moving towards it.

In the meanwhile, air strategy must conform to the facts of the day — and these are that the supplies for an air force must to a great extent be moved by land and sea. Bombers and fighters working in the Libyan desert were largely dependent for their supplies upon sea and land transport. Similarly, the air forces working along the French North African coast drew heavily on sea transport for their supplies. It is difficult to see how fuel and bombs could be carried by air in sufficient quantity to furnish the entire support for air forces working in such conditions and at such distances from their main bases, at any rate for some time to come. So long as the fundamental fact remains that an air force draws its strength from the land and the sea it can never be independent. It can be, of course, autonomous, as it is in the British three-Service arrangement; but even autonomy has had to be modified in the light of experience, and the Royal Navy has not only had to assume full operational responsibility for the activities of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force but it has also had to be given leave to build up its Fleet Air Arm on a much larger scale than had originally been visualized. Similarly, the British Army now disposes of glider forces and parachute troops and has many pilots in its personnel. The Army Coöperation Command of the Royal Air Force contains numbers of Army officers assigned to it for duty.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that air force independence varies with the extent of air-borne supplies. Most of us who believe in aviation think that at some remote future date air forces will become truly independent. They will not only work in the air but they will move all their equipment and supplies by air. But as the war has proceeded, British thinking has been evolving; and by the end of 1942 it no longer was as confident as it had been two years earlier that the war could be won by strategical bombing alone. Indeed, the view was officially repudiated by eminent Royal Air Force officers. Strategical bombing was still regarded as an important factor for striking at the enemy — perhaps the most important — but it was seen to be related to the other factors of land and sea action. The whole thing can be put in another way: that the military axiom of concentration of forces on the critical point at the critical time demanded that the program and

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pattern of strategical bombing should conform to concurrent land and sea operations. The catchword had changed from strategical bombing to the "balanced force" of all the arms.

In the western desert, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham developed the coöperative side of air force work to a high pitch of efficiency. They devoted themselves to perfecting the technique whereby an air force can work with an army; and in General Alexander's break-through at El Alamein and in the subsequent pursuit to Tripolitania this technique proved successful. At the other extreme, the strategical bombing of Germany was continuing, in the early part of last year, without much apparent direct relation to other activities. It is natural that the United Nations should approve of this bombing of Germany. Germany's method was to wage war in other people's countries while keeping the Fatherland itself free from war's dangers and inconveniences. The Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force determined from the start to get at Germany, however difficult the task and however costly its execution. It has been difficult and it has been costly. German defenses are extremely strong and extremely efficient. Anti-aircraft fire is intense near all the main targets. Searchlights are used in hundreds. The night fighter technique has been improved, and it is aided by numerous scientific devices which enable a fairly high percentage of night interceptions to be made. The Bomber Command thus faced fairly heavy losses when it struck into Germany. But none of these losses ever altered its determination to multiply its direct attacks on the chief instigator of the war.

The emotional satisfaction produced by heavy raids upon places in Germany undoubtedly tended for a time to upset a clear appreciation of the real position. With every raid there rose a chorus of approval in the United Nations, and the prophets of absolute air power stated more and more strongly their views that available industrial resources should be devoted mainly to building up the strategical bomber offensive. In those circumstances, it was difficult indeed to gain attention for the view that air, land and sea forces working in close collaboration were stronger than the sum of their individual strengths. But in 1942, the year with which I am dealing, that view did gradually gain favor. It was recognized that the promises of the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and later of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris, were made

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in good faith. It was seen that the captains and crews of the bomber aircraft were ready to take all risks to get at Germany with the biggest weights their aircraft could carry. But it was also seen that Germany is a large place, that it is being supplied with war materials from the conquered countries, and that in consequence the most prodigious efforts by the bombing forces might not be sufficient to deliver a knockout blow.

Simultaneously the calls for air support for the Royal Navy and for the Army became louder and more persistent. The aircraft was proving itself a superlatively good weapon for countering the U-boat, and this led to an increased demand for long-range machines capable of carrying heavy bombs, mines, depth charges and large caliber guns or cannon. The factories, in Lord Beaverbrook's phrase, "rolled out the bombers." But the demands were insatiable, and the strategical bomber forces did not grow quickly enough to bring within sight the time when Germany could be knocked out by bombing alone. The realization gradually ensued that the bomber force must strike at Germany as often as it could, but that it must also be ready to collaborate directly with other forces. In the western desert, large four-engined machines began to take part in operations. The Handley Page Halifax was mentioned in the official communiqués and the American Consolidated Liberator and Boeing Fortress bombers. Before this, the bombing in the western desert had mainly been the responsibility of medium and light machines. The introduction of heavy bombers, therefore, was the outcome of an extension of the lines of communication, or, in other words, an increase in the responsibilities of land and sea transport.

When we take into account the gradual increase in the attacking weight in the western desert, the air support provided for the American and British troops in French North Africa, and the increasing air protection for Atlantic convoys, we may conclude that this important phase of World War II showed the need for using the air coöperatively rather than independently. Independent bombing was essayed to the fullest extent possible. It brought small results in relation to the gigantic events of global war. But air power used in coöperation with land and sea power had begun to produce results which offered genuine strategic gains. Long-range strategical bombing was not in the least discredited. On the contrary, its value was shown to be great. What had been demonstrated was that its value could be mul-

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tiplied several times over if it were mingled with the values of land and sea work. Strategical bombing might be partially wasted if it were directed against an objective which could not be subsequently assailed by land or sea forces. It would be used to the full if the objective, after being fully trounced by long-range bombers, could subsequently be threatened by swiftly advancing forces on the land or the sea.

One additional strategical aspect of the air war must be considered. I would emphasize, however, that I am taking account here of those aspects which present themselves most clearly to us in the United Kingdom, and am largely ignoring the equally important aspects which arise in the war in the Pacific. This one-sided view will be excused, I hope, by the fact that I am familiar at first hand only with the air war as it is being waged in the West and that any comments I might make on the air war as it is being waged in the Pacific would be second-hand. The additional matter to which I would like to direct attention concerns the general strategical pattern as it emerged at the end of 1942. General de Gaulle said in the latter part of November that the land of France had become the strategical center of the western war. Accepting that statement as being true — and there is nobody with a keener strategical sense than this Frenchman — we may say that the problem of the United Nations consists in bringing to bear upon certain points in the large circumference that has France as its center an air force which is capable of breaking through, or at any rate of preparing the way for a break-through.

On the Russian front there are obvious difficulties in providing the air force necessary. Let us assume that Germany's first-line air strength is between 4,000 and 6,000 aircraft. Then in order to achieve air supremacy (which is more than air superiority) on the eastern front, Russia would require a first-line strength of at least 6,000 aircraft. Since many of her big factories have been overrun by the Germans we could hardly expect her to develop such a striking force for some time to come. In the coastal region in the West, Great Britain can obviously develop a striking force sufficient to create a break-through; but there is the additional problem there of that gigantic tank trap, the English Channel. Air forces sufficient to blast a way might be available, but the subsequent step of landing adequate armored units might be fraught with extreme difficulty and danger, as was indicated in the Dieppe raid of August 1942. On that occasion, the Allied air

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forces maintained ascendancy in hard-fought battles which entailed losses on each side of something like 100 aircraft.

In North Africa the position was much better than in either of the regions so far mentioned. Here the Axis Powers had greater difficulty in assembling aircraft in very large numbers and there was an opportunity for an Allied break-through. In the last quarter of the year we seized this opportunity with both hands, proving conclusively the farsightedness of the planning inspired by Mr. Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt. The expedition raised additional problems of supply and created a new pressure on shipping. On the other hand, in this North African region the United Nations were able to bring to bear air forces of sufficient power to achieve local superiority over the Axis wherever the fighting mounted to a climax.

We see, then, that there are two concentric circles which have their centers on France — the defensive air circle of the Axis and, just outside it, the offensive air circle of the United Nations. The very fact that the United Nations were exercising their air power centripetally implies that their problems of supply were greater than those of the Axis. But their output was also greater, so that in consequence they were able in some measure to overcome their positional handicaps by mass. In a smaller measure, as has been explained, they were able to overcome these difficulties by the ingenious use of the long-range capabilities of some of their machines, among which must be quoted with approval the Avro Lancaster bomber with its four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines.

At the end of 1942 the strategical situation of Great Britain remained on the whole unfavorable. For, to paraphrase a famous remark of Napoleon's, it may be said that the strategy of a state lies in its geography, and the small islands of the United Kingdom were obviously nearer to the advanced bases of the German air forces than the bases in those islands were to the essential targets in Germany itself. I have quoted before now the statement of a Royal Air Force officer, Air Marshal Peck, which seems to me to present in perfect form the fundamentals of the case as between Britain and Germany. He likened the strategical situation to the picture in a comic paper which showed an extremely tall, thin man dancing with an extremely short, fat woman. Two friends watching the dancing from the edge of the floor are speaking to one another, and one says: "You know, Smith, when one is dancing with Mrs. Tunningley-Howitzer *she* always seems

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to be nearer to *you* than *you* are to *her*." Germany's air force has been strategically nearer to Britain than Britain's air force has been to Germany. That is one of the results of the early German conquests, felt especially ever since the France of Marshal Pétain signed an armistice with the Germans. In the past year, however, something has been done to overcome that handicap and to spread around Germany an aerial encirclement which will be capable in the future of bringing to bear upon her a pressure not only from the Mediterranean direction but also perhaps from other directions.

II. AIR TACTICS

I turn now to the tactical side of the air war in the West. Tactics are a subject on which for obvious reasons there is need for reticence, and it is only possible to refer here to those aspects which must inevitably emerge in the minds of any thoughtful critics who study the events. I cannot, then, go into details of the formation patterns employed by the Royal Air Force and into the numerous changes in them that have been made as a result of war experience. There are a few things which experience has taught, however, and which may be mentioned as pointing the way to future developments.

The great tactical problem of the moment is concerned with the use of larger numbers of machines. As has already been pointed out, the United Nations are beginning to enjoy the benefits of their superior industrial resources. But they cannot enjoy those benefits to the full unless the technique of using large numbers of aircraft in battle is fully understood and applied.

In 1914–18, air fighting was a matter of individual combat. When large formations met they immediately broke up into numerous atoms, each consisting of two units revolving round one another on tactical orbits. At the start, the fighting in the present war was on much the same lines. Big formations were used. But when these clashed in battle they immediately broke up and scattered into paired atoms, with the outcome dependent upon individual skill and individual technical merit. In 1942, however, it began to become obvious that a further stage must be visualized in aerial tactics and that means must be devised for holding together a large formation so that it could fight as a formation and not as a group of individual units. Some progress has been made in this direction, but more than that cannot just now be said.

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Other tactical developments concern the use of low-level attacks, the use of dive bombers, and the use of high-flying aircraft. Low-level attack includes dive bombing and machine-gunning and cannon fire, and it covers such different operations as assaults upon tanks and transport and intruder patrols at night by fighters. The dive bomber has not received the favor of the Royal Air Force, which has always thought that the so-called "fighter bomber" could do all that the dive bomber can do, and with less risk. In this my personal opinion diverges from the official opinion, but I do not intend to press the point here. I shall only say that the fighter bomber has done remarkably fine work in the western desert and in Northern France. The Hurricane in various modified forms can attack targets from a low level with the fire from four cannon or with two 250-pound bombs. It could be made to carry two 500-pound bombs in certain cases. After delivering its attack on whatever ground target has been selected, it still retains its powers as a fighter and therefore has a fairly good chance of making its escape. Hurricanes have been singularly successful in this work. They have been used both by night and by day, and they have conducted innumerable operations against enemy transport in France as well as against enemy gun positions and other targets. Their losses in this work have been low. The North American Mustang has also been working on similar lines with equal success. The Army Coöperation Command of the Royal Air Force has used this machine extensively and has found it well suited to the rigorous conditions under which it functions. Low-level work has been shown to need not only aircraft especially adapted to it, but also especially trained personnel. For example, the demands made upon the pilot of a Mustang making an attack at treetop height on a German position in France differ sharply from those made on the pilot of a Spitfire meeting the enemy at 30,000 feet. The use of ground contours for giving cover right up to the moment of attack has been studied by the Royal Air Force Army Coöperation Command, and those who have been privileged to witness demonstrations by this Command know that formations of low-flying machines are able to approach their target not only unseen but often unheard until they are within short range. Presumably the correct use of the ground contours has some screening effect upon the sound of the machine as well as in making it invisible. The attacks made on railway locomotives in Northern France have largely been conducted by cannon-

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carrying fighters, which have sufficient accuracy of aim to strike the locomotives and are then able to make good their escape.

The last of the tactical considerations to which I would direct attention concerns high flying. The Junkers 86P stratosphere bomber has been reported over England on at least one occasion, and two or three machines of this type have been shot down in the Mediterranean zone by specially lightened Spitfires. The Junkers 86P is still, at the time of writing, something of a mystery. It is believed to have a pressure cabin for the crew and to have a relatively low maximum speed. It has been reported on several occasions at over 40,000 feet, though whether this figure can be relied upon has yet to be settled. There can be little doubt, in any case, that the 86P marks the opening of an era of high-flying work which was foreshadowed by the operations of the Boeing Fortresses when they first went into action on the western front in the hands of Royal Air Force pilots, and which received fresh emphasis by the truly magnificent achievements of the United States Army pilots later in the year. The Royal Air Force sorties were made with the early model Fortresses which had comparatively little armament protection. In consequence, they relied almost entirely upon height and speed for performing their work and then returning home undamaged. On some occasions they were challenged by enemy fighters and were considerably shot about in the ensuing combats. But they did show that a proper use of height might extend the range of bombing operations. Good vertical visibility is essential for effective bombing from 35,000 feet, and it is not found often over the western front.

The progress made with the stratosphere bomber has led inevitably to more attention being concentrated upon the fast-climbing, high-flying fighter. Here we can distinguish two separate lines of development. The first, favored mainly by United States constructors, is founded upon the turbo-blower, which gives the engine good performance at height. The British line of development, though it also takes account of the special virtues of the turbo-blower, has so far been mainly concentrated upon the mechanically driven supercharger. The Rolls-Royce Merlin 61 engine has been in service for some time, although it was only announced publicly by the Air Ministry in November 1942. This has a two-speed, two-stage supercharger with inter-cooler, and although I am not in a position at the moment to give precise figures I can say that it provides remarkable high-level fighter

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performances. It goes with the four-bladed airscrew in the Vickers-Armstrongs Spitfire 9.

In the tactical field, then, the things we note in particular are the development of low-flying attack, the development of extremely high-flying methods, and the development of close support bombing, whether by power glided bombers, dive bombers or level bombers. Formation work tends all the time towards the more efficient utilization of large numbers of aircraft at the same time. These are the things which stand out. The technique of individual combat does not show any marked development. Indeed it resembles very closely that of the war of 1914–18.

III. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT

I have already said something about the war of high-flying aircraft, a field in which we shall unquestionably see considerable technical development in the future. At present the chief problem is to provide protection for the crew. The pressure cabin seems the obvious solution, but it also introduces certain difficulties. One of the principles of the Royal Air Force is that the pilot should always be given a fair chance of escaping. Consequently the pressure cabin in aircraft capable of flying in the stratosphere would not be considered completely satisfactory unless the pilot were provided with a portable means for sustaining life in the event that he had to bail out and until his fall brought him down to air sufficiently rich in oxygen. It may be recalled that the world's height record flights were made by British pilots around 1937, when heights of nearly 54,000 feet were attained. These were accomplished with a Bristol monoplane with a closed but unpressurized cockpit. The pilot wore a form of diving suit which was maintained at a sufficient pressure during the whole of the flight. The same scheme was followed by the Italian flier, Mario Pezzi, when he reached 55,490 feet in 1938. For war purposes, however, there are obvious defects in the pressure suit, among them the fact that it so encumbers the wearer that he is unable to manipulate his guns or other equipment efficiently. We may assume, therefore, that the pressure cabin must inevitably be the final answer to high-flying problems. And in fact this form of cabin has been in extensive use and a good deal of information about it is already available.

Now let us see whether there are any outstanding trends in the low-level machines. Here we find that the one thing coloring all

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progress is increase in power. The Hawker Typhoon, which frequently has been mentioned in the news, though at the time of writing it has never been officially mentioned as having been in action, appears to be a comparatively big aircraft for a single-seater. It is powered by the 24-cylinder Napier Sabre engine, which gives a good deal more than 2,000 horse-power. Here we have the trend epitomized: an enormous increase in power and the maintenance of as small-sized a machine as possible. A consequence of this form of development is that wing loadings are tending to rise. At the moment there seems to be no limit in sight to this development. Fighters and bombers are operating at steadily increasing wing loadings. This entails a reduction in the powers of manœuvre, since the turning circle of an aircraft increases in radius as the wing loading goes up. But the advantages in speed are held to outweigh the disadvantages in manœuvre. And in fact designers of the latest types of machine concentrate rather upon speed and climb than upon manœuvre.

There is always a possibility that a higher degree of specialization will prevail among fighters in the future and that some types will be set aside for high-altitude work and other types for low-altitude work. If that occurs, we may expect to see the high-altitude aircraft having a high aspect ratio and perhaps a slightly lower wing loading than the others; but this is sheer speculation. The existing trend is to produce good all-round fighters and then, if the need develops, to modify them for any special duties. The enemy did this with the Messerschmitt fighter. In its original form (109E) it had square-cut wing tips and heavy armament. In the later form, the 109F, the armament was slightly reduced in order to cut weight, and rounded wing tips were provided so that the aspect ratio was increased and the aircraft's performance at height improved. The difference in altitude performance was not very great, according to the calculations which have been placed before me. Nevertheless the incident does show how much importance attaches to giving a fighter pilot just sufficient performance to allow him to have a fighting edge over his opponent.

It is more difficult to make a few simple generalizations about bomber design than about fighter design. One school adheres to the view that the most important thing in bombers is speed, and that provided a load of 2,000 pounds can be carried the whole of the remainder of the design effort should be devoted to giving high speed. The de Havilland Mosquito can be said to epitomize this

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view. On the other hand, the Avro Lancaster, though much slower than the Mosquito, carries a much greater load. It also has four power-operated turrets whence it can bring fire to bear in almost any sector. The question really is, then, whether the Lancaster is fast enough to bomb without heavy losses by day and by night. If it is, then obviously economies can be effected in the crew required per thousand tons of bombs dropped. Modern interception methods are so highly developed that in the daylight without cloud cover any aircraft, however fast, can hope only rarely to penetrate enemy defenses without being tackled by fighters. Thus daylight bombing appears to require some altogether novel solution. One possibility has been presented by the United States Army Air Force in Britain, whose Boeing Fortresses have relied upon their great fire power to beat off attack. But if the aircraft in question are to penetrate any great distance into enemy territory this method means that they must carry huge supplies of ammunition. The problems of the long-range fighter have not yet been satisfactorily solved, for as the range of the fighter goes up so its speed and climb performance go down, which means it is no better placed for tackling the enemy's defending fighters than the high-speed bomber.

In conclusion, I may say of air operations in the West at the close of 1942 that the United Nations might be considered to be engaged in an enormous encircling movement. Air bases encircle the enemy along the North African coast, up through Syria, along the Russian front, and (with a gap) back through Iceland and Great Britain. A sufficiently great aerial striking power will enable the United Nations to come in and attack on any point in that circumference. For this they will need the mobility which might be supplied by air transport on a large scale. They therefore must develop to the limit the troop transport aircraft, the troop transport glider, the supplies machine and parachutists. They must then press forward with the task of increasing by all possible means the range of all types. Finally, they must retain a sufficient technical superiority in short-range fighters so that they can hold the bases which they have secured against all possible attacks and so that they can cover their essential supply of operations wherever they may be.

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CANADA:
UNITY IN DIVERSITY

By Adélard Godbout

IT SEEMS to me in order that our friends to the south should know more about French Canada, which by trade, culture and intercourse is so closely linked with them as to be American in the larger sense, without becoming in the least less Canadian or less French Canadian for all that. This subject is one very dear to my heart, and I shall express myself on it as frankly and clearly as possible. My comment will be divided in the form of answers to three questions:

First. What is the position of the French Canadians as regards the United States?

Second. What is their position regarding Canada and the British Commonwealth of Nations?

Third. How does that dual relationship of the French Canadians make them an element of strength and order, and therefore of unity, in our joint civilization, which necessarily includes not only Canada and the British Commonwealth of Nations, but also the United States, the Latin republics of America and liberated France?

I

French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians are both as staunchly loyal to Canada as you Americans to whom I address myself are loyal to the United States. You and we nevertheless have so many things in common, we both of us form such an integral part of the North American continent, and we both are so thoroughly animated by a spirit of friendliness and neighborliness that we are evidently called upon to work together more and more closely and directly toward an amicable solution of our mutual and even our respective problems.

Every Canadian acknowledges this fact. But we French Canadians, whether we live in the Province of Quebec or in one of our sister provinces, *a mari usque ad mare*, are particularly conscious of it.

The obvious reason is that millions of our kinsmen live in your country: in your Eastern states, in your Central states, and as far south as Louisiana. They are good Americans, tried and proven true, deeply loving the new land which is theirs now as it

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is yours. Their true allegiance to the United States cannot be denied. In this war, as in previous ones, they are your brothers in arms. On your farms, in your war factories, everywhere they are doing their bit. Day after day, tons of foodstuffs, matériel, ordnance, ammunition and arms of all sorts are turned out by their strong, deft hands. They take special pride in helping you manufacture that outstanding American weapon, the Garand rifle, which was conceived and realized by an inventor of French Canadian ancestry.

French Canada's part in the life of your country goes far back into history. Explorers, discoverers, missionaries, and settlers from Canada were the first civilized men to set foot on many a distant part of what is today the United States. Samuel de Champlain discovered the lake that was named after him, and determined the coast line of New England; Jean Nicolet discovered Wisconsin; Nicolas Perrot explored the Middle West; Robert Cavelier de La Salle, Jacques Marquette and Louis Joliet discovered the Mississippi and reached the shores of the Gulf of Mexico; Pierre le Moyne d'Iberville was founder and first governor of Louisiana, and also founder of Mobile, Alabama; Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, Sieur de la Vérendrye, discovered the Rocky Mountains and the territory which is now your state of Wyoming; François Norbert Blanchet was the first Bishop of Oregon; Julien Dubuque founded Dubuque, Iowa; Charles Aubry, one of the trail makers of your Western states, gave his name to cities in Arizona and Colorado; Robert Cavelier de La Salle marked the places where now stand Niagara, New York, and Joliet, Illinois, and Memphis, Tennessee; Antoine Launet de la Mothe Cadillac founded Detroit, Michigan. The list could be prolonged indefinitely. These few names of explorers, founders and missionaries are enough to show how large a rôle French Canada played in the early history of the United States. They all came from our three principal historical cities in Quebec — Quebec, Montreal and Three Rivers — or from smaller communities in the present province.

In our own day, statistics show that there is a large French Canadian population in New England. Take, for example, the percentages of French-speaking inhabitants in just a few New England cities and towns: Biddeford and Saco, Maine, 59 percent; Woonsocket, Rhode Island, 55 percent; Lewiston and Auburn, Maine, 44 percent; Sanford, Maine, 41 percent; Waterville,

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Maine, 34 percent; Nashua, New Hampshire, 40 percent; Manchester, New Hampshire, 35 percent; Fall River, Massachusetts, 25 percent; Salem, Massachusetts, 23 percent; Holyoke, Massachusetts, 23 percent; Lowell, Massachusetts, 22 percent.

One of the studies from which these figures are taken states: "Biddeford and Saco, Maine, comprise three large French parishes, with their own schools, stores and other establishments: a city within a city. The French wage earners are skilled workers, steadily employed at good pay, in the textile mills. Families generally are large and expenditure substantial. . . . Woonsocket's French population is an important factor in every phase of activity, political, industrial, and in merchandising. French-speaking clerks are employed by leading retailers to cater to the French-speaking trade. Five French parishes, six French grammar schools, two high schools and two academies maintain French as the common language in this outstanding French market." These figures cover only those born abroad and the first generation in the United States: there also are "substantial numbers of the second and third generations to be considered, because of instruction in French, in French parochial schools." In an article in the September 1942 issue of the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Director of the New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission and Professor in the University of New Hampshire, states that in all there are over 2,500,000 Franco-Americans in the United States.

The contribution of these Franco-Americans is qualitative as well as quantitative. They all, of course, are bilingual. They are law-abiding citizens, blessed, as a rule, with large families, and their standard of living is high. Their culture is a fine one. They publish newspapers and periodicals, write books, succeed in the fine arts, science, politics and business, just as we do here. They are even creating a literature of their own, parallel to ours. If the total contribution of the Franco-Americans to your civilization, and their total wealth, could be set forth accurately and in detail there is no doubt that the figures would be astounding.

Their endeavors are dedicated to the greatness of your country. But when French Canadian artists such as Wilfred Pelletier, musical director of the New York Metropolitan Opera Orchestra, or Raoul Jobin, Nicolas Massue, or Jacques Gérard, gifted Metropolitan tenors, participate in the musical development of your

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people, and when a pianist like young André Mathieu plays to music lovers all over the United States, we also cannot but hope and think that French Canada is adding something to the beauty and value of an intellectual life that knows no frontiers. We are thankful also that in some of your universities, lectures are given on French Canadian literature and civilization, and that a good many of your boys and girls come to study in our colleges and universities.

If you stop for a moment, then, to consider the mental and practical attitude taken toward you by French Canadians, their understanding of your ways of thinking and living and their participation in the formation of your historical background, you will conclude, I am sure, that — on both sides of the border — they hold a useful as well as a happy position on our American continent. If one further reflects on the fact that there are eight million French people in North America — every man, woman and child among them true to his own country, yet devoted to the broadest American ideals — all standing with you and with us in this war in the pursuit of our civilization's ultimate victory over barbarism, one will better conceive the noble rôle which Providence has granted us the privilege of playing on the stage of the New World.

Finally, one should realize what it means that the civilization of the Western Hemisphere as a whole has three component parts. There are 135,000,000 English-speaking persons; 130,000,000 who speak Spanish and Portuguese; and well over 8,000,000 who speak French. French is also the second language of a great number of English-speaking Canadians and Americans, as well as of the Latin American élite. The French Canadians and Franco-Americans, therefore, may well act as a living link between the Americans of all countries and languages, and in that way make for a greater human unity among nations and men of goodwill in this Hemisphere. What a varied yet solid texture for the building of a healthy and enduring Pan American civilization, if it is properly used!

II

Now let us consider the position of the French Canadians regarding Canada and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The French Canadians are, first and foremost, Canadians, so much so that up to recent years that name was spontaneously

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and generally given them by the people of other races in Canada, especially the English, as meaning those most deeply rooted in the soil and history of Canada. The reason for this is simple. Canada was set apart, some four centuries ago, as our country, and nothing could ever change us in that respect. We have toiled so fervently for Canada, shed our blood for her so freely, that she has become part and parcel of our soul, bone and sinew.

As one turns the pages of the political and military history of Canada one sees that everything our forbears did, all that we are doing or shall ever do, is in the fundamental sense Canadian. Would it be fair, then, to rebuke us because our mental disposition is not colonial? While the English Canadians lived in deep communion with their mother country, we, in spite of our vivid love for France, thought and acted as Canadians. And by Canada, I do not mean exclusively the territory of our own Province, but that of the whole land we discovered, defended and Christianized.

As far back as 1506, Jean Denys, of Honfleur, explored the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In 1534, Jacques Cartier took possession of Canada and planted the Cross at Gaspé. And for a long period of time before that, Basque and Breton fishermen had visited our waters and shores yearly. Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts, was Lieutenant General of New France in 1603 — 23 years before the sale of Manhattan Island to the Dutchman Peter Minuit. Port Royal, where now stands Annapolis, Nova Scotia, was founded in 1605 by Jean de Biencourt, Sieur de Poutrincourt. There gathered noble men like Poutrincourt himself; Samuel de Champlain, soldier, explorer, geographer and writer; Michel Sarrasin, surgeon, botanist, member of the Paris *Académie des Sciences*, and a few others. They established the first literary society in America, *L'Ordre de Bon Temps*. Civilization thus was early and happily implanted in Canada.

The list of other French explorers and settlers is almost endless. Every nook and corner, every mountain and plain of Canada, as far west as the Rockies, has been made accessible or opened to civilization by the French. They worked, fought, prayed and were martyred for their love of God and country. It was they who gave us all this great land of Canada.

After the Seven Years' War, this country of our deserted, famished, heart-broken forbears was ceded by France to England. Cut off from all political, cultural and commercial connection with France, lacking everything that means power and influence,

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they started to build a new and greater Canada on the ruins of their homes, churches, schools, farms and shops. They accepted as partners in that immense task the new, English-speaking fellow-citizens whom the chances of war had given them. Forgetting their hardships and the injustice of their fate, relying on God's help, the fortitude of their hearts and British fair play, they set themselves unflinchingly to work.

They were loyal to the British Crown, for French Canadians have a deep sense of honor and their realistic minds know the meaning of *le fait accompli*. They have been accused of being priest-ridden. They love liberty too much to be ridden by anyone. But they learned for themselves in those trying times to revere and obey the Church, their bishops and their priests in things spiritual. For their clergy not only enlightened their souls — they had taken part in the colonization and civilization of New France, they remained in Canada when the French officers and nobles accepted the British offer to return them to France, they gave their people the example of every virtue. In that way they endeared themselves to our people and earned the right to preach to them the Gospel of Christ. In a spirit of true devotion, in accordance with the sane and sound doctrine that they learned from their priests, the French Canadians put into practice the tenet of their religion which says that allegiance is due to the established order. The souls of the French Canadian and Acadian people were unconquered, but they coöperated with the British instead of trying to paralyze their efforts. And a little more than a century later, a French Canadian, one of the Fathers of Confederation, Sir Étienne Pascal Taché, President of the Quebec Conference and Prime Minister of Canada, declared that the last cannon fired for the British in Canada would be fired by a French Canadian. Such fealty cannot easily be paralleled.

As years went by, our influence was more readily accepted because certain prejudices against us were found to be groundless. Thus we became more free to work hand in hand with our English fellow citizens to make Canada an autonomous entity. And the better and quicker it is understood that French and English-speaking Canadians must live together in harmony, while treasuring their own characteristics and keeping their own personalities, the better and quicker will Canada develop, morally, physically and materially, enriched by the gifts of our two complementary and not antagonistic civilizations.

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But the process by which the two peoples came together was a long one. The terms of the capitulation of Quebec granted us the prerogative of keeping our religion, language and laws, but the Treaty of Paris abolished those privileges and imposed the Test Oath, which was directly aimed at the Catholic faith. The French Canadians were then the overwhelming majority in Canada, but they had recourse only to peaceful means in trying to obtain what they thought essential to their very existence. The firm ground they stood on was that, being loyal British subjects, they could appeal to the Crown. So, working in their own interest and in that of their English-speaking fellow-citizens as well, they obtained, bit by bit, certain constitutional liberties which finally led to the passage of the British North America Act of 1867, commonly known as the Act of Confederation.[1]

The first of these liberties were won when the military régime of 1763 gave place to the Quebec Act of 1774, which accorded freedom of religion, did away with the Test Oath, reëstablished French civil law and created a Legislative Council. Next came the Act of 1791, which was the first Canadian Constitution. But it lacked certain essentials, and we continued to demand complete ministerial responsibility and acceptance of the elementary principle of "no taxation without representation." Any Britisher or American who looks back to those days and considers the things we fought for will feel a very sensitive chord being touched in his heart.

Things came to a head in 1837–38, when a rebellion took place. Two facts about this must be kept in mind. First, the rebellion was not against the British Crown, but against a detestable oligarchy and bureaucracy which were condemned by the British themselves. Secondly, there was an identical movement among English-speaking Canadians in Upper Canada (now Ontario). The leader there was the grandfather of the Prime Minister of today, William Lyon Mackenzie King. Even in our Province, then known as Lower Canada, one of the principal leaders was an English-speaking Canadian, Dr. Wolfred Nelson. The outcome of this rebellion was the Act of 1840 which compelled us to pay half the debt of Upper Canada, but granted the much-coveted ministerial responsibility. This was followed by Confederation in 1867. Confederation was made possible only by its

[1] Of course, as the English became more and more Canadian, an ever-increasing number of English-speaking persons began to think as the French Canadians did on the subject.

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acceptance by the French Canadians. It is not perfect, but it has some important merits and it is far more than a *modus vivendi*. It should be envisaged more as a pact between the French and the English-speaking Canadians than as an agreement between provinces, some of which actually did not exist at the time.

In the course of the years since Confederation, we have proved our deep and practical Canadianism and guaranteed our fidelity to the British Crown. We feel we have done more than our part in keeping Canada secure for the British. I need not recall such dates as 1775, when Montgomery's troops were beaten at Quebec, and 1813 when Michel d'Irumberry de Salaberry was the victor at Châteaugay. Thus was thwarted a manifestation of United States imperialism, the success of which would have complicated exceedingly your life as well as ours.

What more need be said about our position regarding Canada and the Empire? Our devotion to our King and to the Constitution we helped to mould and define reveal our intentions clearly enough. In 1931 a French Canadian of great vision, Ernest Lapointe, had the opportunity to express these ideals of his kinsmen and see them embodied in an act of universal importance, the Statute of Westminster. Now Canada is an independent nation, equal in every respect to England and all our sister Dominions. Our sovereign is the King of Canada, who is also the King of England and of every one of the nations of the Commonwealth. Like our English-speaking fellow-Canadians, we are proud and active partners in this Commonwealth, which is a liberty-loving society of British nations, self-sufficient but not self-centered, joined together by their allegiance to the same sovereign and by their community of interests.

III

When this war was declared, there was not a protest from the French Canadians. In spite of anything that may be said to the contrary, in spite of certain potential causes of friction, we stood and we still stand as one with our English fellow-Canadians for the defense of Canada and for our common ideal of liberty and civilization.

An objective consideration of the facts reveals unmistakably that the plebiscite held on April 27, 1942, was a consultation as to which was the better way of waging war overseas: by conscription or by voluntary enlistment. The French Canadians gave

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their opinion, but nothing could keep them from fighting side by side with their English-speaking comrades.

Plebiscite or no plebiscite, our soldiers, sailors and aviators are fighting to bring victory to the arms of Canada, to share that victory with other members of the British Commonwealth, with the United States and with all our other glorious allies, and to save France, the old and revered mother country, now cruelly trampled by Hitler's hordes. Plebiscite or no plebiscite, our farmers, mechanics, and workers of all sorts are producing the requisites of victory. Plebiscite or no plebiscite, our officers and soldiers have died at Hong Kong and at Dieppe.

Was the right approach used in addressing the French Canadians? Was their coöperation fully appreciated? Those are questions which time shall answer. Let us first win this war!

I should like to quote, in this connection, a few words spoken by the late and much lamented Lord Tweedsmuir, former Governor General of Canada, whom we loved so much. In 1937, at the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, he said: "If the Commonwealth, in a crisis, is to speak with one voice, it will only be because the component parts have fought out for themselves their own special problems, and made their contribution to the discussion, so that a true common factor of policy can be reached. A sovereign people must, as part of its sovereign duty, take up its own attitude to world problems. The only question is whether that attitude shall be a wise and well-informed one, or a shortsighted and ill-informed one."

The attitude we have taken resembles so much that of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, three of our sister-nations of the Commonwealth, that we do not think we have shown any lack of patriotism.

IV

In order to promote and achieve unity in Canada, the French Canadians contend that they are doing the right thing in according the English minority in our Province of Quebec every right and prerogative. They ask only that the same be done for them in the rest of Canada, the common Fatherland. It is certain that our two races have everything to gain by standing together, come what may. We will stand together if Canadianism is understood to be the result of tolerance and mutual respect for one's neighbor, his characteristics and his culture. And it is by learning and

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speaking our neighbor's language as he learns and speaks ours that we shall first show proof of our desire to communicate directly with him and establish such friendly relations that national teamwork shall become a total reality. The ideal would be for English Canadians to speak French as their second language, just as we French Canadians have English as our second language.

If I might add a personal word, I would say that I myself have a very warm feeling and admiration for my English-speaking fellow-Canadians and Americans, just as many of them show that they have for French Canada. I fervently hope that this reciprocal regard shows the real trend of feeling. We should all strive to make it more general. Unity cannot be achieved by pitting one part of a body against another, whether the body be human, social or political. The crushing of one element can only result in dwarfing the whole.

Diversity cannot hamper unity. Diversity, by enriching it, strengthens unity. In strengthening it, it gives it a more cogent sense of order. *Unity in diversity* should therefore be the slogan not only of French Canadians, but also of all Canadians, of all the citizens of the United States, of all the inhabitants of Latin America, of all the people of France, of all the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Is it not the expression of true civilization? And it is the civilization which we each hold as our own, and which we all have in common, that we are fighting to safeguard and to raise to an ever higher level.

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ON OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

By Herbert Feis

Author's Note: The ideas presented in this article must make their way in the world of controversy on their own merits. They carry no official authority.

THE perplexities of international economic relations do not favor simple prescriptions or encourage bold ones. The facts that must be taken into account are intricate and the circumstances are variable. To attempt even a preliminary sorting out is something like trying to solve a jigsaw puzzle of thousands of pieces in the midst of heavy bombardment. But I believe one clue to the discovery of the pattern is clear — if the Anglo-American part of the puzzle can be fitted together, much of the rest will fall into place; while if it cannot, the pieces will long remain a jumble. This is so for several reasons.

First. The commercial and financial activity of the United States and of the countries of the British Commonwealth and Empire have been and will be a great part of the total of world activity. The policies they pursue will greatly affect the policies and fortunes of all countries.

Second. The hopes of a large part of the world for securing capital and consumer goods to meet pressing deficits in the immediate postwar period will be largely centered on them.

Third. Their territories contain a large part of the raw material resources of the world, and their citizens also share in the ownership or direction of many resources situated outside their own territories.

Fourth. They both are certain to engage vigorously in undertakings that by their nature are world-wide in compass — particularly shipping, civil aviation, telephonic and radio communication and the production and distribution of petroleum. In these fields the interests and activities of the two countries will come into direct confrontation at many points.

For these reasons, if the United States and the British nations can satisfactorily adjust their relations, and if they can work together to create and support international economic organizations, an orderly basis will be provided for economic transactions throughout much of the world. If they cannot do so, international economic relations will remain uncertain and turbulent; if they

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quarrel, others will be involved. I hardly need emphasize, I hope, that the foregoing is said without any suggestion that the United States and the British nations should afford each other privileges or opportunities of a type not afforded to others, or that all like-minded nations should not fully share in the negotiations and resulting accords.

II

Trade policy is the field in which satisfactory adjustments must above all be attained — not only as regards the movement of goods between each other's territories but also as regards the trade of each with other countries. The period immediately after the war may prove a favorable one for making them. For there will then be an insistent demand, both domestic and foreign, for goods; and active employment seems assured. Also, we may anticipate that in this period difficulties will be mitigated by aid provided through an international program of relief and rehabilitation.

But presently (unless the economic organizations of both countries find a miraculously improved balance as compared with the past) many branches of production will be found to have capacity in excess of naturally available markets. Circumstances now in the making suggest unpleasant possibilities which can be avoided only by foresight and a mutual determination to prevent them from coming to realization.

We in the United States will emerge from the war with the production of agricultural products, such as wheat and cotton, well beyond our own likely needs. This will be true even though our level of national consumption remains high. We shall have greatly expanded the production of other crops, such as peanuts and soya beans, to take the place of products hitherto imported. Many of our industrialists, especially those making automobiles, machine tools, electrical and marine equipment, refrigerators, road-building machinery, airplanes and chemicals, will look back at their prewar records of production as Lilliputian. Unless we find a satisfactory balance, both as between the different branches of production within the United States and in our exchange of goods with the outside world, a sense of frustration is certain to develop. This might well stimulate an impatient search for foreign markets on any terms, regardless of the fact that the means which others will possess to acquire our goods will depend

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on their ability to sell their own goods or on our willingness to forego payment.

I shall comment later about loans or gifts as a possible way of helping to bridge certain difficulties; if we make them, they should be even-handed, sparing, and designed ultimately to put an end to their own necessity. As to the use of special devices such as export subsidies and similar measures, I think it is clear that, in the case of commodities sold in competition with efficient foreign producers, they usually defeat their own purposes and cause trouble. Experience shows that the use of them by any important country stimulates offsetting uses by other countries. Should this occur, trade competition between ourselves and the countries of the British Commonwealth and Empire will be a constant source of ill will and reciprocal accusations. There will be fretful disputes over the signature on the sales slip for pins and pipecleaners, patent medicines, planes and parachutes, pears and peanuts. Nor, of course, will the difficulty be peculiar to our relations with the British.

For the United States will not be the only nation of the world that will have an urgent need for exports. The standard of living of the people of Great Britain and the activity of British industries have been and will be dependent upon the importation of a much greater value of goods than they export. During the years 1933–1938, this annual excess of imports into the United Kingdom averaged 330 million pounds sterling. The difference, as is well known, was financed mainly from the proceeds of British investment — including investments in gold mines — and shipping. The investment income of the British people and their resources outside the Empire will be much reduced by the end of the war, and shipping earnings cannot redress the loss. They will be compelled to rely more heavily than before the war on the proceeds of exports to countries outside the Empire.

The alternatives are plain: either we and the British nations will work out with each other a program which will justly balance our several necessities, or we will engage in a bitter trade rivalry that will infect our general view of each other. The methods and terms of the adjustment will not be simple or uniform. A compound of numerous and diverse trade and financial measures will be needed. The selection of them must be guided by acceptance of the view that neither will seek to solve its own problems at the serious expense of the other; by a strong intent jointly to favor

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and assist economic growth in the rest of the world; and by a willingness on the part of each to render, within reasonable limits, financial assistance to the other. Such an attitude can be hoped for only if after the war the two nations are dominated by a sense of having a common economic destiny similar to the present sense of a common military destiny.

The required measures will also have to be in harmony with the general characteristics of the internal economic situation and structure that emerges in the main trading countries. These characteristics we can now grasp only incompletely. But probably both in this country and in many others the costs of production and prices will in a substantial measure be "determined" or "managed" either by public action or by private influence exercised by industrial, agricultural, financial and labor groups. They will be less flexible than they were in the prewar period. Whether or not capital and labor will have the disposition and opportunity to shift easily from branches of production in which competition proves oppressive to other branches will be determined largely by whether there is prosperity and full employment or depression and unemployment. In the latter case, each group will grimly defend its cost and price position against all disturbance, no matter how gradual or moderate, from outside. In the postwar period, the state of employment will be a governing condition of the policy of nations. If there is relatively full employment for all, nations will be considerate of the needs of other nations; if there is not, they will not.

The cautious tariff-maker and the negotiator of international commercial accords will do well in any event to reckon with increased, not lessened, resistance to the impact of unguarded and open-price competition from foreign sources. If international trade is to grow in the face of such a tendency, rather than shrink, various positive measures will have to be devised for joining domestic programs and foreign trade agreements smoothly together. For instance, the perpetuation in some form of government purchasing activities or government-directed purchasing activities seems indicated, perhaps in connection with programs for maintaining stable supply and production conditions.

If the growing tendency towards "management" is accentuated to the point where international trade is unduly limited, then the great benefits of that trade will be wasted. Management could justify itself better by finding the terms and means for

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extending trade. There must be no wavering on this point if the United States and the British nations are to discharge their economic responsibilities.

III

Whether or not the United States and the British nations find a satisfactory and conjoined trade relationship will be determined largely by their disposition of monetary and financial matters. Here the question of the rate of exchange between the dollar and the pound sterling will be in the forefront. No great difficulty is to be anticipated in reaching an accord as to what the dollar-sterling rate should be, and in assuring its stability. The view has established itself in both countries, I think, that depreciation of the exchange value of a nation's currency is a poor remedy for economic difficulties; and the view that currency depreciation is a satisfactory means of gaining competitive advantage now meets with scanty favor. In fact, it is probable that a dominant aim in almost all countries after the war will be to try to maintain the relative exchange values of currencies in face of the possible threat of vast increases in currency issues and banking assets. The firm establishment of a stable pound-dollar rate would have a generally beneficial influence. For extremely unsettled economic conditions in many other countries, particularly those of continental Europe, may necessitate a trial period before stabilization of their currencies can be undertaken. That period would almost certainly be lengthened if the pound-dollar relationship was fluctuating. Further, an established pound-dollar relationship would facilitate the early lessening of exchange controls.

The development of international arrangements so that countries may aid each other in maintaining stable currency relations is widely favored. But their form, and the extent to which they should find expression in formalized international accords, are still undecided. They are likely to be considerably more significant than the Tripartite Monetary Agreement that operated as between the United States, Great Britain and France before the present war.

Should the pound-dollar rate be firmly established, and supported, we would desire and expect to see the gradual relaxation of exchange restrictions. However, it may prove useful to retain a system of intergovernmental clearing. Within Great Britain,

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and possibly in certain of the Dominions, there may well be, during the immediate postwar period, a need of maintaining some restrictions in order to direct the use of available foreign exchange for the most urgent needs of reconstruction. In determining its course in this matter, Great Britain will have to take into account the large accumulation of frozen sterling balances belonging to the banks and treasuries of other countries — particularly the Dominions, India and the Latin American republics. How long restrictions have to be maintained will depend upon many matters — the balance of payments position, the political outlook, and the alleviation which may possibly be provided through some international financial institution in which the United States and the British nations participate.

The range of the understanding between the United States and the British nations on monetary and foreign exchange matters should extend beyond the treatment they accord each other. It should include agreement as to the course that each will seek to pursue as regards other countries, though on neither side may it be possible at once to promise to adhere to a rigid uniform line of action during the immediate postwar period. One troublesome question that will present itself is the future disposition of the numerous "payments" and similar financial agreements with other countries to which the United Kingdom is now a party — as, for example, those with Argentina and Spain. Are they to be retained, modified or absorbed in more universal financial accords? The state of trade and the tendencies that prevail in the political relations between states — these will bear on the decision that might recommend itself in discussions between the two countries.

This compels consideration as to whether the United States and the British nations (as part of a general United Nations program) will be disposed during the period of postwar readjustment to make available some small fraction of their own national productions to meet the essential needs of other nations. Proposals of that sort may well emerge as the economic counterpart of a mutual assistance political system. How great the need for it will be we cannot tell now. If ample and responsive world markets are available, if a return of order and trust between nations reassures private capital, the burdens which governments would be called on to assume might be small. Once the war-impoverished lands had been aided to start anew, the funds that governments might

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be willing to provide would be used for the development of natural or capital resources which private capital could not undertake unaided; or they could be devoted to purposes of health and social improvement. Such undertakings would be well justified by the increased production which they would make available to the world.

IV

The seas are broad and the skies are vast. It is comparatively easy to prevent collision of the physical objects which may travel upon or through them; but it is going to require reasonableness and farsightedness to prevent collision between the people who build and operate the physical objects. The United States and the British nations will be among the most active in the operation of shipping, international air transport, and radio and telephonic communications systems. They must agree upon the principles in accordance with which these activities are to be guided if conflict is to be avoided. The task will not be made easier by the fact that the span of these activities includes certain ones which may determine a country's strategic and diplomatic situation.

No dispute is likely to arise over the rights of ships of any national flag to operate everywhere. The well-established rules that kept the ports and seas of the whole world open to the ships of all countries will be restored after the war. Some more specific questions arise, however. To what extent — now or after the war ends — should ships be turned over by us or the British to a country like Norway, whose shipping has always been one of its primary economic activities and whose ships are being largely used in the conduct of war operations? To what extent will the construction and operation of ships be left to become a field of embittered competition between Great Britain, ourselves and other contestants — an unrefereed battle for traffic between ships of different nations, all built at public cost and operated with the help of public subsidy? Can we and other nations agree upon a division of the shipping business, or upon the terms on which governments extend support to shipping? Fortunately, the immediate postwar years may provide an interim favorable to the settlement of these matters, since shipping may continue to be relatively scarce and in demand. Those who undertake to negotiate the necessary settlements will have to take into account military and political

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circumstances, the details of which are still of course unknown.

In the conduct of air operations the two countries may clash violently if cool minds do not direct developments aright. For activity in the air is excitingly new, and destined to increase in importance as it extends over and into remote and weak and dependent areas of the world. It will change the strategic and economic map. The traffic will be heavy, the operating organizations will be strong, the routes will be numerous, and the landing fields and installations far-flung. The air has proved a natural field for American enterprise — natural because of our habits of ready travel, our large trade, our ability to produce planes, our skill in operating them, and our experience in establishing international routes. It is also a natural field of activity for the British people, particularly in light of the geographic extent of the Commonwealth and Empire.

A free-for-all and unregulated struggle between nations to extend their own air lines will be enough in itself to plunge the world into bitter imperialist quarrels. There do not now exist any generally accepted premises on which regulations can be based. Rules and agreements to govern the use of the sky for international traffic and to establish and use ground installations still await formulation in large part. The aim is to establish broad and equal rights and obligations for all nations in this field. This can be achieved, I believe, without requiring any nation to endanger its security or to give up its right to exercise justifiable control over the use of the air above its territories and of the ground installations upon them. The prevailing principle should be "equality of opportunity," though there may well be some international routes and some ground positions in regard to which individual countries can justifiably claim some prior or semi-exclusive right or interest. The methods used heretofore in bargaining for transit and landing rights will not be adequate to produce the necessary international agreements. There will probably be a complementary need for accords or understandings regulating competition, sizes of services, taxes and similar matters. In short, a great new body of public and private international law is urgently required. The whole matter can become a test of reason or of strength; a world that knows the sufferings of war will make the choice.

In the field of international communications the task should prove much easier. Nations are not apt to feel that the problems

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involved have such military or political importance as air problems. Much can be achieved merely by agreements for linking up national systems. But in this field, also, the need for painstaking study and preliminary arrangements is pressing.

V

I turn now to the matter of how the United States and the British nations are to act as regards access to and control over raw materials. The question has been obscured by the protests and arguments put forward by Germany, Italy and Japan as a justification for their military programs — arguments made most eloquently at the very time when those nations were importing and stocking up on greater quantities of copper and chrome, of rubber and oil, than ever before in their history.

At the present time almost all nations control the exports of almost all raw materials. In the period immediately following the war some countries will doubtless maintain restrictions over the export of certain raw materials which are in short supply compared with reconstruction needs — particularly foodstuffs, fertilizers, textile fibers and products of the Far East such as rubber. These restrictions will to some extent handicap the economic recovery of other states and will continue to stimulate the development of high-cost substitute sources. The United States and the British nations will therefore do well to keep any such restrictions to a minimum, and try to influence other countries to do the same.

The emergency period in which the supply of basic raw materials is insufficient will probably in any case be short, for nations will as soon as possible turn their efforts towards producing for peaceful uses. Then, as in the past, raw materials produced anywhere in the world will again become available to purchasers everywhere at the same price. When this is the case, the question of "access" to raw materials boils down to the ability of each nation to gain through trade, on terms that are not oppressive, the means of paying for the raw materials which it needs. Only those who can pay with goods of their own production can induce the miner and farmer of another nation to work and sell, can get a foreign factory's synthetics or plastics. The greater the opportunities which each has to sell its products abroad, the more actual — as compared with nominal — will be its ability to secure raw materials from abroad. Of course international trade, no

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matter how satisfactory, can only modify, not overcome, the difference in effort required of countries of different productivity in order to procure foreign materials. The same pound of nickel wrested from the earth in Canada, for example, will cost the people of China more and harder work than it will Americans.

It may be taken for granted that the United States and the British nations will give each other (and other nations) equality of access, in the foregoing sense, to the raw materials available in their respective territories. In the past, however, the production or export of a few raw materials has been subject to public or private control. I refer to things like rubber, tin and quinine. In the future, controls of this kind must be prevented from establishing a monopoly, with monopoly profits, and existing controls should be brought under review and made genuinely international in character.

The current needs of war have brought under the concentrated light of Congressional investigation the many restraints on production originating in international private business agreements, known as cartels. Until this happened the American public were only dimly aware of their existence. Many European countries long ago came to accept the price and production control features of these arrangements as necessary.

Few of us have mastered the huge outpouring of assertion and counter-assertion as regards the retarding consequences of these agreements upon the production of such commodities as beryllium, magnesium, synthetic rubber, gasoline and pharmaceutical drugs. Nor have most of us mastered the similar material dealing with the effect of internationally controlled patents on the production of enterprises in, for example, the electrical and chemical fields. I therefore leave critical judgment of particular instances in these fields to others. It seems established, however, that agreements of this type have sometimes operated to prevent productive undertakings from being started in many countries, and have given undue price protection to favored producers. There is a feeling abroad that action by governments to review and possibly supervise agreements of this character is urgently needed for the protection of consumers and to assure that all countries will have fair productive opportunities. This is not a question particularly as between the United States and the British nations; but it is one to which they might well jointly address their attention, with a view to seeing which remedial actions are best

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left in the hands of national governments and which might be made of international concern.

More troublesome could be the questions that may arise as between American, British and other interests in the exercise of control over, or the right to own and develop, resources in their own colonies or in the territories of weak and economically backward states. This matter cannot be disposed of in a brief comment. If the raw materials produced are made available freely to all at the same price, the nationality of the owning or operating interest is of secondary economic importance. Whether or not, as between the United States and the British nations, control or ownership of any particular raw material resource will prove to have military or diplomatic importance, will depend greatly on the state of their political relations. If they are coöperating politically, and if an international system to safeguard peace is in effective operation, most such questions will be easily settled. In such circumstances, the governments could leave them to be worked out by the calculations and negotiations of private enterprise. But political tension would certainly be reflected in, and in turn be heightened by, conflicts over supplies of critical raw materials.

Both countries are pledged to avoid imperialistic adventures. Both are also pledged by the temper of the times to grant a reasonable share of opportunity to the capital and enterprise of other peaceful nations in the development of resources over which they may have decisive influence. These principles should be translated into effective practices.

Since petroleum is the basic fuel of peacetime life and the essential fuel of military action, it is of all raw materials the one apt to command the greatest interest. Every nation will want assurances that under any possible future circumstances of peace or war it will have sufficient supplies available. For such assurance, it must look first to the enlargement of the flow and supply of oil throughout the whole world, and secondly to the sufficiency of its own reserves and the political and military factors which safeguard them. Only by frankly recognizing each other's needs, and by sharing and partnership, can conflict be avoided in this matter, not only by the United States and Britain but by other nations as well. American enterprise has led in oil discoveries and developments throughout the world. We have drawn upon our domestic reserves with freedom. Now we are drawing on them

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even more heavily in order to supply the war requirements of all the United Nations. It will be essential, therefore, that American oil enterprise go forward in foreign fields, in close agreement with the other governments and peoples concerned, to assure adequate supplies for all countries on favorable terms and to maintain adequate reserves for our own use.

VI

Those who work on some of these problems at desks in Washington can be encouraged by the extensive and effective work carried on by the Anglo-American joint boards established during the present war. Amidst the Washington tumult of various high-pitched and briskly-expressed opinions the following boards are quietly operating: the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, the Combined Food Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Munitions Assignments Board, as well as a great number of other joint boards and committees with more restricted assignments.

The work being performed by these boards is, in essence, as follows:

First. To pool the sources open to the United Nations for the conduct of the war, and to guide the distribution of them in accordance with military plans and decisions.

Second. To try to influence and coördinate the production efforts of the United Nations so as to increase the supply of those materials most needed for war purposes and in accordance with standards that will make them most useful.

Evidently this field of operations is large and important. The judgment exercised by the boards determines whether the various munitions industries of each of the United Nations will have the raw materials they need, whether the production of such things as ships, tanks and planes will be well correlated to military undertakings, whether the food supplies available to the populations of the different United Nations shall be sufficient and fairly distributed, and whether shipping is directed to serving war needs as efficiently as possible.

They make their decisions subject, of course, to the approval of the governments they serve, and the execution of those decisions is entirely dependent on the machinery of their governments. Often the concerted action which they have been able to

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achieve has fallen short of what was necessary, and certainly short of the ideal possibility. It is not easy to merge the efforts of great and cautious nations and to discover the precise terms on which stubborn minds can agree. The fact remains that they have succeeded in a very real measure in translating into action the general pledge of coöperation contained in the United Nations accord: "Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war."

Each day, each week, the British and American representatives find it possible to reach full agreement on some specific points which determine whether their respective military forces will have more equipment or less, whether greater burdens will be laid on their respective treasuries or less, whether their respective peoples will have to make more sacrifices or less. Their decisions seem generally to have recommended themselves to their governments and to the public, if we can judge by the remarkably small amount of criticism that their work has aroused. Every student of military affairs knows the difficulties of being "allies." The Axis has made unceasing efforts to provoke disagreement between the American and British Governments on just the matters of military interest with which these boards deal. This propaganda has failed. The work of the joint boards — shaped, of course, to the decisions of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill — shows that the pledge expressed in the United Nations accord is being fulfilled.

Apparently there are some persons who long for the time when all machinery for joint discussion and coöperative effort can be boisterously dismissed and each country can indulge in the luxury of talking and acting in reckless independence of the other. Others, however, wonder whether the intergovernmental machinery developed in the stress of war could not serve in the postwar period as the framework around which to build the necessary structure for more lasting coöperation. The answer is not to be found in any textbook of political science. It will be given in accordance with the desire and temper of the two peoples when the war is over.

The achievements of the joint boards to date have been made possible by several favoring circumstances. The main objective, victory, is agreed upon unanimously. This Government and

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the Governments of the British Commonwealth have pledged themselves to the maximum effort, and the boards have had the firm support of their governments in applying that guiding rule. Further, they have not had to reckon with difficulties of cost and finance, for each country is ready to meet any required outlay to the full extent of its power. Will the peoples and leaders of the several countries carry forward this attitude into the postwar period? Unless they do, even well-staffed boards could accomplish little.

In any case, be it noted, the boards now in operation have found it necessary for practical reasons to include only British and American officials. Many questions of the greatest moment arising out of the concerted war effort and the need of sharing national resources in a common war have been decided in discussions in which the boards have played no part. Such was the case, for example, with the protocols signed by the United States and Great Britain with Russia and with the long negotiations with the Chinese and now with the French. It seems clear, therefore, that any of the existing Anglo-American boards which were maintained in peacetime would necessarily be only a fraction of the total machinery for conference and decision among the United Nations as a whole.

VII

These reflections are necessarily inconclusive. They will have served their purpose if they have brought into the foreground the need for a close concert of economic policy between ourselves and the British nations. But even this concert will be successful only if it is part of a still greater design and effort. The design must include all the United Nations and the effort must solicit their full help and participation in devising economic measures and institutions which will enable all to share in the benefits of prosperity and peace. Neither great nations nor small will find it satisfactory to live in uneasy separateness in the shadow of the airplane — unwilling to shape their methods of economic intercourse so as to dispel its potential dangers and unable to make full use of its productive promise.

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YUNNAN, PIVOT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Owen Lattimore

ACROSS the great colonial zone of Southeast Asia stretches one of the ragged edges of American and British thinking about the course of the war which we are fighting and about the aims which we hope to achieve by victory. Little is available in print about the multifarious problems that lie in wait for us in the vast territory between British Calcutta on the west and French Indo-China on the east, and such as there is either lacks official authority or clear thinking. It can be conservatively summed up, however, by saying that though there is not enough to prove a fixed pattern of planning there is enough to indicate a cast of thought.

Now a prevailing cast of thought usually expresses itself in habitual assumptions and a habitual approach to problems. People who are affected by such habits are often unaware of them, and are capable of thinking that they have decided on an original solution of a novel problem when they have in fact done no more than give a new name to something that either is not new at all or only partly new. Indeed, the phase in which, in the thinking habits of a society, the new and the old are intermingled, making it difficult to decide on new definitions, is probably a more critical aspect of the phenomenon of change than the phase in which old and new become sharply and suddenly divided.

We may go still further and say that from the study of the whole sweep of history a general law may be deduced, affirming that in human affairs genuinely sudden and "revolutionary" changes are abnormal. The normal process of change is one in which the new begins to draw apart from the old rather gradually. As they draw apart, a kind of web comes to be stretched between them, concealing the gap that is in fact opening between the old and the new. As this web is gradually drawn thinner and more taut it often simply wears away, and people become accustomed by degrees, and without surprise or alarm, to the fact that the present has become separated from the past, and that they can never return. Sometimes, on the other hand, the web of connection or continuity is drawn taut so rapidly by the rate of change that it tears apart suddenly, giving people no time to accustom themselves to the naked cleavage between past and present.

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When this happens, one part of society may find itself satisfied, on the whole, with being on the new side of the cleavage that has opened up; while another part may find itself left behind on the old side, or believing that it still is on the old side, or that the cleavage is not final and that someday it can return to the past. At such times both portions of the sundered society may be thrown into confusion and conflict, each against the other and also each within itself.

When we judge these historical processes the test of political competence is the ability to detect the phenomena of change before there is an open gap; to judge the texture and strength of the web which connects that which is changing with that which has not changed; to assess the rate at which the web is being drawn tighter and thinner; to anticipate the time at which a final gap will open between past and present; to foresee whether the cleavage will lie nearer to the side of the old or the side of the new, or midway between them; and to carry out with the minimum of disruption those political adjustments which have become inevitable.

There are several margins in this global war where the web that veils the final appearance of great and permanent historical changes is wearing very thin. One of them is in Asia. Our peoples and our governments in the Western world are in a general way aware of this, and accordingly there is little danger that we will run into complete disaster as a result of failing entirely to perceive either the processes of change or the necessities of our adjustment to them. There very decidedly is a danger, nevertheless, that we shall run into trouble by misjudging the critical areas of change, the rate of change, and the timing of our adjustment.

Various aspects of this problem are illustrated by our recent policy in China and by the adumbrations of our policy (for we have not yet openly committed ourselves to a policy) in southeastern Asia. In 1942 both Britain and America of their own accord gave notice to China of their intention to renounce the special rights and privileges which they held under the treaties of the extraterritoriality system. The new treaties have now been signed. We have thus of our own initiative brought to an end the century of the Unequal Treaties, extending from 1842 to 1942. In so doing we have changed not only the legal status of China but our own status relative to China.

Yet we are still a very long way from changing completely, or

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even adequately, something that is much more important: the habit of thought bred into us by a hundred years of the old status. The simplest definition of this continuing habit, which affects a far wider area than China alone, is the assumption that Asia is a geographical area which has things done in it, and to the people in it, by the Western nations. Conversely, it is often assumed that Asia is not a part of the world which can be expected to do things that alter the destiny or destroy the power of decision of the Western peoples. In this respect even Japan is commonly regarded as a usurper, not as an original political force. Thus in military terms we are resolute in our decision to drive the Japanese "back to where they belong." But in political terms we have hardly even examined the disturbing fact that it was because we were hopelessly out of date in our political thinking that we were strategically so vulnerable to Japan's assault.

II

In China's province of Yunnan the quality of our now prevailing thought can be tested in several ways against the nature of the problems with which we shall have to deal. Yunnan is the geographical frontier between China, French Indo-China and Burma. Just to the south, the northern part of Thailand wedges up almost far enough to prevent the junction between Burma and Indo-China. Farther to the west the borders of Burma, northeast India and Yunnan merge rather than meet in a wild and poorly surveyed marchland of mountain and jungle. Ethnically also, Yunnan is a frontier land. Of its population of approximately eleven million, more than half are not Chinese. Its many tribes and peoples illustrate the cultural process by which the Chinese people has been formed. Some of them are related to stocks which, anciently considered barbarian by the Chinese, have now become part of the amalgam of the Chinese people. Many of them are ethnically, culturally and linguistically intermediate between the Chinese and the peoples of Indo-China, Thailand and Burma.

Technologically, Yunnan is part of the pregnant and diverse frontier between the overwhelmingly agrarian China of the past and the new China which, partly as the result of the shock of war, is poised at the edge of an accelerating process of industrialization. Historically, Yunnan is the frontier where British penetration by land routes of the hinterland of India and Burma dwindled away during the past century, while during the same

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hundred years — the hundred years of the Unequal Treaties — there came into being and flourished an international system of controlling and exploiting China from ports along the coast, without deep penetration of the hinterland except along the waterway of the Yangtze, which represented an extension inland of the maritime system. Politically — and this brings us to the uncertain zone between the past on one side and the present and future on the other — Yunnan is the frontier between China, where we have begun to prepare our minds for a future that will be very different from the past, and colonial Southeast Asia and India, where, though we are too uneasy about the past to have much faith in it, we are neither decided about the future nor ready to decide about it.

This is the frontier where we should begin to think about the future of Southeast Asia as a whole, because this is the geographical dividing line from which we can work in one direction toward self-governing China and in the other toward the colonial regions of Asia which are not self-governing. We — America and Britain — are not working *from* this dividing line at present, but *toward* it. Looking landward from the coast of China, we accept the idea of self-government and freedom. Looking landward from the Bay of Bengal and the Java Sea, we do not. On the one side we have committed ourselves, not simply to the freedom and equality of one people, but to a whole body of ideas associated with that freedom. On the other side, we have not yet detached ourselves from commitment to the lack of self-government of a number of other peoples. Here again what is involved is not a simple political definition but a whole body of associated ideas. What is to happen when, after the end of the war, these two complexes of ideas meet, and we find ourselves involved with both of them?

An uneasy premonition of this future problem is already troubling men's minds. There is talk — a little of it open, much more that has not yet come into the open — about "how are we to deal with the future imperialism of China, and Chinese pressure to expand into Indo-China and Burma, and perhaps Thailand?" This talk is dangerous, and a symptom of politically incompetent thinking, because it jumps far ahead to worry about the hypothetical future. There may or may not be a Chinese imperialism in the future. There is an actual and present British, Dutch and French imperialism; there is a certain amount of actual and present American imperialism, and there is a deep

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

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American economic and political involvement in British and Dutch and French imperialism. To raise an alarm about an imperialism that might manifest itself at some time in the future is of course one way of justifying an imperialism that actually exists in the present. But if imperialism as such is bad and a danger to the world's peace, then the duty of honest statesmen is to deal with the imperialism that exists, instead of by-passing it in order to debate the dangers of an imperialism that might exist at some time in the future.

III

I believe the proper historical point at which to begin a discussion of the land frontier between colonial subjection and national independence in Southeast Asia is the building of the Burma Road, by the Chinese, in 1938. Until this time, the modern history of communications in China had been a history of *penetration into China*. Beginning about half a century ago, the Russians had built a railway out of Siberia into Manchuria; the British had built one joining Mukden with Peking; the British and Germans had built a system linking Shanghai with Peking; the French and Belgians had built one from Hankow to Peking; the Japanese controlled one from Korea deep into Manchuria. Then the Chinese had begun to recover control. In about 10 years, under the National Government, they had unified operation, under a government department, of the railways in which foreign capital was still invested. They had built other lines which were entirely their own. The first railway which they had financed and engineered as an all-Chinese enterprise was that which opened up Inner Mongolia. This was before the establishment of the National Government. In later years, they had built more lines and had begun a rapid development of motor highways. The "opening up of China" was already becoming a planned and orderly function of the Central Government.

The Burma Road, however, running through Yunnan Province to Burma, was the first modern line of communications which *the Chinese themselves pushed outward to a foreign frontier.* The significance of this has been largely overlooked because people in America and Britain tended at the time to think of the whole enterprise as a desperate Chinese effort to create an emergency inlet into their country for foreign munitions. The Burma Road was then thought of, and indeed still is often thought of, as

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a symbol of China's continuing dependence on the Western world.

What will be the significance of the Burma Road after the war? As far as some people think of it at all, they think of it, perhaps, as the line by which the Chinese might encroach on Burma. To assume any such thing is to concentrate on one possibility in a very complex situation.

Besides the truck road to Burma, the Chinese had already completed most of the engineering of a railway line from Kunming to the frontier by the time that the British lost Burma to the Japanese. There were no rails and no rolling stock, but the most difficult part of the tunnelling and grading had been done. At the end of the war, it would be the work of only a few months to complete this railway and extend it to Lashio. There could then be through rail traffic from Rangoon to Kunming and from Kunming (with a change of gauge) to Haiphong on the coast of Indo-China. The Yunnan end of the French-owned railway to Kunming would of course first have to be restored, because the Chinese have torn it up to prevent a Japanese invasion; but this could be quickly done.

If through rail communication across Southeast Asia from the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea had been opened in the nineteenth century it would have ranked in the history of colonial enterprise with the opening of the Suez Canal. But it was not. The French opened a narrow-gauge line into Yunnan from Indo-China, and the British discussed and partly surveyed a line from Burma; but colonial penetration of China by land across these frontiers never developed. The commercial and financial exploitation of China continued to be dominated by the system of treaty-protected concessions in the coastal and river ports. Now what was not done at the height of nineteenth century colonial expansion has become possible as the result of the rise of a free and powerful China. Since China will be the creator as well as the controller of the essential middle link in the line of communication by road and rail across Southeastern Asia, we may well take the Burma Road and its consequences as portents of the end of colonial imperialism in that area.

It is hard for those who do not know the old China to see at once the significance for Yunnan Province of road and rail transport and of access to the sea on two sides. It is even harder to appreciate the difference between the development of this remote corner of China that followed the opening of the narrow-gauge

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line from Indo-China, which was the work of French colonialism in its late, weak, and unashamedly corrupt phase, and the development which will be brought about by planned Chinese effort on a national scale.

When the Chinese were driven back from Hankow at the end of 1938 they lost the last important industrial center in their country. Ever since then the Chinese have held a fairly stable front. From Inner Mongolia to the Yangtze this front is in the main a north-to-south line. Then, from the Yangtze, it curves away irregularly to the southeast until it reaches the coast. On the usual political map, the logic of this front does not appear; but when the line is traced across a topographical map that shows differences in the height of land, it can be seen at once that the Japanese hold the vast plains of the middle and lower Yangtze and Yellow River, while the Chinese hold the higher country to the west and southwest. There are also blocks of higher land within what we loosely and not very accurately call Occupied China; but generally speaking such hilly terrain is more likely to be held by Chinese guerillas than by the Japanese.

Taken as a whole, the front proves that the armies of Chiang Kai-shek have fought a very brainy war. In the terrain which they hold, it is difficult for Japanese reconnaissance by air to keep an accurate check on major Chinese troop movements and concentrations. Moreover, when the Japanese attempt a drive into this terrain it is possible for the Chinese to dispose their forces in such a way that effective concentrations of Chinese troops cannot be cleaned out by effective concentrations of Japanese tanks, motorized troops and artillery. In order to get at the Chinese, the Japanese have to risk dividing their own forces into smaller columns, and this enables the Chinese, who are weak in planes, motor vehicles of any kind, and artillery, to "chew up" the invaders with trench mortar fire, machine guns, rifles and grenades.

Conversely, the Chinese in the open country are tied down to guerilla action. They cannot launch any major counterattack because of their lack of equipment. Once out in the open, their concentrations, no matter how swiftly they are made, can be spotted by the Japanese from the air. The Japanese can then bring against them counter-concentrations of combat vehicles and artillery with a devastating superiority of fire-power. This explains, in the first place, the long stalemate in China; in the second place,

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it explains why the Chinese need planes and other equipment in order to win the war — not, as many people so obstinately persist in believing, in order to "prevent a collapse of China."

The future of China, as well as the present strategic situation, is affected by the geographical disposition of the battle front. The line taken up for military reasons cuts with surgical decisiveness between the economic and social past of China and its economic and social future.

IV

For centuries the military and political history of China has been keyed to certain well-defined areas, appropriately called by a modern Chinese writer the "Key Economic Areas." [1] The most important of these areas lie to the east of the present battle front, in the lower plains of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. When, at the beginning of the seventh century A.D., the lower Yellow River was linked to the lower Yangtze by the Grand Canal, a standard was established for all barbarian invaders of China from the north, and all founders of new dynasties within China. He who could make good his control of the great, rich, productive plains — the "Occupied China" of today — could make valid his conquest or the founding of his new dynasty.

This was because farming — rice in the south and wheat and millet in the north — was not only the major pursuit of the Chinese, but the paramount, absolutely decisive occupation. Almost all Chinese were farmers; but it was the farming of the Key Economic Areas which produced a surplus that gave military and political power to control the whole country. Irrigation canals made possible a more intensive agriculture, and a higher yield per acre. Before the age of machinery, however, increased yields demanded, besides water, a high expenditure of man-hours per acre, which could only be supplied by a high population per square mile. Out of this there was created a well-rounded complex: irrigation gave a high yield; a high yield gave a high population and a revenue based on rents and land taxes. At the same time the waterways, especially the Yangtze and the Grand Canal, provided cheap transport of grain. Men moving grain by barges consumed part of the grain, but in less favored regions animals transporting grain by cart consumed much more. Consequently those who controlled the favored regions could accumu-

[1] Ch'ao-ting Chi, "Key Economic Areas in Chinese History," London, 1936.

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late grain at the decisive military and political points, enabling them to sustain garrisons in time of war and to tighten their economic control in years of bad harvest.

This China of the past was penetrated, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first by the mercantile and then by the industrial influences of the West. Under the Unequal Treaties, concessions were established at Treaty Ports chosen because they were most handy to the areas of high agricultural development providing tea and silk for export, and a selling market for foreign commodities. The first factories were established in the Treaty Ports because there they had legal protection in ordinary times and gunboat protection in times of trouble.

Shanghai became the symbol of this later development, with by far the greatest accumulation of machinery in all China. Few men bothered their heads about the fact that industrial Shanghai was an economic monstrosity. The greatest center of machine-building and machine-use in China, it lay far from the iron and coal that make machinery. More coal had to be brought to run the machinery, and there was no water power to use as a substitute for coal. Shanghai's machine-made goods were cheap because they destroyed the old handicrafts of the rural villages. Shanghai grew rich, or rather made fortunes for a few, because it was also the swarming center of the most terrible poverty in China. Its machinery devoured cotton and other agricultural industrial raw material, shattering the old balance between farming and handicrafts, creating for itself a cheap supply of labor from rural unemployment, and bringing coal and iron from great distances to provide industrial energy because cheap human labor and cheap water transport made the Shanghai industrial complex as a whole as financially profitable as it was economically and socially unsound.

Against this background the present Japanese invasion throws an ironically distorted shadow. Using as one of her main pretexts her hunger for industrial raw materials, Japan has invaded exactly those areas of China which are most heavily agricultural. Several iron and coal producing areas, of which the most important is in Shansi Province, lie within the line of deepest Japanese penetration; but these areas are closely beset by guerillas, and the Japanese have been able to develop no new exploitation on a scale that comes anywhere near matching their economic needs.

Developments in Free China must be appraised not only in

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themselves but in relation to Japan's problems in invading what we may call the China of the Past. Japan's invasion has affected and distorted, without bringing under satisfactory control, about a third of China's territory within the Great Wall; but at the time of the invasion this territory, because of its heavy concentration of intensive agriculture, contained probably more than half of the population of China within the Great Wall.

China succeeded in evacuating from the Treaty Ports into free territory only a pathetic fraction of her machine equipment. This equipment is of course lamentably inadequate to the wartime needs of Free China; but this should be no reason for overlooking the effect it has had on the fabric and structure of Chinese economy and society. The effect is epochal, in the proper sense of the word. It marks the turning point between the history of China in the past and in the future.

In Yunnan Province all the factors that need to be studied can be seen with special clarity. In Yunnan can be found many of the phenomena of the Old China that are considered to be typical; yet these phenomena are exhibited in a manner which proves other "typical phenomena" of the old China to be either fallacious or only partly true.

Agriculture in Yunnan is intensive, concentrated, associated with irrigation, and dependent on a high expenditure of man-hours per acre. Trade in commodities, until the Japanese invasion, was dependent on handicraft production, because there was almost no modern industrial plant except one or two textile mills. In mountain areas, marginal tribal societies had survived for centuries; but in open land which could be farmed in the Chinese manner the agricultural technique and the social structure had long become typically Chinese even though a number of non-Chinese languages and customs had shown a remarkable ability to survive. In one most important respect, however, Yunnan was clearly different from Yellow River and Yangtze China. In an area about twice the size of France, it had a population little more than one-quarter that of France. The "typical Chinese overpopulation" was lacking. Why was this?

First and foremost, Yunnan lacks cheap inland water transport. Several of the largest rivers in Asia run through it, but they run savagely, in deep gorges, and will probably never be navigable. Cheap road transport was also lacking. Yunnan is a vast plateau, ridged with mountains. Within the network of ridges lie

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many plains of rich bottomland. Most of them are ancient lake beds. They tend to be oval in shape and gently hollowed toward the center. Thus they are easily irrigated, making possible relatively dense concentrations of population; but most of these concentrations are local in character, not metropolitan, because only one or two of them are relatively large in size.

As each well-populated area was homogeneous in occupation and production with almost all other areas, there was no need for bulk traffic between them. Because of the mountains dividing them, it would have been economically wasteful to bring surplus rice from one region for storage in another region, even for political and strategic purposes, because of the small loads that carts could carry over steep roads, the extra animals needed for uphill hauls, and the expense of feeding them. (Chinese agriculture was never, in any region, geared to the growing of grains for the feeding of cart-hauling animals.) Consequently, Yunnan was a land largely without even roads for wheeled traffic; a land of narrow mountain trails on which packmules carried handicraft wares and such special commodities as tea, salt and tin.

Tin mining in Yunnan showed the characteristics of mining in China generally, though perhaps in an abnormally marked way. With the complex of Chinese economy and society as a whole set in a firmly established pattern, mining alone, as one minor factor in the complex, could not develop beyond a low technological level. There was no use, no demand, and no reward to stimulate the working out of methods for the production of increasingly large quantities at decreasing costs per ton. The economy and the society, taken as an entire complex, not only offered the best rewards to capital invested in agriculture but tended to force cheap labor to remain on the land. In such a system, capital invested in tin mining could only be sure of a profit by keeping methods primitive and the amounts extracted small, and by keeping the sale of tin as nearly as possible a monopoly. As with all minerals prior to the introduction of Western industrial influence, there was neither a market demand for tin which would result in increased production, nor a pressure on the market of large, cheap quantities of the metal to encourage the development of methods for larger use. The end result was that Yunnan, although it contains an unusually wide range of mineral resources, some of them in really large quantities, and though its climate and soil would permit the growing of a diversified series of crops with industrial

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uses, remained, until the invasion of China by Japan, a rice-growing region almost untouched by industry.

The war suddenly pushed a number of new factors into Yunnan. Each of these factors would by itself have upset the long established balance of society and economy to some degree; taken together, they operated not as single factors, but as a new complex, powerfully modifying the old complex and capable, potentially, of superseding it.

First in importance was the introduction of modern industry, including heavy industry. An important part of the small total of machinery in Free China is concentrated at and around Kunming, capital of Yunnan. This includes textile mills, arsenals, smelters, a small plant for making high-test steel, and a hydro-electric plant which, though small, is the largest in all China. Also — most important — there is a government-owned plant for the manufacture of high-precision machine-making machinery. This plant, the equipment of which was bought largely in America but partly in Germany, is the only well-planned and completely rounded one in all China, invaded or free. The machines were brought into Yunnan just in time, before all shipments through French Indo-China were suspended under pressure from Japan, with America and Britain standing impotently by.

Second in importance was the building of the Burma Road, or rather that portion of the road to Burma leading through Yunnan. This was a road which private enterprise had neither the resources nor the incentive to build. Central Government and provincial authorities were able to build it primarily because they had the power to conscript labor. Once built, the road did far more than open a way into China from abroad. It completely changed the structure of production and distribution within Yunnan, giving access to new sources of raw materials and linking them by a rapid, modern method of transport with the new industrial complex at Kunming. The effects already radiate beyond the province. One spur of the road, running north to Sichang, taps an area in which significant quantities of coking coal of the finest quality lie within a few miles of large quantities of iron ore equal in quality to Swedish ore. The potentialities revealed by the truck roads will naturally become even more important after the war, when the province is linked with both Burma and Indo-China (as well as with the rest of China) by rail.

Third in importance was the shortage of labor. Near the coast of

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China machinery has never taken full effect. On the one hand its long-range constructive potentialities were offset by its short-range effect in destroying a highly specialized agricultural economy; on the other hand, the cheap human labor thrown on the market by agricultural depression prevented a fully rational use of machinery. In Yunnan the centers of agricultural development on flat bottom-land are widely separated from each other by unpeopled hills. There would not in any case be enough people to supply the new activities created by industry and the Burma Road with a surplus of cheap labor; and the labor shortage has further been increased by the drafting of men and women to work on the building and maintenance of motor roads, and by the drafting of men to the distant fighting fronts, where Yunnan troops have won an especially good reputation. Shortage of labor has had remarkable effects in a country like China traditionally oversupplied with labor. It has put pressure on industry to make the most rational use of labor, and has rewarded those industrial managers who train and educate the individual worker most efficiently. Kunming has become one of the most important technological schools in China; the factories there compete with each other in giving their workers opportunities to increase their skill and knowledge.

For lack of space the total result must be described very briefly. Machines, formerly located at Shanghai for political reasons which did violence to rational economics, have been more logically placed in relation to raw materials. An attraction has been created for the eventual shifting of surplus population from eastern China to the underpopulated southwest. The basic lines of a system of rapid bulk transportation have been so laid out that they will develop immense new territories. The emphasis of industrial demand is more on skilled labor than on cheap labor. At the same time agriculture, being without a surplus of cheap labor, will be under pressure of a kind that encourages modernization and the mechanization of farming — something that had barely begun to take place in eastern China.

V

All of these are considerations that ought to modify the way in which we think of Yunnan as the province of China bordering on Burma and Indo-China. Kunming in Yunnan, like Chungking and certain other inland centers, will never again be related to Shang-

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hai as remote provinces are related to a metropolis. China, of course, will recover her whole coastline, and Shanghai, of course, will recover its importance as one of the world's great ports. But the industry, especially the heavy industry, which has already begun to take root far inland will not move back to the coast.

This will affect the whole future growth of the country. The centers of gravity both of population and of politics will shift westward. The relation of agriculture to industry will change, and with it the character of China's foreign trade and foreign relations. The forms taken by all of these changes will depend partly on what China does and partly on what other countries do. This is not a field for exact prophecy, because the possible variants are too many. All that can be foreseen at the present stage of development are the general limits within which the most important developments will take place.

Yunnan Province, for instance, is likely to become a focus of attraction for Chinese. Does this mean that a second stage is likely to supervene in which Chinese pressure will be exerted on Burma and Indo-China? Personally, I do not think so. Burma and Indo-China are more likely to gravitate toward China in political sympathy than to recoil from the threat of Chinese expansion.

Burma and Indo-China are very backward colonies. The commercial and industrial capital of their masters has developed only their fringes. In these and other colonies many Chinese immigrants occupied an intermediate position. The Englishman, the Frenchman, the Dutchman and in the Philippines the American were interested in banks and in a few large enterprises. They were too lordly to be interested in small-scale enterprise. Here the Chinese flourished. He made money out of the colonial subjects and invested his savings in ways that pleased the colonial rulers, putting them into banks or into plantations and small businesses that helped to keep the banks and shipping and insurance companies going. Often the colonial people disliked the Chinese even more than they did the real rulers of the colony; they could see from close at hand the Chinese making ten thousand dollars, and envy him; while the British or American or Dutch corporate enterprise that made money by the hundred thousand or the million was on a scale that they could only dimly apprehend. With the actual colonial rulers apparently too strong ever to be overthrown, and with the Chinese intermediate between the rulers and the ruled, and protected by the "law and order" of the

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colonial police, it naturally happened that the Chinese became the targets of a certain kind of dislike.

It is a mistake to assume that things will be the same after the war. Both Burma and Indo-China have deep, undeveloped hinterlands leading up to the Yunnan frontier. We think of the end of the war as meaning the reëntry into Asia of United Nations forces from the sea. But what are likely to be the thoughts of the subject peoples of the Burmese and Indo-Chinese hinterland, standing between a free China and those forces that come from the sea and look as though their mission were to restore the order of colonial subjection and racial discrimination, world without end? In their eyes the Chinese will assume an altogether new and more admirable position.

Furthermore, it is inconceivable that Yunnan will relapse into its old lethargy. It will become one of the most profitable places in China for men of energy, ambition, and special skill or experience. For this reason it is likely to be specially attractive to Chinese from the colonial possessions. These men once made money more easily under the colonial order than in China, and they were in the habit of thinking that when they had made money they could invest it more securely in the colonies than in China. Politically, they knew all about the inequity of taxation without representation, and fretted because whatever political representation they were allowed was more ornamental than real; but on the whole they were satisfied to remit money to the Kuomintang in China and to stay with their investments and their businesses in the colonies. Now, however, the illusion of the security of British, American and other banks and investments has gone forever, as far as the colonies are concerned.

We must bring our political speculations into line with these general probabilities. Broadly speaking, we know that China will have immense tasks of construction and reconstruction within her own frontiers after the war. Preoccupied with these tasks, she is not likely to want to expand beyond her natural frontiers. As for her relations with other countries, China need not fear encroachment from without for a long time to come. She is not strong enough to abuse other countries; but she is already strong enough not to be abused by other countries.

The only reasonable conclusion is that immediately after the war China's policy along her land frontiers with Burma and India is less likely to be determined by her own attitude or intentions

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than by the attitude or intentions of the colony-owning empires. If those countries which once owned colonies now occupied by the Japanese and which hope to recover them from the Japanese will show in good time an obviously genuine intention not to restore the old colonial order fully or permanently, there will be no danger whatever of a "new Chinese imperialism." If, on the other hand, China is made to feel that a ring of long-range imperialism, garnished with air power and sea power, is being restored and tightened around her, she will feel her own dearly won freedom menaced. And she is strong enough to react in ways very disturbing to us.

Today, there is in Asia not an adult man or woman, not an adolescent child, who does not know what freedom is. If these people are not either given the freedom which is as much their birthright as ours, or guaranteed a future freedom on terms that are specific, patently genuine, and above suspicion of political juggling, they will look to China. They will understand even better than we do the significance of the fact that China has both emancipated itself from a hundred years of Western imperialism and resisted successfully in war the imperialism of Japan. From the hinterlands that actually touch the Yunnan frontier, there will be direct and open appeals to the Chinese. How the Chinese might respond to such appeals would not be likely to depend on whether they were intent on expanding their frontiers; but it would be very likely to depend on whether they felt that their frontiers were being hemmed in by a renascent imperialism of the Western Powers.

The stand that China would prefer to take has been authoritatively stated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: "Having herself been a victim of exploitation, China has infinite sympathy for the submerged nations of Asia, and towards them China feels she has only responsibilities — not rights. We repudiate the idea of leadership of Asia because the Fuehrer principle has been synonymous with domination and exploitation, precisely as the [Japanese] East Asia co-prosperity sphere has stood for a race of mythical supermen lording over grovelling subject races." How China's "repudiation of leadership" will work out in practice, however, will not depend upon China alone. A China which does not seek leadership may be forced into leadership if the weaker peoples of Asia, their hope of eventual emancipation and self-government deferred beyond reasonable expectation, fall back on China for support.

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In short, Yunnan is the pivot on which events in Southeast Asia are likely to turn after the war. Whichever way they turn, the Chinese will be important. They may be important because of the example which they set for the rest of Asia in social, economic and political development, or they may be important because they back, either morally or with aid of one kind or another, the aspirations of their neighbors in Southeast Asia to become as free as China already is. In either case, however, it will probably not be the Chinese who give the first push that sets events to turning about the pivot of Yunnan. It is more likely that the push will come from us, the countries which for a hundred years have been accustomed to thinking of ourselves as the Great Powers. Whether we give the right push or the wrong one to the turn of events will depend first and foremost on whether our minds are turned toward the imperialism of the last hundred years, the winding up of which we have formally acknowledged in China but not yet in Southeast Asia, or toward the next hundred years, the opening up of which we have in fact inaugurated by our new treaties with China — inaugurated, not for China alone, as we are inclined to assume, but for all Asia.

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ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE SETTLEMENT

By J. B. Condliffe

LEND-LEASE is an emergency system of supplying war materials to countries whose defense against their Axis enemies is deemed necessary to the defense of the United States. Before the United States entered the war it could be described as a modern form of the subsidies that powerful countries have often in history given to their allies or potential allies. Britain from the outbreak of war gave the same sort of assistance, and on a comparable scale, to many other of the United Nations. Since Pearl Harbor, reciprocal or "reverse" lend-lease has developed on a considerable scale to meet the needs of United States troops on foreign territory. Thus the lend-lease system has become a means of pooling the resources of the United Nations in a common war effort. It is an essential mechanism for the conduct of the war. If the powers granted by Congress to the President to conduct lend-lease transactions should lapse, an elaborate system of inter-Allied financial agreements would have to be created in their place. Such a change-over would cause confusion and probably would seriously handicap war operations.

In its essence, lend-lease is an emergency program of economic warfare. It may have to be continued for a brief period after the end of hostilities in order to cope with the confused and urgent necessities of relief and rehabilitation. But this is a very different thing from reorganizing postwar international trade on a permanent lend-lease basis. There has been a good deal of loose talk implying that this might be done, as though lend-lease were a great economic discovery with long-range applicability. It has been suggested vaguely, for example, that exports for reconstruction and international economic development might be made on a lend-lease basis, instead of in the normal way against payment which must ultimately be made by imports. Such suggestions are perhaps responsible for the apprehension with which the whole lend-lease procedure is viewed in some quarters. They tend to create an impression that foreign consumers may in future be supplied, without payment, from the spasmodic surpluses of mis-

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directed American production — surpluses which might result in particular from programs of public expenditure designed to create employment in the United States. From an economic point of view, this would be an elaborately ineffective way to avoid recognition of the fundamental truth that exports must be paid for by imports. From the political point of view, it is absurd to believe either that the United States can or will subsidize foreign consumers indefinitely, or that foreign countries will be content to exist on a poor-relation W.P.A. or international food-stamp level.

In this article we shall first trace the steps by which lend-lease developed from a unilateral subsidy in kind into an extensive system of mutual aid. In the next section statistics will be used to show the extent to which normal trade is at the moment overshadowed by this new system of pooling war materials. The gradual emergence of principles for the settlement of lend-lease obligations will then be discussed. Finally, attention will be drawn to the opportunity which that settlement will offer for the restoration of multilateral trade and the expansion of prosperity.

II

The Lend-Lease Act was passed March 11, 1941, almost nine months before the United States became an active belligerent. Its primary purpose was to relieve the strain upon the British balance of payments. Great Britain had been at war for a year and a half, and for nine months had been virtually alone in the struggle against the European end of the Axis. London had made a tremendous effort to mobilize exchange assets, but current exports, gold shipments and security sales were inadequate to finance the ever-increasing imports of war materials, including food. Within the Empire there was effective pooling of resources, including exchange assets. Purchases outside the Empire, however, had nearly exhausted the available means of payments. Large fixed investments remained in British ownership, it is true, though ownership had in some cases been transferred to American citizens and the United States Government was about to take a mortgage on others. But it was not easy to mobilize these and there were insufficient liquid assets to continue and expand purchases to meet the rising scale of needs. The Lend-Lease Act was intended to solve this problem by making goods available for war purposes, not only to the British countries, but to "any country

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whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."[1]

The generalizing of lend-lease procedures began immediately upon the entry of the United States into active hostilities. The full story of reciprocal aid cannot yet be told; but immediate British aid to meet such urgent American needs as that for anti-aircraft guns has been publicly acknowledged. As detachments of American troops moved into widely dispersed theaters of war, and as the United States Navy extended its operations, increasing quantities of local supplies were obtained on reciprocal lend-lease. Full information on this broadening of mutual aid has not yet been supplied, since it might serve to indicate the size of the American forces in different areas. In the same way, the quantity of materials secured by the United States from Allied sources also remains a military secret. Some of these materials, like some of those furnished by the United States, have been purchased with foreign exchange; but much has been supplied without payment. The accounting must wait for the end of the war. In any case, the situation changes so rapidly that progress reports would not be very conclusive. Probably on balance the United States is a heavy creditor; but the regular reports on United States exports should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there are balancing entries, which in some cases may turn out to be very substantial.

By the end of the first year of lend-lease operations the President could report that: "All the resources of the United Nations are now part of a common pool, out of which arms and men pour as considerations of military strategy dictate. Into this pool flow lend-lease munitions, together with the entire military, air and naval strength of the United Nations." While this statement may have been based on aspiration as well as on fact, successive quarterly reports to Congress have indicated progress toward the pooling of economic resources.

For example, the fifth report, issued in June 1942, said: "American troops on Australian and British soil are being fed and housed and equipped in part out of Australian and British supplies and weapons. Our Allies have sent us special machine tools and equipment for our munitions factories. British antiaircraft guns help us to defend our vital bases, and British-developed

[1] This extension of its benefits has made the Lend-Lease Act a powerful diplomatic instrument in neutral as well as belligerent countries. Forty-two nations, including Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Iran, 'Iraq and Turkey, are on the list of lend-lease recipients.

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detection devices assist us to spot enemy aircraft. We are sharing the blueprints and battle experience of the United Nations." And the sixth report, in September 1942, stated: "Under reciprocal lend-lease General MacArthur's men are receiving munitions, uniforms, food and shelter from the Australians. Similarly, United States forces are receiving aid from New Zealand. The Fighting French in Equatorial Africa and New Caledonia are furnishing us with materials, facilities and service. In Great Britain we are receiving a formidable amount of munitions and supplies. Guns and camps, aircraft and military stores have been turned over to our troops. In July alone, a quarter of a million British workmen were engaged on construction for the American Army."

The pooling of resources began to be regularized in the important agreement signed by the United States and Great Britain on February 23, 1942. Similar agreements have been signed by the United States with China on June 2, with the U.S.S.R. on June 11, with Belgium on June 16, with Poland on July 1, with the Netherlands on July 8, with Greece on July 10, with Czechoslovakia on July 11, with Norway on July 11 and with Jugoslavia on July 24; while an exchange of notes with Australia, the Fighting French, New Zealand and the United Kingdom on September 3, 1942, set forth in somewhat more detail the principles governing the provision of reciprocal aid. A financial agreement with China dated March 21, 1942, and joint agreements with Canada and certain Latin-American countries, complete the network of agreements so far negotiated.

It will be observed that the commitments are bilateral between the United States and its several allies. In fact, the pooling is multilateral, but the obligations are bilateral. The same may be said of the administrative agencies. Washington is the effective center of the United Nations organization; but that organization exists in the form of bilateral agreements with the United States. This is clearly a difficult situation for the United States, whose world-wide obligations are not shared by its allies (though the United Kingdom has parallel obligations). It is also a precarious situation for the other countries, since a shift in American policy could wreck the whole system.

III

The extent to which barter under lend-lease has replaced ordinary trade is difficult to measure, even for the United States.

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While lend-lease aid does not necessarily constitute a debt in monetary terms, account is kept of the monetary value of the American goods and services supplied. Their nominal value is already impressive. The amounts authorized from appropriations to the President or by transfers from other appropriations total nearly 60 billion dollars. About 12.5 percent of this amount (7.5 billion dollars) had been or was being supplied at the end of November 1942. Most of this came from appropriations to the President. About four-fifths of the amount actually transferred represented military supplies, foodstuffs, raw materials and industrial goods; one-fifth covered services such as shipping and supply services, shipping repairs and shipyard facilities.

In the first year of lend-lease, the exports on this account were about 20 per cent of the total exports of the United States, and the proportion has grown rapidly. For the next six months it was well over 60 percent; and it still is rising fast. Monthly shipments were at the rate of approximately 8 billion dollars a year in August 1942; in October 1942 the rate was almost 11 billion dollars a year.[2] Meantime, the trade carried on through normal channels was shrinking in volume if not in value. It does not seem an exaggeration, therefore, to state that a new, improvised system of bilateral or unilateral barter transactions, designed to meet strategic rather than economic needs, has been superimposed upon and has now partly displaced the multilateral trade formerly conducted by private enterprise.

Unfortunately no clear picture can be given of the reverse process. Imports into the United States have increased, though not in proportion to exports. How much of this represents shipments on reciprocal lend-lease is not stated, nor can the facts be gleaned at present from the export returns of other nations. In any case, the greater part of the reciprocal lend-lease transactions consists of services and supplies to United States forces in foreign countries. It must be remembered also that Britain is practising what is in effect lend-lease to other nations to an extent which may approach what she is herself receiving from the United States.[3]

The fact that United States exports, mainly on lend-lease, have increased so much more than imports is an indication of the fact

[2] These figures do not include supplies exported to United States forces abroad.

[3] "Part of the military equipment exported to the United Kingdom has been sent by the British to U.S.S.R., Egypt, India and other areas of the Middle East. In addition, Great Britain has sent a major share of its own production of war supplies to these fronts." ("Seventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations: For the Period ended December 11, 1942," p. 11.)

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that lend-lease is a war expedient superimposed upon, but not woven into, the pattern of international economic relations. The paradoxical fact that the greatest creditor country in the world has an active balance of both agricultural and manufactured exports has been made more obvious. The United States is lending more by exporting more; but repayment facilities in the form of imports do not appear to be increasing. The hostile reception given by Congress to the President's request for emergency powers to abrogate restrictions on migration and imports for the period of the war shows that the resistance to payment for United States loans, services and even exports continues strong.

It is also clear that the barter of supplies and services on lend-lease is not cutting new trade channels for the future. New markets may possibly be created for certain American products by reason of their being supplied on lend-lease in new areas; but continuing trade calls for organized marketing services which are not being set up. At the same time, the prewar marketing organization languishes and shrivels, so that it may be difficult to restore trade along the old lines after the war. New agencies must be created, new connections made and customers re-won in former markets, while the processes of marketing must be established anew if the potential demands now being stimulated in new areas are to be met when lend-lease stops. Many complaints by private trading agencies bear witness to the serious consequences of the dislocation of normal trade channels.[4]

In the case of some foreign countries, reverse lend-lease operations may give rise to serious balance-of-payment problems. New Zealand, for example, by supplying food and equipment to American troops on lend-lease, loses sterling exchange which might be earned by exporting these goods to Britain. Consumers in England become used to substitute products and in the meantime New Zealand's means of payment for imports are curtailed.

While the organized machinery for the promotion of international trade is thus weakened, there is no weakening of tariffs and the other barriers imposed by government regulation, or of the various instruments of indirect protection. There has been a great extension and consolidation of exchange control and quota systems. Exchange control has, in fact, become universal. At the same time, war production, as always, has brought

[4] *Cf. New York Times*, October 2, 1942, p. 33.

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about great shifts in the pattern of international specialization. In the war of 1914–1918, German chemists developed synthetic nitrates and so dealt a heavy blow at Chilean prosperity in the postwar period. The development of synthetic rubber in the present war may be an even heavier blow to the future prosperity of countries which export natural rubber. These are merely dramatic aspects of a widespread process. Relative production costs of many commodities have shifted. There has been a hastening of industrial development in countries like Australia, Brazil and India. Agriculture has been rationalized in Britain. The whole structure of agricultural specialization in Europe has been twisted to fit the Nazi scheme of attempted self-sufficiency. The mobilizing of strategic materials by purchasing agreements, development contracts and preclusive buying merely accentuates the disturbance of former specialization. The fact that some of the war contracts will project into the postwar period is a relatively minor aggravation of an inevitable dislocation.

Examples might be multiplied of the many ways in which lend-lease operations are displacing and dislocating former trade relations without laying the foundations for the development of trade in the future. It is true, of course, that lend-lease will probably not create postwar transfer problems as a result of unbalanced financial transactions, and this is a great gain. The restoration of multilateral trade after the war, however, must be based upon the enfeebled survivals of the prewar organization, modified in some measure perhaps by the allocation of markets now being practised by Britain and the United States.

The smoothness with which United Nations resources are being pooled in the war effort is no indication that such pooling can continue after the war. Indeed, the fact that lend-lease is a substitute for the laborious breaking down of trade barriers, an avoidance of troublesome political controversies by a temporary war expedient, is likely to consolidate the barriers and weaken the organization of world trade.

IV

Minor quantities of lend-lease goods and services have been supplied against payment in foreign exchange. The bulk of the obligations, however, have been left for future settlement. Possible ways in which such a settlement might be approached are indicated in successive reports by the President to Congress.

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The March 1942 report referred to three significant lines of settlement with Britain as, first, "the military contribution to American security which flows from the continued British fight against the Axis;" second, "the increased flow of reciprocal aid;" and third, "an understanding with Britain (and prospectively with others of our allies) as to the shape of future commercial and financial policy." The following quarterly report went a step further. Its closing passage read:

> The real costs of the war cannot be measured, nor compared, nor paid for in money. They must and are being met in blood and toil. But the financial costs of the war can and should be met in a way which will serve the needs of lasting peace and mutual economic well-being.
>
> All the United Nations are seeking maximum conversion to war production in the light of their special resources. If each country devotes roughly the same fraction of its national production to the war, then the financial burden of war is distributed equally among the United Nations in accordance with their ability to pay. And although the nations richest in resources are able to make larger contributions, the claim of war against each is relatively the same. Such a distribution of the financial costs of war means that no nation will grow rich from the war effort of its allies. The money costs of the war will fall according to the rule of equality in sacrifice, as in effort.

This appears to mean that there must be all-round cancellation of obligations in respect to lend-lease goods actually consumed in the war effort, on the theory that each of the United Nations will have contributed, to the best of its ability, to the common effort and, having given of its best, will owe nothing to the others.

Of course, there may remain substantial unused stores of war implements: ships, munitions, machines, materials and food. The disposition of these must be negotiated at the close of the war. Many of the airplanes, tanks, munitions and other war supplies will be returnable, or if not returned may be paid for in some fashion — by the performance of garrison duty, for instance, or by contracting a loan, or by cession of bases or territory, or merely by conformity with policies desired by the creditor. Some stocks of food and transport facilities will undoubtedly be turned over to restored governments or to international institutions to be used for relief and reconstruction purposes in liberated areas.

The most knotty problems will probably be presented by the capital equipment which has been supplied on lend-lease in certain areas. Instances of such equipment have been cited in various quarterly reports — port facilities, unloading, storage and assembly plants, railroads, locomotives, trucks, pipe-lines and new

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industrial equipment. No estimate of the value of these supplies is available, but they are unlikely to reach such amounts for any country — even the United States — as to cause grave transfer problems, even if the full cost is charged at full interest rates. The really costly items supplied on lend-lease are such things as bombing planes rather than industrial equipment. Since the former are likely to be written off and the latter to be written down, the postwar trading world should not be afflicted with unilateral transfer problems comparable with those created by reparation and war debt payments after the last war.[5]

It should also be noted that the provision of capital equipment on lend-lease, to be settled for after the war, has aroused suspicions of imperialist designs in some quarters. Although the American economic mission to India proclaimed that its activities were limited to war production, it seems to have been regarded with suspicion in Indian even more than in British quarters.

V

The argument up to this point may now be summarized briefly. Lend-lease has developed into a system of mutual aid for the purposes of war. It approximates a pooling of the economic resources of the United Nations. It has grown to proportions that dwarf normal trading operations. Exports from the United States have inevitably shown the greatest growth. This barter exchange of strategic goods and services does not take place through organized trade channels. On the contrary, it has dislocated and enfeebled the private channels which conducted prewar trade. It seems likely that the principles of settlement for lend-lease obligations, now beginning to emerge, will avoid the exchange and transfer difficulties consequent upon unbalanced financial obligations. The restoration of expanding multilateral trade, however, will require a decisive effort in view of the great shifts in specialization and cost relations inevitable in war production.

Article VII of the master lend-lease agreement foreshadows "agreed action . . . directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, . . . to the elimina-

[5] There will, however, be a somewhat similar problem arising from the accumulated balances on trading account blocked in London and to a much greater extent in Berlin. This is the problem which lend-lease has averted wherever it has been utilized.

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tion of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers." In the circumstances, the implementation of this article will be a great and complex task.

The various stages of postwar action, beginning with reoccupation, relief and rehabilitation and going on to long-run reconstruction and economic development, form a complex and interwoven whole. It is natural that attempts should sometimes be made to distinguish between these stages. For example, the problems of relief, upon which much interest is concentrated, are sometimes discussed as if they could be dealt with apart from reconstruction problems, about which there are marked divergences of opinion — at least in the United States. In plain language, there is general agreement that it is the duty of the United States to take a leading part in the humanitarian tasks of relief; but there is strong resistance in some quarters to any relief procedures or institutions which would commit the United States to continuing participation in international political or economic action. Such resistance is particularly strong among those who realize that, at least during a prolonged transition period, international collaboration must involve a continuance of controls over the allocation of food and raw materials.

It is the writer's belief that relief and rehabilitation cannot be separated from reconstruction. Attempts to separate them proceed from political motives rather than from a realistic appreciation of actual conditions. In fact, the approach to reconstruction by way of the provision of food and other immediate relief promises to open the way to action in many fields: restoration of transport facilities, rearrangement of the pattern of international specialization, investment to raise productivity and living standards in hitherto depressed areas and, as a necessary condition of all these developments, a freeing of multilateral trade.

Not only is there an immediate connection between relief and reconstruction in each national area, but employment in the more developed areas will depend largely upon participation in the relief and reconstruction of less developed countries. Belgium offers a good example. To get food into Belgium, ports must be dredged and communications restored. The amount of relief needed will depend upon the measures taken to reorganize Belgian agriculture and industry so that effective production may be resumed. If Belgium is again to import staple foods and raw ma-

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terials, outlets must be provided for the characteristic Belgian exports of semi-finished and finished manufactures.

Thus the implementation of Article VII demands both negative action to reduce the obstacles to freer trade and positive action to coördinate national economic policies and direct them toward reëmployment and reconstruction. It is generally agreed that, for a transitional period at least, inter-government controls of commodity allocations, investments and capital movements, must be continued. But even if these controls should be directed toward establishing conditions of equilibrium which will permit the progressive restoration of free enterprise, there will clearly be need for international organs of coördination in such fields as exchange stabilization, foreign investment, commodity and cartel agreements.

An attempt to sketch a possible pattern of international economic organization after the first period of immediate relief would go far beyond the space of this article.[6] All that can be said here is that lend-lease is a useful expedient in the emergency of war but not a suitable base for permanent international economic collaboration; it is, therefore, unlikely to survive the immediate demands for relief at the close of the war. No self-respecting national community will wish to remain dependent upon such subsidized relief, nor is it likely that even a very rich country will be able to subsidize the rest of the world indefinitely.

The process of winding up lend-lease arrangements will afford an opportunity to secure agreement upon policies designed to reduce trade barriers and eliminate discriminatory trade practices. Those negotiations, the most important of which will obviously be conducted between the United States and the British Commonwealth, will also offer opportunities for the creation of machinery to stabilize the exchanges and reëstablish multilateral credit clearings, to direct capital toward the economic development of countries with low living standards, to moderate the cyclical fluctuations of commodity prices, and, by the coördination of national economic policies, to minimize recurrent strains on the balances of payments.

[6] *Cf.* the author's "Agenda for a Postwar World" (New York: Norton, 1942); and "Problems of Economic Reorganization" (Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1942).

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POLITICAL DANGERS IN THE SETTLEMENT

By William Diebold, Jr.

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE'S tight-lipped comment on the war debts owed the United States by its former allies was: "They hired the money." The lend-lease policy adopted by the present Administration sought to establish a basis for the most effective possible prosecution of the Second World War and also to avoid the sort of wartime financial errors which contributed so much to the economic and political troubles of the twenties and thirties. Article VII of the lend-lease master agreements provides that the conditions of the settlement "shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations." If this formula can be implemented, no serious economic problems will result from the American part in financing the joint war effort of the United Nations. But political dangers remain. As things stand today, certain aspects of the lend-lease program may well induce serious disputes with our present allies when the time for settlement comes.

When the President proposed the lend-lease idea he told his press conference, on December 17, 1940, "What I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign . . . get rid of the silly, foolish old dollar sign." There should be no financial debt, only repayment in kind. "Suppose my neighbor's house catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.' . . . I don't want $15 — I want my garden hose back after the fire is over."

The lend-lease master agreements carried the concept a step further. Goods that have not been destroyed shall be returned if the President wishes it; "full cognizance shall be taken" of reciprocal lend-lease aid; the remainder of the settlement shall be such as to further the broad economic ends sought by the United

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Nations. Commenting on Article VII, the fifth quarterly report on lend-lease says: "By this provision we have affirmatively declared our intention to avoid the political and economic mistakes of international public debt experience during the twenties." There has been no serious public opposition to this idea, either at the time the lend-lease bill was passed or since our entry into the war. There is no evidence that "informed public opinion" expects repayment of any large share of the lend-lease aid we have sent to our allies.

Recognition of this change from the attitude voiced by President Coolidge seems to have combined with the sheer novelty of the lend-lease idea to create a widespread belief that all the poison has been taken out of inter-allied debt relations and that the settlement can now be left largely to the experts. Such a belief will not stand examination. Two conditions in particular may lead to political trouble: (1) the widespread public belief that the United States ought to be repaid for lend-lease aid, and foreign uncertainty as to what we will ask in settlement of the account; (2) the treatment of lend-lease as aid from the United States to other countries.[1]

What evidence there is regarding American public opinion indicates that most people think the United States *should* be repaid for the lend-lease aid sent to its allies, although they have considerable doubt that it *will* be paid. This has not interfered with public support for the program. In January 1943, one-quarter of the people interviewed in a Gallup poll did not know what lend-lease was. Of the remainder, 72 percent felt that the countries receiving lend-lease aid should repay the United States for it (which means that 54 percent of the total number of persons interviewed gave this answer). However, only 29 percent believed we really would be repaid, and 58 percent thought we would not be. These results bear out those of earlier polls conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver. The latest poll by that organization, taken in July 1942, shows that 39 percent of those polled thought that Britain should repay all of the lend-lease aid received from the United States, 43 percent wanted "part" paid back, and only 8 percent thought there should be no repayment. Somewhat smaller

[1] *Cf.* "The Economic Implications of Lend-Lease," a paper read before the American Economic Association, January 7, 1943, by Eugene Staley, to whom the present author is indebted in a number of ways.

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percentages favored repayment by the U.S.S.R. Only 20 percent thought China should pay back everything, while 24 percent thought she should make no return at all.

The polls are not altogether satisfactory. Repayment "in part" may mean almost anything. There was no attempt to find out what people would say if they understood what this country would have to do to accept full repayment. Nevertheless, the results of the polls are of considerable political significance. Only a small percentage of the population seems positively to believe that we should not be repaid for lend-lease aid. A majority believes our allies ought to repay us. Others do not know what lend-lease is; we may presume that if they did, most would think that we should be paid for goods sent abroad. If this situation has not been changed before the time comes for the lend-lease settlement to be made, any propaganda group in this country will be in an excellent position to mobilize support for the idea that we should "take a strong stand" and that failure to collect is a betrayal of American interests. With political strength of this sort apparently to be had almost for the asking, it is too much to expect that no one will seize it. Of course, public opinion may change before the time comes for a lend-lease settlement, provided there is a prompt and prolonged and effective attempt to explain that we have more to gain from a "generous" settlement than from a strict accounting. The polls show that a sizeable group of people believe we will not be repaid, even if they think we should be. This indicates that there would probably be a good reception for a well-presented argument against insisting on repayment.

Foreigners are aware that their obligation to the United States under lend-lease is indefinite. The fundamental economic position of some countries may be deeply affected by the policy we finally adopt. Uncertainty usually has bad effects on policy. For instance, in "Reconstruction," a report on postwar problems, the Federation of British Industries presents as one of the arguments favoring a bilateralistic commercial policy for Britain the supposition that, "Instead of being a creditor, we shall be a debtor nation, to an unknown extent, in view of the implications of 'lease-lend.'" Whether it is true that by any accounting Britain would become a net debtor, and whether it follows from this that bilateralism is the best policy for Britain, is not the question. What is politically significant is that foreign countries may feel

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that lend-lease is a contingent liability of unknown size that can be met only by adjusting all their policies toward this end. The feeling in allied countries that the United States holds a whip hand over their future is not likely to encourage postwar coöperation between them and this country. They may be expected to try as hard as possible to escape from such a position, even if that means ignoring some of the goals set out in Article VII of the master agreements.

The second great political danger lurking in the lend-lease settlement arises from the fact that lend-lease is a national instrument of the United States used to aid our allies. "The transfers made under the Lend-Lease Act . . . are contributions of material to a common pool with which a common war is being waged."[2] Nevertheless, they are still marked down in the books as aid sent from the United States to individual allied states.[3] Detailed accounts are kept by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration showing the quantities and value of all goods (and services) sent abroad to our allies or received by them in the United States. Reciprocal lend-lease aid from our allies to the United States is similarly catalogued by us and, apparently, credited to the account of the country from which we receive it. The decision as to what shall be sent abroad under lend-lease, and in what amounts, is made by agencies of the United States Government acting on requisitions from allied governments. The power of decision as to what shall be used where in this "common war" is thus largely in American hands. However wise and correct the decisions of American governmental agencies may be, they are not common decisions in the same sense that this is a common war. The political implications of these facts bear largely on wartime questions and fall outside the scope of this article. It is the political implication of the fact that accounts are kept, and of the manner in which they are kept, that is dealt with here.

An account implies a balance. There is a total which represents American aid to a particular allied country and another total showing the aid which that ally has given to us. The difference between these two totals must inevitably appear as a "debt" from the country which has given less to the country which has

[2] "Fifth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations," p. 13.

[3] A number of neutral countries receive lend-lease aid, but the bulk of it goes to our allies. The comments in this section apply to a settlement with them only.

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given more. This is true whether the debt is to be paid or forgiven. It is generally assumed that the United States will be the creditor of its allies on lend-lease account, and this is probably correct. Financial repayment has been ruled out, but the balance of the lend-lease account of the United States with each ally would presumably be the indication of how much return in kind or by way of other "benefits" we would expect from that country. Or, if we asked no return and forgave the debt, the balance would appear as the index of how generous we had been to each ally.

Such accounting concepts, and a balance indicating the debt one country owes to another, are not compatible with the idea of a common war. Victory is a vital interest of all the United Nations, and whatever each country does to help attain victory is at once aid to the common cause and self-help. Not all of the contributions of any country can be measured in common terms. Inevitably, one ally will suffer heavier losses in men than another. How can this be weighed against a larger output of war materials? As Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius has said: "What the other United Nations do to bring about the defeat of the Axis is obviously a vital contribution 'to the defense of the United States.' This is a benefit which cannot be measured in figures. There is no standard of values by which the loss of a thousand Russian lives, for instance, can be compared with a thousand fighter planes."

This incommensurability carries the seeds of postwar clashes between the United States and its present allies. It is not hard to imagine conditions under which Americans would come to feel that they had been "swindled again" because the foreigners never paid for what we sent them to use in the war. Our ex-allies could just as easily forget that Americans, too, died in the war, and might regard the balancing of lend-lease accounts as a new attempt to fasten American commercial domination on the world and make the poor pay tribute to the rich.

Even if we consider only goods, and services which in peacetime would be commercial, lend-lease accounting makes no sense. American and British troops are fighting side by side in Tunisia. The Lend-Lease Administration has made it clear that on the battlefield available material is shared as needed, presumably without regard for accounting.[4] However, suppose the British troops are using equipment previously supplied from the United

[4] "Seventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations," p. 14.

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States on lend-lease. If a town must be taken and the British troops do it, the British Government incurs a debt to the United States by using up the equipment. If American troops carry out the operation, no such obligation is created. Innumerable examples of the same sort can be imagined, all pointing to the absurdity of thinking of wartime operations in accounting terms. To match the charges we would make for war materials supplied by us for use against the Axis, our allies might suggest that we pay them for the services of men to fire the guns or drive the tanks, since we have not enough skilled labor on the spot to handle our own output. The idea is no doubt fantastic. It illustrates the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between things which should be paid for and things which should not be paid for in the war against the Axis.

There is room for endless controversy over the settlement of lend-lease accounts. We keep a detailed record of what we send abroad, but apparently the British, at least, do not make a similar check of what they have received from us.[5] Mr. Stettinius has testified that our own officials have not been able to keep detailed accounts of the value of reciprocal lend-lease aid supplied to us by other countries because of the difficulty of putting dollar valuations on all of the goods and services involved.[6] In following the complicated processes of valuation, determination of ownership and use, and in tracing the history of particular supplies, there are many chances for disagreement between allies if a detailed casting-up of accounts is attempted.

Perhaps the greatest threat of friction in the lend-lease settlement lies in the determination of what shall go into the reciprocal lend-lease accounts which our allies are too ffset against the lend-lease bills that we can present. In the first place, there may be disagreement among the officials of all governments as to what shall be included, and among the experts as to which items should be counted and which not. But it is from the "inspired" public reaction that the most serious trouble is to be feared. No question would arise, probably, over such things as food, construction materials, wages of civilian labor, transportation facilities, army equipment, and the like, which our allies might supply to us. This is the same kind of thing that we are supplying to them under lend-lease. However, there are other facilities,

[5] Oscar Hobson, "Mixed Up in Their Affairs," *The News Chronicle*, September 15, 1942.
[6] OWI Press Release No. 1147, January 24, 1943.

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more directly connected with fighting, about which there is no convention or understanding that they represent "services rendered" for which one would expect to pay a fee. For example, rent for airfields in the British Isles might appear to some Americans to be not very different from "rent for the trenches," about which there was so much misinformation, misunderstanding and recrimination after the last war. Great political play might be made of an attempt to charge to reciprocal lend-lease the telephone bill General Eisenhower must have run up in London laying plans for the North African campaign. It could be made to seem the crassest commercialism for the British Government to charge the United States passage-money for American troops who went to England on British ships. Over such items as these there could be bitter and endless controversy, particularly if they were unearthed as a "discovery" by those who wish to present them in an unfavorable light at the end of the war. Even if the money value of such items were negligible, the bad feeling they could engender might easily make all the difference between an atmosphere in which international peacetime problems could be met on the basis of collaboration and one in which friction and rivalries would destroy the possibility of establishing peace and restoring prosperity.

Too much of the difficulty should not be ascribed to the accounting process alone. The root of the trouble and the prime source of danger are that we are trying to fight a common war largely on the basis of separate national actions. No doubt it would be impractical to scrap the accounting process altogether. Records are necessary. But no one ever thinks that because weapons produced in Massachusetts are used by troops coming largely from South Carolina the latter state incurs a debt. While accounting is not the original source of the possible trouble, and may be a necessary process, it is likely to produce serious political repercussions if the lend-lease settlement calls for a casting-up of the accounts. Perhaps there is an ingenuity of accounting that will avoid this danger. Otherwise the only feasible solution would seem to be a complete wiping out *in advance* of the possibility that any international obligation will flow from lend-lease, regardless of who is creditor and who is debtor when the war is over. Presumably this could be done if the President announced that the use of materials in the war against the Axis constituted the "benefits" to the United States which he is authorized to

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determine under the Act. No doubt equivalent action could be taken by the proper authorities in other countries.

Perhaps other ways can be devised to avoid the political dangers inherent in lend-lease as it stands today. The Lend-Lease Administration itself has suggested that the principle of "equality of sacrifice" might be applied. Whether this is feasible or not, and whether the principle can be given precise meaning, is a matter to be explored. It has also been suggested that lend-lease supplies be allocated to the commanding officers of United Nations troops in various parts of the world, not to any country. An international corporation which would receive and disperse all lend-lease supplies, even if only in a formal, bookkeeping sense, is another possibility. Regardless of the form of the solution, the main aims to be achieved would seem to be two: (1) the avoidance of any attempt to "count-up" mutual aid so as to strike a balance; (2) the determination of as definite a settlement as possible in advance of the peace, so as to prevent the growth of a public opinion in the United States favoring repayment and the adoption by foreign countries of undesirable policies as a result of uncertainty regarding their obligations to the United States.

The purpose of this article is not, it will have been seen, to say how an effective lend-lease settlement can be reached, but to point out some of the political dangers inherent in the present process. The master lend-lease agreements and the statements of American public officials have gone far to assure the world that the lend-lease settlement will not damage the postwar economy and may be used to facilitate a generally desirable settlement. There is no similar assurance that the lend-lease settlement will be politically beneficial. Present evidence points the other way. "We have scotched the snake, not killed it."

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OUR ISLAND HEMISPHERE

By Waldo Frank

WE NEED broad generalizations for our social and cultural thinking, as engineers need the formulae of physics. Both are working approximations, certain to shift with deepening awareness — as, for example, Newton's mathematics was amended by the non-Euclideans, Einstein, the quantum theory. Man is an infinitely more complex field than physics. Therefore, our generalizations on man, compared to those of algebra or geometry, are at once more crude and more shifting, precisely because the human substance is more subtle and eternal. Thus, the generalization of the "three Americas." It ignores deep distinctions, in order to give us a conceptual tool for *thinking* America at all.

When I call the United States and Canada "one America," whose signature is Anglo-Saxon, I am not unaware of French Quebec. I know the weight and strength of non-Anglo-Saxon elements in the United States, the ever-widening and deepening contributions of Latin, Negro, Slav, Jew and Celt to our symphonic nation. Nevertheless, our dominant note — political, psychological, cultural — is an adaptation from British sources. Language has played a great rôle in this; for our words shape and limit the scope of our thinking. The Protestant religions have played a large part, even among those who have consciously abandoned the credos of their fathers. Most influential of all has been the excellent adaptability of British *mores* and values to the pioneer life of temperate North America and to the needs of a commercial-industrial civilization.

"The domain of Spanish" we may call a second America. It has far wider and subtler variations within it. Nations like Cuba have a strong Negro strain. Nations like Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, are profoundly determined by the high Indian cultures. Nations like Costa Rica are predominantly Spanish. Those like Argentina and Chile have strong European populations other than the Spanish. Yet they form one America, because of Spain and of the incidence with Spanish traits of the Indian cultures. Mexico, for instance, in which the inhabitants without Indian blood are a small minority, is a deeply Hispanic country, more Spanish in character than Argentina. And yet basic Hispanic elements per-

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sist in the Argentine transformation and converge with the primordial Indian traits of the *gaucho*. Even in a country where the Negro is strong, like Cuba, the African element has been Hispanicized. Cuba's music is close to Brazil's in idiom; but its accent, rhythm and meaning are closer to the Hispanic musics. Between all the American nations that speak Spanish there is a strong family resemblance which is determined not alone by language and the common heritage of history and religion, but more deeply by the selective convergence of Spanish and Indian traits upon a common American present.

The third America is Brazil. Brazil's racial elements are almost identical with those of Hispanic America; the man of Portugal is not far from the Spaniard; and the African and Indian components of Brazil are, of course, close to those of our second America. Yet Brazil is distinct — as distinct, indeed, from the other great family of Ibero-America as she is from us. The Indian of the great tropical forest is at an adaptive disadvantage, compared to the Indian of Mexico or Peru. On the other hand, the African in Brazil's tropic forest is at an immense adaptive advantage. The Portuguese, moreover, since the earliest Christian centuries, has been a strong variant from the other "Spains" of Castile, Aragon, Andalusia, Catalonia. The resultant in Brazil of all these differently developed and selective strains is a people as distinct as we are from the passional and tragic America of Spain: a people in certain ways closer to us than to their Iberian brothers.

The three Americas vary in their understanding of each other. The weakest of them, economically and politically, because it is split into nearly 20 republics, the America that speaks Spanish,[1] understands itself and the other Americas best. The weak must understand the strong. And in the case of this America, political weakness is joined with cultural strength. Brazil has a slow cultural gait not unlike ours; a trait of a vast continental country which can take its time about making up its mind. Yet Brazil knows us far better than we know Brazil. Brazil's knowledge of the other Ibero-America is weaker. Perhaps one reason why we are better understood by them than they are by us is that we are more accessible to the Ibero-American understanding. There are, of course, hundreds of thousands of peasants from Mexico to Brazil who have scarcely heard of our existence, whereas any

[1] The reader will not forget that Indian languages are also spoken by millions, especially in Mexico, Paraguay and the Andes.

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American is likely to have attended a balderdash movie "about" Rio. But large numbers of Ibero-Americans have in their past a strain of the European which makes the United States an open book, compared to what the Afro-Indian-Hispanic past is to most Americans.

Yet the reasons for our ignorance lie deeper. The strong need not know the weak neighbor. And our mind, so long as it remains complacently rooted in the shallow empiricism of the eighteenth century, cannot know cultures whose chief expressions are religious and aesthetic. A dimension of reality is lacking from our common consciousness; that is why, when the average American looks south, he sees a distorted vision of "picturesqueness" or violent revolution. But the deeper, because more organic, consciousness of the Ibero-American can embrace at least the surfaces of our commercial civilization and of our culture of comfort, entertainment and fact-finding. The great, dissident voices of our culture — Emerson, Poe, Whitman, Thoreau — have always been recognized and respected in the Ibero-Americas. And our masters of technics, industrial or political, have always found Ibero-American disciples.

The relations of the United States with the other Americas have been elementary, calling for little penetration beyond the needs of buying and selling. (There have, of course, been exceptions: Mexican art, for instance, has influenced our recent art; American archeologists have done good work in Central America. But the exceptions have not gone deep.) Our diplomatic relations have on the whole been patterned after our rudimentary business intercourse: a combination of bargaining and bulldozing, with rhetorical appeals to our mutual democratic tradition.

The conscious relations between the two Ibero-Americas have not been much better. In Brazil, there is an oppressive silence about her neighbors, although Mexico enjoys a remote high esteem. In Argentina the silence is broken too often by shallow irrelevancies about Brazil. The Spanish-speaking republics have little sense of unity on the political plane; they are but vaguely aware of Brazil as a potential power from whose growth they may all profit. Lack of functional intercourse is the chief hindrance to good inter-Ibero-American relations. There is not trade enough, although it grows. Argentine wheat, for instance, goes increasingly to Brazil in exchange for coffee. Uruguay and Chile know far more sharply their need of relations with the United States

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than with Brazil or with each other. The pervasive inter-Ibero-American feeling is cultural. And it is likely to ignore the difference between Brazil and the other republics. To the poets and novelists of Spanish-speaking America, Brazil is "one of us" — and to the social revolutionaries, also.

II

Variety, confused, is weakness; integrated, it is life. Rich as the experience of these three Americas has been, their future holds a vastly deeper promise. Said Alfonso Reyes, the great Mexican man of letters: "We have never been able to resign ourselves, from both sides of the linguistic frontier, to the proposition that the American world is a geographic and historic accident; we have ever understood America in the prophetic sense."[2] Sociology, economics, all human history, have conspired to make the poets' dream into a necessity. The three Americas need one another to become themselves. The functioning principle of each of the three — and of each political entity within each — must be the One America. As one, they can best do business together. As one, they can stand firm in a dangerous world and conserve their independence. As one, most important of all, they can channel and energize their national powers in a dynamic direction which will ensure health within each frontier, and harmony together. Their need is manifest in what each of them has that the others lack. The relations between them of exchange and mutual nurture are organic; they are the relations of integral personalities, each sovereign, yet for the fulfillment of its independence demanding integration with the others.

The three Americas have a more immediate possession than a hemisphere, a possession without which the hemisphere could easily disintegrate, in political and cultural terms, like Africa or Asia. It is their common sense of democratic destiny, their dynamic will that the term New World shall have a meaning deeper than the geographic in which the discoverers used it. The Jesuits in Paraguay, the Puritans in New England, were remote yet strict collaborators in what became the American Commandment: to build in this hemisphere the new City of Man. The eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century statesmen who forged the Americas' political independence turned this early

[2] In his introduction to the new edition of "Virgin Spain," by Waldo Frank (New York: Duell, 1942).

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religious aspiration into a secular religion. What it lost in depth it gained in practicability. Men like Jefferson and Franklin and their southern disciples who founded the Hispanic republics were convinced that the New World would issue from properly drafted political constitutions. Their conception of democracy was naïve; but it served to put the vision of free men on the statute books from Canada to Chile.

Freedom is infinitely more complex and tragic than these optimistic children of Rousseau and Locke conceived. The generations since they founded the American republics have had no greater, no more arduous task than to deepen the American religion of democracy. The United States played the leading rôle in its establishment, in the actual writing of it as the basis of all American law and in the development of social-political and mechanical technics for its propagation. The peoples of America Hispana, politically and economically our backward disciples, have played the leading rôle in the deepening of the democratic concept. This they have done, not by overt doctrine, but by their racially, aesthetically and intellectually more free and more organic ways of living.

The perils of the Americas, and their capacities, complement one another. In the Ibero-Americas there is danger that the released depths of emotional and aesthetic power, lacking order in political and economic forms, lacking communication, lacking industrial organization, may remain in flux and chaos. Our danger is that our stereotypes of economic and political forms, becoming ends and objects in themselves, may absorb our love, drain our energies, shallow and deplete our vision. Our life is perilously centrifugal. The life of the other Americas is perilously subjective. We save the lives of our children; through the schools and the mechanized arts of radio, newsprint, movie, we give them intellectual and aesthetic nurture. But we lack values for the substance of this nurture; we lack even the will and the "time" to criticize our lack of values. Our fellow-Americans, as superior to us in the substance of their values as we are to them in the matter of roads and the distribution of goods, let their children die; and those that survive, they permit to be exposed to alien, more efficient forms of communication.

The wondrous truth is that the three Americas have nurtured different aspects of the person, whose full growth in *all* dimensions is the heart of the common American religion of democracy. The

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person is not the mere individual. He is the individual aware of his organic and purposive part in the social group and in the cosmos. These two integrations are not divisible in life; only the needs of analysis may separate them. Integration in the group (which includes concentric bodies from family and labor union to sovereign state and international federation) requires social justice, race freedom, an ethic of mutual respect and service. Integration in the cosmos implies the experiences and activities of the arts and religion. And of course these activities cannot be dissolved from the individual's social and public conduct. Both integrations enlist all man's centers: his instinctive and emotional life, his will, his aesthetic and intellectual thinking. Only when the individual functions on all these planes and in all these directions is he a person. And democracy is the one principle of life which requires this wholeness of behavior; which, therefore, moves ineluctably toward the development of persons. In the totalitarian and aristocratic systems, for instance, the individual's responsibility toward public action is taken from him and vested in a leader or a caste. In the materialistic forms of Socialism and Communism that make an absolute of human society, the individual's direct conduit to the cosmos atrophies and disappears.

Democracy, in the complete sense that I have given it, must include not only all men, but *the whole man*. Freedom must mean growth not only for every man, but for every phase and dimension of the man. Short of this wholeness, as our modern history reveals, democracy develops the poisons to destroy itself; freedom employs its energies, privileges and genius, to abolish freedom.

In the United States, there is the will toward social justice. It remains shallow, fundamentally feeble; not only because our way of life fails to generate the capacity to confront the social injustice implicit in our economic institutions; even more because our blindness to the aesthetic and religious dimensions of man, our mute and deliberate contempt for the pre-rational and the organic, deprive us of the energy and insight for creative social action. In many of the Ibero-American countries the idea of *the whole man* has conspicuous acceptance, yet fails to flourish because of the lack of social-political technics without which man's social dimensions in our modern world cannot possibly develop.

Nevertheless, in the complete sense I have given it, democracy is the dominant will, the dominant intuition, of the three Ameri-

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cas. In this universal value, the American hemisphere is a new world; the concept of One America has meaning.

III

Now look at the map. You will see that Europe and Asia form one immense mass, with Africa — a step below Gibraltar — its appendage. Similarly, Australasia depends upon Eurasia and the masters of Eurasia. This is the eastern hemisphere. In area, it is seven-tenths of the terrestrial globe; in population, it is more than nine-tenths of mankind. Look again at the map. See how the vast arm of Asia thrusts from the west into the eye of our hemisphere at Alaska; see how, from the east, Africa looms upon us at the bulge of Brazil. The Americas are an island in this overwhelming land-mass; a minority island surrounded by the far greater lands and populations of the other hemisphere.

The American religion of democracy as I have defined it — this bone of our political structure, this blood of our intimate ways — is not shared, and never has been shared, by the overwhelming majority of the human masses. The concept of the person as the fundamental integer of value was born in the Mediterranean world. It is not of the main fabric of the great cultures of India, China, Japan. The Hindu's belief in reincarnation radically limits the person to an ephemeral form, and personal action to an extrinsic value. The Chinese ancestor-worship shifts the focus of good to the family and, largely, to the past; in Japan there is a state-idolatry closely akin to the religion of the Fascists. Russia's Christian tradition brings her within the domain of the person; Russia's current religion of dialectical materialism definitely — even if only shallowly and temporarily — places her in another camp. In Western Europe, where the religion of democracy was nurtured through its hazardous childhood, it is today engaged in a great struggle for survival. In Germany, Italy, Fascized Spain — in fact, on the whole Continent — its very existence is threatened. And the threat will outlast Hitler, since Fascism itself is a mere end-product of deep-grained anti-democratic forces within the very texture of modern European thought, and of the whole industrial West: forces which have penetrated into the altars of democracy, Great Britain, France and the United States: forces which unconsciously corrupt in large measure the liberal and radical thought that today complacently "leads" the fight against Fascism.

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The enemy surrounds us. The enemy is within us. It is the inward enemy that we must ultimately face. For if we overcome the enemy without, we may still break from within. But if we overcome the enemy within, we shall be sound, we shall be whole, and no outward enemy shall break us. The great Oriental cultures, such as the Hindu, have been based upon a sense of the individual very distinct from ours. These are not enemy but alien cultures. Our modern civilization of techniques, of empiricism and science-worship, by reducing the dimensions of man's reality, is a falling away from our own basic vision. Here is the essential enemy. Its alliance, as in the case of Germany, with the alien culture of Japan, points to our fragile position in an overwhelmingly hostile world. The war against the outward enemy cannot be successfully conducted unless it is understood as a phase of the deep war against the inward enemy, lodged at the very heart of our liberal and radical thought. In this aspect of the war for the survival and nurture of the person, Ibero-America has resources as much more developed than ours as our physical defenses and our organized social will against the outward enemy are more developed than Ibero-America's.

We cannot win the true sense of ourselves without a true awareness of our limits; which means, awareness of what lies physically beyond us. Our hemisphere, this minority island, has in the United States, Canada, and, incipiently, Brazil and Argentina, a *continental* psychology. It must be changed for an *island* psychology.

A continental vision, like Russia's, India's or China's, gives to the people a feeling of invulnerability; makes them strong in defense, lethargic in attack. The people that feels itself an island, because it is vulnerable, becomes aggressive. Greece, during its brief unity under Alexander, had the island feeling. Rome, a peninsula, had it, as did Spain, also a peninsula, and in modern times, Britain and Japan. These are all instances of island or "near-island" peoples whose aggressiveness was physical. Germany is only superficially an exception. Since the Thirty-Years War, the German people have felt themselves an island within the invading sea of France, Russia, Italy and Spain. At first their defensive aggressiveness took an idealistic form: German philosophy and German romanticism. Finally, under the impulse of Prussia, itself an island in the German sea, it became economic expansion and military aggression.

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There is in history one case of a people, also surrounded by continental foes, which sublimated its aggressiveness into spiritual terms, and — although by no means perfectly, with many lapses into materialistic aggression — has sustained these terms for ages. I have named the Jewish people. They were a minority "island" within the threat of Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Egypt, Rome. They sent forth their vision through Alexandria to Rome, through Rome to Europe, through Europe to the West; and they conquered. Their victory has long outlived the physical victories of island empires like Greece, Rome and Spain.

That victory created Europe through the great tradition of the person — heart of the Judeo-Christian religion. Europe did not discover America; it created *our* America — the potential new world dedicated to the fulfillment of democracy, the world of *persons*. The sanctity of man has many premises; one is the overcoming of man's impotence before nature, the abolition of economic dearth. Pre-scientific Europe could not fulfill this premise. Its defeatism before unmastered nature moved the mediaeval fathers to project their democracy to Heaven. Our America was created by Europe as a first instinctive step in a transposition of democracy from Heaven to earth. This required not alone land, but tools. The same will that made Europe Christian created the machine. The American hemisphere must become an island dedicated to the democratic will of creating persons; implemented by the technics that alone can give to man the peace, leisure and knowledge to become a person.

IV

How are we to be sure that if our hemisphere does achieve an island psychology it will not translate its defensive aggressiveness into physical terms and become another island empire in the bad way of Japan or Germany? The Jews were saved by their smallness; they could conquer only through the Word. Our hemisphere, as the democratic Island, will be saved only if it continues to be, progressively, three Americas — by the variety and by the equal sovereignty of its components. If our island psychology generates an economic and military imperialism (there are threats of this, like the "American century" of certain journalists), there will be no hemisphere at all, beyond geography. For our aggressiveness will throw Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru into the hands of whatever power in Europe or Asia, or both,

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stands ready to counterpoise us. And in two more generations the immense resources of South America (Brazil alone would suffice) will have torn our hemisphere asunder into crippled fragments under whose shards democracy would stifle.

A program for hemisphere union must contain these basic propositions:

(1) The replacement of capitalism by a socialist system of production for use, owned and controlled by the producers.

(2) The return of Latin American public wealth, such as mines and oil, now in the hands of United States capital, to the peoples of the respective countries. This process may take the form of loans to the governments as the means for buying back the properties at values which should consider past profits as amortization.

(3) At least a negative guarantee of basic democratic governments for all the republics, in the form of a refusal to recognize obvious dictatorships. The time has surely passed when any people dares to say that the kind of government in a neighboring country is none of its business. Democracy is safe nowhere, so long as totalitarianism is rampant anywhere. The American republics, considering themselves a family, have the right to keep their democratic house in order. This is a proposition dangerous and difficult to enact. Its premise at least should be accepted as a beginning. Of course, enforcement should always be a joint, collective effort.

(4) We must face our failure in race democracy. We cannot expect confidence in the American republics, so long as we continue to discriminate against a minority as important as the Negro, and to make of him an inferior nation within our nation.

(5) Cultural and intellectual exchange between our America and the others will remain a frothy failure so long as it is left in the hands of benevolent committees and individuals without authority. It should begin in our schools. All American children should be required to study the comparative civilizations and cultures of the other Americas. The histories of African and of Amerindian cultures should become at least as important in our classrooms as the politics of the dynasties of Europe. Spanish or Portuguese should be a compulsory part of our primary education, as English should be a compulsory part of education in the other Americas.

These points suggest basic directions for American leadership.

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To undertake them seriously would be the demonstration of our democracy for which the Ibero-American peoples are looking. Such a demonstration would win them to work with us. Anything less fundamental will continue to invalidate the thousand and one minor good deeds and services of our committees. For although we have done much to overcome their distrust, we have not won the confidence of the Ibero-American peoples.

This is the challenge of our American world. We of the United States cannot fulfill our destiny of leadership unless we understand it. Destiny is character. The grammar of leadership is knowledge. The history of four centuries has led the United States to the threshold of leadership and knowledge.

The American hemisphere I envisage will be possible only by the coördination of its three great sovereign personalities, each with its language, each with its vast physical resources, each with its deep human genius. The common ground of this union is simple, single — and deathless, if man is real. It is democracy as I have defined it. Democracy can never go on an imperial raid, like the old island aggressors. Democracy can proceed only on the mission which our religious fathers founded, who preached its essence: man's destiny to move forward toward the freedom that dwells in justice and toward the knowledge that is love.

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GOOD NEIGHBORS IN THE WAR, AND AFTER

By Percy W. Bidwell

ADOLF HITLER, a Latin American diplomat has suggested, deserves a statue in the patio of the Pan American Union in recognition of his services in promoting hemisphere solidarity. When his submarines attacked and sank our merchant ships and the merchant ships of many Latin American republics within gunshot of American shores, they drove home the need for common action against a common foe. And the action of his Japanese allies further emphasized that need. By seizing the Philippine Islands, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, Japan forced us to look to the resources of this hemisphere for most of our supplies of strategic materials. Finally, by cutting off the Latin American countries from their overseas markets and sources of industrial products, Germany and Japan compelled them to turn to us for salvation from economic disaster. All the American states are now facing a common problem — how to make the most effective use of their combined resources for mutual aid.

Fortunately, our relations with our neighbors in this hemisphere were better in December 1941 than they had been for many years; in this respect we were not caught unprepared. Beginning at Buenos Aires in 1936, a series of inter-American conferences had strengthened the ideological basis for mutual assistance and had prepared mechanisms for joint defensive action. At Havana in 1940 representatives of all the republics joined in declaring that an act of aggression against one American state by a non-American Power would be considered an act of aggression against all. Acting on this declaration, all nine of the Central American and Caribbean republics declared war on the Axis Powers within a week after Pearl Harbor. Mexico joined the belligerent group in June 1942, and Brazil in August. The remaining republics, except Argentina, have broken diplomatic relations with the enemies of the United States.

Full economic coöperation was pledged to the United States by the Latin American republics at the Rio Conference in January 1942, particularly in the direction of supplying us with the maximum possible amounts of the raw materials needed by our

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war industries and cutting off trade and financial relations with Germany and Italy. We, in our turn, pledged our aid in cushioning the shock of war to their economies. How economic coöperation has worked will be described in the following pages. They will show how, using a remark made by Mr. Churchill in another connection, we and our neighbors have become somewhat mixed up together for mutual and general advantage, and will inquire what may be the results of the mixing process after the war is over.

I. MOBILIZATION OF HEMISPHERE RESOURCES

We are buying for our war industries all the strategic materials that the mines, forests and plantations of Latin America can produce, and more than ships can carry to our shores. In order that they can produce more, we are helping the Latin American states to install new facilities, rebuild their railroads and improve their ports. We are also making liberal purchases of non-strategic materials which we do not need and which, for lack of shipping, we must store in their ports. On the other hand, we have steadily cut down the volume of our shipments to them. Our rigid control over ocean shipping, our export controls, and our War Production Board priorities, have reduced their imports of our manufactured goods to a bare minimum of essentials. As a result, shortages of both capital equipment and of consumers' goods have already appeared in many of the republics, bringing in their wake rationing and price fixing. They also have had a depressing effect on public works projects and new construction of all kinds; while railroads and public utilities have been unable to provide adequately for repairs and depreciation.

We have tried to mitigate these effects by enlisting the coöperation of the Latin American states in determining what imports they need most. Their coöperation has been particularly useful in the delicate business of dealing with blacklisted Latin American firms. The foundation of inter-American action against these firms was laid at the Rio Conference. At a later conference in Washington (June 30–July 10, 1942) representatives of the various governments agreed to eliminate the activities of residents known to be, or to have been, "engaging in activities inimical to the security of the Western Hemisphere." As a result, many German, Italian and Japanese firms have been forced to replace their managers, to submit to government management, or to sell

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out, either to nationals of the country where they had been doing business, or to the state itself.

Joint action was especially effective against Axis interests which in 1939 controlled 10,500 miles of air transport routes in South America (16 percent of the entire network of the continent) and a transatlantic service to Europe. The fatal weakness of the German and Italian lines was the fact that they depended for fuel and spare parts on sources of supply within this hemisphere; this made them vulnerable to our weapons of economic warfare — export licensing and the blacklist. The United States Defense Supplies Corporation, working in close association with South American governments, used these and other weapons with such good effect that within two years all German and Italian lines had been eliminated and their services had been replaced by extensions of the lines operated by United States companies or *bona fide* Latin American companies.[1]

To cushion the shock of war, the United States Commodity Credit Corporation has been making a number of purchases in Latin America. Thus it has agreed that by September of this year it will buy 10,600,000 bags of Brazilian coffee, much of which, for lack of shipping, will be stored in Brazil. It also has made contracts to buy Haitian coffee and Nicaraguan, Haitian and Peruvian cotton, not for our own needs, but to furnish a substitute for European buying of those commodities. The United States Treasury agreements to provide funds to Mexico, Ecuador and Colombia to assist in stabilizing their currencies also should be included among the "shock-absorbing" measures. Pursuing similar objectives, the Export-Import Bank has extended credits for road building in Honduras, Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America where lack of shipping has thrown banana and coffee workers out of their jobs; also for public works in Venezuela, as well as to finance the cocoa and coffee crops there. It also has considered making loans to develop coal mining and to erect steel and iron works in Peru, and to construct a hydroelectric plant in Uruguay; but the lack of shipping space and shortages of machinery and equipment in the United States make it unlikely that even if these projects are agreed upon they will be carried through until after the war.

[1] This subject is being treated in detail in a forthcoming book, "The Struggle for Airways in Latin America," by William A. M. Burden, to be published shortly by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

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The United States has sent technical missions to the southern republics in large numbers and for a wide variety of purposes. Some have gone to explore the possibilities of industrial development; others to stimulate interest in increased food production or to demonstrate new agricultural methods; others to discover areas suitable for products which the United States formerly imported from the Far East — rubber, abacá, insecticides, vegetable oils, quinine and other medicinal plants. Finally, as part of our drive to increase the output of strategic materials, we have launched, and partially financed, extensive coöperative campaigns against various tropical diseases, especially malaria and yellow fever.

Obviously, then, the war effort of the United States has not failed to take Latin America into proper account. The Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs alone has a staff of 800 in Washington; and other government departments and agencies have assigned hundreds of employees to handling Latin American affairs. The number of our officials on temporary and permanent assignment in the other republics is variously estimated at from 500 to 800; probably the lower figure is the more accurate. The largest groups are those of the United States Rubber Reserve Company and the Board of Economic Warfare. The latter employs 140 persons in Latin America, of whom 33 are stationed in Brazil.

Our expenditures of government money in the 20 republics during 1943 will be somewhere between a billion and a billion and a half dollars. This sum will go for purchases of strategic materials, expenditures for defense projects, agricultural, sanitation and cultural programs, disbursements of the Export-Import Bank and miscellaneous items. Judged by our present scale of government spending, a billion and a half dollars is not a large sum. It is only one percent of our 1942 national income and only 6 percent of our 1942 total war expenditures. But by Latin American standards, it is a very considerable sum indeed. For example, it equals three-fourths of the value of the total exports of the 20 countries concerned in prewar years. If distributed evenly over the entire population, it would amount to about $12 per capita. Of course, it will not be equally distributed; and in some of the smaller republics our outlays may be large enough in relation to the national income to bring a very substantial increase in national prosperity.

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II. OUR AIMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

What does all this activity add up to? What results can we claim for the effort made and the money spent to date?

Perhaps the fairest way to frame a reply is to recall first what we want to accomplish. We want to win the war. We want the Latin American countries to help us — for our own sake primarily, of course, but also because we believe it is their war as well as ours. We have endeavored to enlist their political sympathies on our side, and we have sought their economic assistance, particularly in supplying us with strategic materials. In return, we have offered to help them avoid the economic disaster threatened by the loss of their European markets. All these purposes are actually so inter-connected that any specific project, such as, for example, a rubber purchase agreement, may help in all three directions. Underlying some of the projects which we have sponsored, particularly those in the field of sanitation and nutrition, is the broad humanitarian purpose of helping masses of people less fortunately situated than ourselves to achieve a higher standard of living. But it should be remembered that, to the extent that such activities raise the efficiency of labor employed in getting out rubber and other strategic materials, they also contribute directly toward the primary purpose of winning the war.

When we recall that our own unity of national purpose was brought about only by the direct Japanese attack on our territory, we could hardly expect that all our neighbors to the south would rise as one man to take their stand at our side. Differences in educational advantage and in access to newspapers and the radio aside, there remains the stubborn fact that for 170 years we have been a single country while they are 20 different countries, separated by physical difficulties of transportation and communication, by differences in language and in culture, and by the memories of bitter and bloody wars. In some of the republics, the official act of breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis received stronger support from the working classes than from the small groups that direct governmental affairs. In others, Mexico for example, the official attitude is genuinely friendly, but popular feeling, in some classes or regions at any rate, lags behind. Thus many Mexican peasants, who have always looked upon the *gringos* as traditional enemies and Europeans as friends, are bewildered when they are told that Mexico and the United

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States are fighting side by side against Germany and Italy. An important specific test of political coöperation is the measure of support given by Latin American governments in blacklisting and blocking the funds of German and Italian business firms. This test reveals wide variations; some smaller countries score much higher than their larger neighbors.

Thus far the threatened economic disaster has not arrived. It is true that agricultural workers in Central America are suffering. The republics of this area have always depended principally on our markets, and now that we have diverted our shipping elsewhere, their bananas are not worth picking. Our loans and purchases have helped; but unfortunately, before we realized how much we would be cramped by our shortages of goods and shipping we made large promises which must in some cases wait until after the war for fulfillment. Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Peru, on the other hand, are prosperous. Mexico, favored by the fact that she adjoins us by land, is furnishing us with important quantities of minerals of all kinds. Brazilian rubber, manganese and iron ore, and Chilean and Peruvian copper get high shipping priorities. These countries, therefore, are exhibiting the familiar signs of a boom: rising prices, credit expansion and business optimism. Argentina, partly as the result of large British purchases of beef and mutton (including some for our account),[2] is enjoying a reasonable degree of prosperity.

We cannot yet measure the results of our health and sanitation campaigns in Latin America, or of our efforts to encourage new crops and better agricultural techniques. For the present, our scattered efforts in these directions can hardly amount to more than demonstration projects. As such, they may many times repay their cost; but what they accomplish in the long run will depend on how genuinely the responsible Latin American leaders believe in them and how far they are willing and able to support them. They will be hampered by meager public revenues and lack of native technicians. President Vargas of Brazil appears to understand thoroughly the value to his country of the sanitation measures to which the United States has contributed. But leaders

[2] Argentine beef exports for the year September 1941 to August 1942 were 40 percent higher in value than the average of the five years 1935–39. Mutton exports have risen nearly 50 percent and canned meat 250 percent. (*Foreign Crops and Markets*, December 1942, p. 301.) The Combined Food Board has announced that the British Ministry of Food has been designated the sole purchaser of Argentine, Brazilian, Uruguayan and Paraguayan meat and meat products for both the United States and the United Kingdom. (*New York Times*, February 22, 1943.)

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in some countries take a different attitude; they seem to fear popular dissatisfaction after the war if they are not able to support the new social services established with our aid.[3]

In some of the republics, economic and social progress can best be promoted through industrialization. The war has cut off Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Colombia from their normal European sources of imports; our export controls have shut off their supplies of American specialties. The resulting shortages and high prices give a strong impetus to the expansion of manufactures, which we have encouraged by our loans and in some instances by the novel plan of supplying second-hand industrial equipment made idle here by our scarcity of raw materials. Four of our textile plants have already been shipped to Brazil, one to Venezuela and one to Mexico. A storage-battery plant went to Chile, and a blast furnace to Brazil.[4] We are also training young Latin Americans in our technical schools as mechanical and electrical engineers.

In the past, various handicaps on the industrialization of certain of the republics have commonly been emphasized. Critics have dwelt on their lack of coal and iron in favorable locations, the inexperience of their native populations, the difficulties of transportation, and the scarcity of capital. But now new factors have come in. The development of a new technology based on light metals and the progress made in air transportation, for example, give the problem a different aspect. New conditions will also affect the terms of capital investment; in future, none of the countries concerned will probably want to accept foreign capital if it carries with it foreign control of their enterprises. The new slogan of "economic independence" is finding practical application in the growth of state ownership, or participation, in key industries and in the insistence that citizens of the country shall hold a controlling interest in industries which remain in private hands. We have recognized the validity of this principle in agreements defining the terms on which the Export-Import Bank will aid in the establishment of new enterprises in Latin America. These agreements stipulate that native capital shall participate in the new ventures. Thus our wartime policies are setting a pattern which may be usefully followed by private capital in postwar investments.

[3] *New York Times*, November 19, 1942.
[4] *Ibid.*, November 21, 1942.

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III. POSTWAR POSSIBILITIES

This is the second honeymoon of Pan Americanism. For a second time a world war has brought the United States and the Latin American republics into unusually close relations, economic and political. In 1914–18 we took the place of Europe in their export and import trade; in 1918 the total value of our purchases of Latin American goods was more than twice what we had bought four years previously. Our sales to them increased almost three times. Yet, after a brief postwar boom in 1919 and 1920, the abnormal trade structure collapsed, and twenty years later our share in Latin American trade was practically the same as it had been in 1914.

Somewhat the same thing happened on the political side. The United States received a considerable amount of support from other nations in this hemisphere during World War I. Brazil and seven Central American and Caribbean republics declared war on Germany, and four in South America — Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay — severed diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. But, when the war was over, inter-American relations instead of improving steadily deteriorated until, at the end of the twenties, the Havana Conference marked an all-time low.

History does not always repeat itself, and the new and more closely-knit fabric of inter-American relations now being woven need not inevitably be destroyed. This war has brought 19 out of the 20 republics to our side; also, our relations with them have been organized and formalized to a much greater extent than ever before. We must expect, however, that when the dangers from across the Atlantic and the Pacific have been removed, the pressure for coöperation with the United States will slacken. The old causes of hostility and disagreement on both sides will again come to light, above all their fear of Yankee imperialism and our demand for the repayment of prewar loans (perhaps also wartime advances). If instead of ignoring these issues during the war we make a serious effort to remove them, there is no reason why the honeymoon should not result in permanently better relations.

To attempt to formalize these relations after the war by forming a Pan American bloc would probably be a mistake. The idea of a regional organization in which the United States would be predominant appeals to those who feel that the creation of a series of great regional groups would be a substitute for a world

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organization. Many Americans who before Pearl Harbor were isolationists now belatedly realize that modern technology has ended the chance of living a life of complete national self-sufficiency. They consequently have expanded their horizons to take in the whole hemisphere. They find some support among exporters who would like to secure preferential tariff treatment in Latin American markets. Military men, appalled by our lack of adequate reserves of strategic materials at the beginning of this war, might look upon special arrangements for securing such materials from sources in this hemisphere as an essential feature of postwar defense programs.

But there is no evidence that persons in responsible positions in our government are thinking in these regional terms. On the contrary, while their recent public addresses recognize our legitimate responsibilities in this hemisphere, they stress the international or world-wide character of the associations which the United States hopes to maintain after the war. In New York, on January 27, 1943, Nelson Rockefeller, Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, referred to wartime hemisphere unity as pointing the way toward *world coöperation*. On the same day, Under Secretary Welles, speaking at the Pan American Union, emphasized the opportunity which would be offered to the American republics after the war to participate in the tasks of postwar reconstruction *on an international scale*. Secretary Hull thus far has given no indication that he would abandon, in favor of a regional tariff system, the principles of non-discriminatory and multilateral foreign trade for which he has long fought.

The idea of joining with the United States in an exclusive regional bloc after the war seems equally far from the thoughts of leading Latin American statesmen. For example, Dr. Ezequiel Padilla, Mexico's able Minister of Foreign Affairs, writing recently in these pages, referred with approval to President Wilson's interpretation of Pan Americanism as a union of the American republics in their capacity of *spiritual* allies, "that march in accord because they think alike and are animated by common sympathies and ideals." [5]

"The politicians of the days of independence sought by achieving continental unity to counteract European action; while the politicians of today realize clearly that Pan Americanism must not and cannot be thought of solely as a bulwark

[5] FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1942, p. 9.

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for isolation but as a road leading to more efficient universal coöperation." This, he says significantly, marks the outstanding difference between the earlier Pan American hope and the present-day reality. In a recent book, Luis Quintanilla, Mexican Minister in Russia, has stressed the necessity of maintaining ties with Europe: "There will be a Europe again; as a matter of fact there will always be a Europe. Inter-American coöperation must not exclude the participation of our hemisphere in any world enterprise, whether cultural or economic." And he adds: "Inter-Americanism leads to world organization. The history of America must not be circumscribed by geography." [6] Such opinions are in line with the predominant trend of thinking and writing in this country on postwar problems.

But our emphasis on the necessity for a global settlement after the war must not lead us to shirk the responsibilities and obligations which we have undertaken in wartime vis-à-vis our southern neighbors. These responsibilities are formally stated in the Final Act of the Rio Conference. In signing it, our representatives pledged the United States to assist the other republics in making economic readjustments in the postwar period of transition, "in a manner guaranteeing the continuance of adequate production and permitting the existence of trade under conditions equitable to producers." In plainer English, we promised to undertake to help prevent a postwar collapse of their markets.

We have already taken steps in this direction by agreeing that our governmental contracts for the purchase of rubber and other strategic materials shall extend into the postwar years. We may need to go further. We may find it necessary in the period of transition from war to peace to make new purchase contracts on a descending scale, or to make loans to promote industrialization through the Export-Import Bank or through an International Development Corporation. Something might be done to stabilize markets for raw materials and staple foodstuffs by inter-governmental commodity agreements between producing and consuming nations, both in and without the hemisphere. New trade agreements on the Hull pattern should be made, and the terms of those already in effect should be liberalized. We should stand ready to provide the Latin American countries with the technical assistance they so badly need and to make it possible

[6] Luis Quintanilla, "A Latin American Speaks." New York: Macmillan, 1942, p. 182 and 241.

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for well-qualified Latin American students to attend our technical schools.

Such direct assistance will be essential, particularly in the immediate postwar years. But in the longer view, our *indirect* aid will be more effective. We must not forget that none of these countries wants to be dependent, economically or politically, on the United States, or on any other country. On the contrary, they seek to escape from anything resembling a colonial status. The best thing we can do is to facilitate their resumption of normal trading relations with us and with the rest of the world as soon as possible and on the most advantageous terms possible. We can of course do this only if we succeed in warding off a postwar depression at home, for their economies are now so closely linked with ours that if we crash after the war they will crash with us. On the other hand, if we can keep our factories fully employed, our demand for raw materials will help mightily to sustain prosperity in Latin America. But maintaining our own prosperity will not be enough; for example, even if our national income remains at a high level our markets will not absorb more than a fraction of the great quantities of wheat and corn which Argentina will need to export if it is to avoid economic disaster. We shall not be able to take very much of the cotton of Peru and Brazil; and even our great purchases of Brazilian and Colombian coffee will not clear the markets in those two countries. The same is true of many other products of Central and South America. Latin America will also need European markets, and prosperous ones. Here lies our second major responsibility. At times those who are busy with plans for the postwar world seem to be so preoccupied with European aspects of the problem that they seem to be neglecting responsibilities nearer home. But the fact is that if by such planning we are able to help establish a durable world peace and promote the expansion of international trade, we shall have fulfilled in large part our Pan American obligations.

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JAPAN HARNESSES RELIGION IN THE NATIONAL SERVICE

By C. Burnell Olds

NO one can study the development of the Japanese drive for power without being impressed by the fact that in Japan as almost nowhere else in modern times religion has been made an instrument of national policy. The rulers of Japan assume that the chief and indeed almost the only purpose of religion is to advance the fortunes of the state, not to satisfy the needs of the individual.

The Japanese tendency to think of religion as an instrument of national policy grew out of the conception of the universe as revolving about the nation. Such gods as were known to exist were concerned directly with the organization and control of Japanese life and they worked for the Japanese only, not for the human race as a whole. What concerned other people and their origin or destiny was, then, of no practical importance to the Japanese. And even if, outside of their ken, there were a God of mankind — of the universe — what did it matter? Japan had her own gods. Why look beyond that basic fact?

A naïve cosmogony? Yes, but such was Japanese religion in the early centuries. Such was Shinto, the so-called Way of the Gods. It may be said that Shinto is not a religion; controversy has waxed warm over this question, and state officials have been assiduous in trying to prove that it is not. But whether it is a religion or not, Shinto is certainly the *basis* and *source* of religious consciousness in Japan. It can be thought of as the Japanese attitude toward life, toward nature and toward destiny. It was a natural psychological development, with no assignable origin, no creed, no affirmations or ethics or duties, other than the requirement that those who held it be at home in the world and live naturally — in other words, that they follow their own impulses and obey the laws of the state. It was an attitude whose uses were early recognized. Much Japanese energy has been expended in keeping it alive as something that the state could not get along without.

But Shinto has also elements that would seem to make it a religion. There are, for example, gods and goddesses, thought of as powerful and mysterious in the lives of men and in the world

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about them. We know little of the psychology of the primitive Japanese beyond the fact that as a people they were especially responsive to nature, and that their religion, therefore, was a nature-religion. They constantly were impressed by the working of mysterious power manifesting itself in a multitude of ways. And, as any child-mind might do, they accounted for it by saying, all this is caused by spirits. They called the spirits *Kami*, a word which means powers above and beyond full human comprehension. These were personalized forces that governed the world — gods, if you like, although that word does not adequately translate *Kami*. Divinity is a better term, perhaps. And divinity was everywhere, in personalized form, but in different guise wherever it might appear. After that, we may assume, it was not difficult for the primitive philosopher to come to the conclusion that since divinity was everywhere, and he and all things were in touch with divinity, then all must be, in a sense, divine. A sort of pantheism? Yes, but it was something more. It was a conception of a universe fashioned and controlled by a divinity which manifested itself in personalized form.

Various *Kami* came to be recognized, some in the world above, some in the world below. All were graded according to the importance of their functions, whether causing the rice to grow and fructify, the wind to blow, the lightning to flash, the earthquake to rumble or the sea to roar. Then it was natural to single out the most powerful representatives of the *Kami*, above and below. The first of these was, of course, the sun, the greatest, the most powerful and the most beneficent thing the heavens contained. Should it not be taken, then, as *the* god, or goddess, be given the name Amaterasu O Mikami — the Great Shining One of Heaven — and worshiped? Finally, to complete the picture and link themselves with the heavenly *Kami*, they selected as their own greatest and best representative the direct offspring of the goddess, whom she had commissioned to descend to earth, subdue and repeople it and administer it for her glory and his.

II

This is Shinto: the matrix of all religion in Japan. Shinto taught the Japanese to be at home in their world, to take life as it came and rejoice in it; to bow to the inevitable and rise above it by asserting their own divinity and kinship with the gods, while placing their prime emphasis on loyalty to him who represented

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all that was best in themselves. When the Confucianists came in with their teachings of Heaven's law of harmony and the subserviency of the five relations, they found a people prepared to take over their beliefs, but with the emphasis always on the master-servant or lord-vassal relationship. Then when the influence of the Zen sect of Buddhism was united with that of Confucianism and the native warrior-instinct, the result was Bushido, or the Way of the Bushi or Samurai. After that, all religion, all philosophy, and all art too, had their place, and the triumph of militarism was assured for the whole long future.

It was only a step from Bushido, the warrior's way, to Kodo, the Imperial way. Thereupon there was enthroned in every heart the one who was acknowledged to be the arbiter of every man's destiny, and the final authority, whether in heaven or on the earth, to whom every knee must bow.

A key to what this principle means to the Japanese is to be found in their attitude to the Imperial Rescript on Education promulgated by the Meiji Emperor in 1890. The document is not important for what it is in itself, or for what it says, but for what it presupposes and for the attitude of reverence that it has inspired. All it purports to be is a three or four minute homily by the Emperor to his subjects, urging them to be faithful to their destiny and discharge the duties incumbent upon those with such a heritage. Its power derives from the fact, recognized by all Japanese who hear or read it, that it comes to them as the expression of the will, nay the command, of the gods. It is to them, therefore, the symbol, as the Emperor himself is the symbol, of the divine authority to which the unquestioning obedience of every Japanese subject must be given.

The veneration shown for the Emperor's photograph is revealing of this attitude. Not only must this precious square of paper be housed securely in every school in a special alcove or in a building erected for the purpose, but it must be guarded by all connected with the school even at the risk of their own lives. Should a fire break out at any time, the safety of the imperial photograph must first be assured; after that it will be time to think of the safety of the children. A professor in the First Higher School in Tokyo was at one time forced to resign his position for no other offense than his failure on one occasion to make the proper obeisance in the presence of the picture.

This, then, is the spirit that rules Japan today — a spirit that

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commands and is obeyed, not from compulsion alone, but from individual choice. It is this last element which makes its authority so powerful and sinister, especially when the Emperor himself is under the sway of the militarists and is compelled to serve as the mouthpiece of their will, rather than using them as his servants to carry out *his* will in the interests of the people.

We are inclined to blame the militarists and excuse the populace. But alas, this cannot be so easily done, even though the primary blame must be put on the militarists. For every Japanese born in Japan is a Japanese first, not from birth only but from choice, and that means loyalty to the Emperor and unconditional obedience to every command that is given in his name, whether it be at his own initiative or by the will of those who may succeed in exploiting him. Whichever it is, no Japanese can escape the obligation; if it is a crime that is on foot, he must be a *particeps criminis*.

III

Let us not be too swift in our condemnation of the naïveté of such beliefs and too critical of their perpetuation into a day when science and truth have compelled other peoples to face reality. The theory has done something for the Japanese, surely. We need not assume that they believe in their myths as the record of historical events simply because they keep the old stories alive and foster the ideology that is built upon them, or even because an ambitious government compels them to teach mythology as history. Shinto has simply made use of its myths to give the Japanese a religious basis on which to build their state.

The theory has done more than produce and keep alive in the minds of the Japanese people an exalted conception of their Emperor; it also has given them a heightened sense of their own importance. For if their Emperor is divine, then they, his children, share that divinity. That means that his mission is their mission; if his is to hold sway over all peoples, theirs is to bring the world under his sway. In other words, they must prove, by achievement, their right to the claim which they make for themselves. If this attitude has given the Japanese an exaggerated opinion of themselves, it has also been a source of power, for it has emboldened them to achieve what should be expected of men with such an endowment.

The theory, furthermore, gives the nation a sense of solidarity

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and timelessness by binding together all living Japanese and linking them with the generations of those who have gone before them. Ancestor worship (though the Confucian influence reinforced it) was always native to Japan. Divinity knows not time. Those who were once divine and alive are always alive. The living and the dead are bound together with the divine powers above for the realization of the nation's great objective.

The perpetuation of the people's faith in the continued existence of their ancestors is, therefore, of strategic importance to the Japanese state. The worship aspect need not be stressed. It is rather the ever-renewed affirmation of their faith that their ancestors are participants with them in the holy enterprise which keeps them alert. However, the daily offering of rice and wine is encouraged as a way of vitalizing the faith.

A similar device, which at the same time provides an incentive for faithfulness where faithfulness is most desired, is the practice, carried on by the Government or under its orders, of deifying soldiers on their decease. On a certain night in October 1939, for instance, by Imperial fiat, 10,397 soldiers were given honored places, amounting to deification, in the national pantheon, as reward for laying down their lives on the battlefields of China. On October 17, 1938, and on April 23, 1939, respectively, 10,334 and 10,389 soldiers were deified in similar fashion, bringing the total in modern times to 166,601.[1] This is also the reason why, at the sound of a siren which is blown every year at precisely two minutes before twelve on September first, every citizen in the nation is required to bare his head and bow toward Tokyo. It was at that hour in the year 1923 that one of the greatest earthquakes in history sent 100,000 of their brothers and sisters into the spirit world, there to carry on the uncompleted national task.

Nor should we regard it as mere superstitious nonsense that the Emperor on his accession to the throne, and every other personage of prominence when he embarks upon a new and important enterprise, is expected to report the matter at once at the Great Shrine of Ise. Thus he links himself with men and gods, with the living and the dead, and commits himself to faithfulness in an enterprise from which there is no turning back. Even a certain Japanese Christian Bishop, brought up to be faithful to the national gods, felt that it devolved upon him, on assuming his new

[1] D. C. Holtom, in "Japan Christian Year Book," 1940, p. 24.

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office, to make his report at the shrine and to pledge his faithfulness to the divine commission he had received.

Such is the place and influence of Shinto in the nationalistic structure of the present-day Japanese state. Is it any wonder that, though Shinto is repeatedly declared not to be a religion, the Government protects and fosters it with all the religious paraphernalia and ceremonialism that can be devised? The Government nevertheless has been compelled to walk softly, for there are jealous Buddhist priests always watching to see that their rights under the constitution are not abridged, and Christian propagandists who are just as alert lest their followers be made to worship at the shrines of another religion. It was for this reason that the so-called "secularizing of Shinto" was carried out in 1899. The officials of the Great Shrine at Ise asserted that thenceforth Shinto was to be regarded "merely as a mechanism for keeping generations in touch with generations, and preserving the continuity of a nation's veneration of its ancestors" — that while Shinto might never hope "to stand as a religion, it might stand as the embodiment of a national sentiment."

In spite of this, the Government is increasing the amount of money it spends on the building and upkeep of public shrines; it is seeking more and more to popularize the performance of wedding and funeral ceremonies within them; and Japanese students are being compelled to worship at the shrines and to profess allegiance to their ancestors and to their Emperor as the vice-gerent of the gods and the living link between earth and heaven.

IV

The two religions which came from the Asiatic continent, Confucianism and Buddhism, were also used for the advancement of Japan's nationalistic interests. The influence of Confucianism was early felt, almost before any recognition was given to Buddhism, and it was duly appreciated, chiefly because of the civilizing influences which, like Buddhism, it brought over from the continent during the early centuries of our era. Its ethical teaching, which based all relationships among men on a fixed order decreed by Heaven, appealed to thinking men and was widely accepted by them.

When Ieyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, came to power in 1603, he quickly seized upon the Confucian teaching because it provided just the sort of stability that he needed for the

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development of his feudal system. He saw that this system, if it was to succeed, must develop a spirit of obedience and subserviency to organized authority. This was contained in the Confucian teaching of the five relations, which required the subserviency of vassal to lord, child to parent, wife to husband and younger brother to older brother, and provided for equality only between friends. When this was adopted as a basis for human conduct in Japan, however, the emphasis was not put on the child-parent relationship, as in China, but on the vassal-lord relationship. The endless kowtowing and subserviency required of inferiors had a repressive effect on them, and it had also a baleful influence on those who as superiors were required to maintain their dignity and treat with condescension or harshness those who occupied stations below them.

The ruling authorities in Japan have been almost uniformly amicable toward Buddhism — too much so at times, when unspeakably corrupt moral attitudes and practices called for far different treatment. They gave Buddhism wide latitude because they knew well what they owed to it. In the first place, it proved to be an effective opiate. It kept the people reverent, obedient, patient and submissive, whatever the burdens imposed upon them. However intolerable present conditions might be, the sure satisfactions of Nirvana or the joys of the "Western Paradise" which the priests promised the faithful, were sufficient to enable them to endure. Of what importance, the priests asked, is this world and of what account are its pains and pleasures? Escape from it is what is to be desired — and the quicker and easier the better. That is why, doubtless, all the new Buddhist developments in Japan were in the direction of short cuts — the easy way, rather than the difficult, abstruse, un-Japanese way that had come from India. There is no easier road to salvation in all the world than the one offered by the Shin sect, and that is the most popular of all the sects in Japan. It requires only that one trust everything to Amida Buddha, the great mystical personage who refused to enter Paradise so long as there still remained outside one soul whom he could help to enter. Not even the endless repetition of the phrase "Namu Amida Butsu," on which all the Pure Land or Amida sects insist, is required of its adherents, but only the thankful mind that thinks forever — when it thinks at all — the words, "We thank thee, Amida."

In the second place, not a little of the nation's education, art,

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literature and other civilized refinements is directly traceable to the influence and efforts of Buddhism. As Chamberlain says in his "Things Japanese:" "All education was for centuries in Buddhist hands, as was the care of the poor and sick; Buddhism introduced art, introduced medicine, moulded the folklore of the country, created its dramatic poetry, deeply influenced politics and every sphere of social and intellectual activity. In a word, Buddhism was the teacher under whose instruction the Japanese nation grew up." The people may forget that fact, but official Japan does not. That is why the authorities have been so tolerant of it, even at its worst. But they never permit it to get the upper hand or to acquire undue influence in politics. When this happens, as it did in the case of the Hieizan priests in the sixteenth century, the hand of the Government descended swiftly and swept the entire assemblage of priests off their mountain and burned their temples to the ground.

Buddhism was saved, doubtless, and its perpetuation guaranteed, by the *ipse dixit* of the representative of the Sun Goddess at Ise in the eighth century. Shomu, who was Emperor at the time, was almost fanatically pious in his worship of Buddha, in spite of the fact that his title to the throne rested on descent from Amaterasu. His attitude soon became the subject of somewhat unpleasant comment. This aroused Gyogi, the most influential and popular priest of the period, who took it upon himself to make an expedition to Ise for the purpose of securing an interpretation that would silence wagging tongues. The oracle that he brought back was to the effect that Amaterasu was to be regarded as an incarnation of the Buddha, a verdict which was confirmed sometime later by a declaration of the Goddess, in a vision to the Emperor, that the sun was Birushana (Vairotchana Tathagata), or Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun).[2] The device was a clever one, to say the least, and it accomplished its purpose, for thenceforth the Buddhist and the Shintoist pantheons were further reconciled until they became more or less interchangeable, and the amalgamation of the two systems at times approached completeness.

V

We come now to Christianity. Soon after their first contact with it in modern times, the rulers of Japan decided to make the

[2] Frank Brinkley and Baron D. Kikuchi, "A History of the Japanese People." New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1915, p. 195.

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utmost use of this new religion from the Occident to further their nationalistic program.

The motive which led Japanese leaders to extend a welcome to Xavier when he came to the shores of Japan in 1549 was purely economic. The Portuguese, who had come a few years before for purposes of trade, had already made a favorable start, and, supposing that Xavier's errand was the same as theirs and that he would soon be followed by merchant ships, the Japanese received him with no little enthusiasm and listened eagerly to his teaching. When he disavowed any interest in commerce, however, only the marked deference paid him by the traders restrained the populace from driving him out of the country. It seems clear, therefore, that, as Brinkley says, "The attitude of the official classes toward the newcomers was mainly influenced by the prospect of trade, and that the attitude of the non-official classes toward the foreign religion depended largely on the mood of their superiors."[3]

In the processes of time, the first favorable attitude of the official Japanese was changed to one of suspicion that the teaching of the Christian doctrine was nothing but a means for gaining entrance into the country, and that it would be followed later by armed forces sent to get possession of the land. Events seemed to substantiate the suspicion. Consequently, when Ieyasu came to power, he was compelled to take cognizance of the matter, with the result that in a few years the propaganda of the missionaries was stopped, they found themselves driven from the country and their hundreds of thousands of converts were either put to the sword or compelled to recant. From that time on until the middle of the nineteenth century the gates of the empire were closed, not only against Christianity, but against all foreigners. And lest Christianity might again find entrance, proscription boards were set up all over the empire to threaten with death anyone who might dare to propagate or espouse the Christian faith. These boards were not abolished until the year 1872, 14 years after the signing of the treaties which permitted resumption of trade relations with the outside world.

After this it was not long until the people, just as 300 years before, began to display marked interest in the newly resurrected faith and to accept it in rapidly increasing numbers. At first, the recognition given to it by the authorities was niggardly and insincere. They tolerated it at all only as a necessary condition

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 531.

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for developing satisfactory relations with other countries. This was made evident by the attitude taken by Fukuzawa, who was at the time the most influential man in Japanese educational circles. He violently opposed Christianity at first, and lost no opportunity to attack it, recommending that Buddhism be favored in place of it, although he did not hesitate to say: "We do not believe in Buddhism, nor do we respect its priests. Our concern is for the national power, in the conservation of which that religion must be utilized."[4]

Only three years later, however, in 1884, Fukuzawa's attitude changed completely and in an essay entitled "The Adoption of the Foreign Religion is Necessary," he said: "The civilized nations of Europe and America have always held that non-Christian countries could not be trusted as enlightened nations. Such being the case, if we desire to maintain our intercourse with Western nations on the basis of international law, it is first of all absolutely necessary that we remove completely the stigma from our land of being an anti-Christian country, and obtain the recognition of fellowship by the adoption of their social color." This he followed up with a later article in which he declared that, in order to have Japan put on an equal footing with other nations, "We must change our professed belief and wear a religious dress uniform with others." He wrote: "We mean by professed belief, what we profess to believe apart from the question of what may be our true doctrine. It would be sufficient to make it publicly known that Japan is a Christian country. . . . We do not mean that the majority of our countrymen should be Christians. A small number, one for every hundred, will be sufficient. All that is required is the assumption of the title of a Christian country." [5]

Fukuzawa's opinion was warmly approved by many others, among them some who even went so far as to urge that the Emperor himself receive baptism, so that Japan might at once be counted a Christian country. This was nothing but a recommendation, of course, that Christianity be used as a tool for the accomplishment of nationalistic purposes. Similar opinions have often been expressed since then. There have been few men in governmental posts who have committed themselves thoroughly to the universalizing mission of Christianity.

[4] Otis Cary, "The History of Christianity in Japan." New York: Revell, 1909, v. 2, p. 159.
[5] Cary, *op. cit.* p. 174.

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The Government's treatment of the Christian church during the years in which the war crisis was developing, and also the way the church in Japan has responded (with a few notable exceptions), lead to the same conclusion.

In 1912 Vice Home Minister Tokonami called a conference of Shintoists, Buddhists and Christians, to which he addressed a plea for union between religion and the state, for the sake of the advantages that would accrue to the state and its people. Each of the existing religions, he declared, Christianity not excepted, should try "to adapt itself to the national constitution, being careful to harmonize itself with the popular sentiments and customs." Some religion, he felt, was necessary for Japan, though of just what kind it should be he had little idea. Probably some kind of amalgam of the three would best meet the exigencies of the case. This implied, of course, that his opinion coincided with that of a good many others, that the sort of religion Japan needs is an eclectic one, embodying only such truths as are best calculated to advance her own particular national interests.

It seems evident that from the very beginning of the Christian propaganda, astute Japanese politicians saw clearly the utter incompatibility between the Christian teaching of universalism and their own fundamental principle. If Christianity stood for world-wide brotherhood and the welfare of all peoples, they stood for their own national aggrandizement alone, even at the expense of all other nations and peoples. If Christ's teaching represented the forgiving spirit and the sacredness of human life, Japan's represented revenge and the prodigal destruction of life, their own as well as that of others, whenever circumstances might seem to require it.

The question then arises, why, if those in authority recognize the utter incompatibility between Christianity and Japanese nationalism, they do not banish Christian teachings from their shores and exterminate the Christian Church, as was done when a similar crisis developed 300 years before. There are two reasons why this is not done. First, international relationships are on a vastly different footing from what they were 300 years ago. Japan knows that to wipe out the Christian Church today would only inflame still further against her the world's already heated passions, so that even if she were able to win this war she still could never hope to realize her age-long ambition to gain the acclaim of the world and compel it to acknowledge the greatness

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of Dai Nippon. Secondly, she cannot afford to lose the backing which the Japanese Christians have already given to her nationalistic program.

The policy which she has decided to adopt, therefore, is one of conciliation toward the Church in Japan, followed by dictation to it when that may become necessary. It must be made plain to the Christians that "the Way of the Gods is the absolute way," to quote Premier Hiranuma's own words, "and that all teachings that run counter to it cannot be permitted to exist." To summarize a statement by Minister of War Araki, the basis for all moral guidance must be understood to be the Imperial Rescript on Education. The Government is now definitely committed to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, and in the carrying out of this policy it expects to use all religious organizations. Araki concludes by saying that "any religious body which acts contrary to our national constitution will be dealt with without hesitation."

These unequivocal statements were made during the consideration of the terms and significance of the Religious Organizations Bill in the House of Representatives on February 23, 1929. This bill was passed as a means for more perfectly controlling the activities and teachings of all religious organizations, Buddhist and Shinto sects as well as the Christian Church. One provision of the law was that all religious groups must be organized in large blocs — in the case of Christians, of 50 churches or more — and each bloc made responsible to a single head. Only the stronger Christian denominations, of course, could qualify. The Christian churches therefore decided to adopt the Government's suggestion and create a unified, interdenominational organization which should include all Christians, or at least all Protestants. On the surface, the decision seemed to be spontaneous, since it represented the culmination of what had long been considered the Church's eventual goal: the union of the entire body of Christians. Those on the inside know well, however, that practically every step in the process of integration was taken at the suggestion, or under the compulsion, of the political authorities. One stipulation made by the Government was that henceforth no funds for the work of the churches or schools should be received from abroad and no foreigner should be permitted to occupy any place of administrative responsibility.

The conditions laid down for the continuation of the work of

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the churches were accepted. On October 17, 1940, consequently, in the presence of a vast assemblage of Christians who had been brought together in Tokyo for the celebration of the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Empire, the new plan of organization which was to make of the Christians one united Church was adopted. That may be looked on as a great achievement, accomplished so far in no other country. There is little doubt, however, as to which was the chief gainer, the Government or the Christian Church. The result was simply the emergence in Japan of a Christianity that is thoroughly Japanized, represented by a Church that is completely integrated with the Government's political program. If the goal the Church set for itself was nothing more than a united Church organization, that goal has been reached; but if it looked for the recognition and establishment of a world-wide brotherhood of all peoples and all races, it is farther from its goal than ever.

The question that now arises is threefold: How much farther will the Government compel the Church of Japan to go? How much more completely will the Church yield to the regimentation imposed? And to what extent will this modify the Church's fundamental Christian faith? A categorical assertion has been made recently by the authorized leaders of the new organization that the Church of Japan will not permit itself to be separated in faith or in doctrine from the universal Church. There remains to be seen how that attitude can be maintained under existing circumstances, and what will be the effect on the Church of Japan's eventual military defeat.

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LENIN IN ZURICH

A Memoir

By Valeriu Marcu

RUSSIA, the Russian Revolution, Siberia, the Peter and Paul Fortress, were magic words to us young revolutionists in Zurich in 1912. We saw the Russian exiles who came to that city in the light of Russian literature. The fact that this most recent generation of refugees from the Tsar was completely different from the heroes of the famous novels did not affect us. What reality can be stronger than a preconceived ideal?

Our Russians were absolutely unsentimental. They used sentiment now and then, as politicians often do. All of them had flight, deportation and a court trial behind them. But it never occurred to them to speak about their past. They would have regarded such talk as childish or as an offense against good taste. They were attractive not only because of their readiness to discuss everything, their willingness to teach without pedantry or didacticism, but, above all, because of their ardent interest in every problem. They were all eternal — and eternally young — students whose thirst for knowledge would never be quenched. In contrast, a French or German Socialist lost his curiosity about mankind as soon as his prudent leaders presented him with a job in the political or administrative machine, or sent him to Parliament.

The Russians we knew in Zurich also displayed the dross in human nature, and sometimes it was as apparent to the beholder as the stains on their clothes. The energy they wasted intriguing against each other would have sufficed to rule a gigantic empire. Yet this must be granted: they were not self-satisfied. Every one of them was in a state of permanent revolution against himself, against his closest party comrades, and against God. These exiles felt the war and the postwar problems directly, concretely, in their own flesh. Politics never left them for a moment. It was like a chronic illness. They dreamed of it, and if they talked in their sleep, surely it was only of things political. Their hope was to track down the germs of war. They worked like bacteriologists to disclose its essential causes. These they hoped to find in books about the recent past.

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I clearly recall Karl Radek standing in the middle of his room in front of a hill of books. Radek was the man who, according to all the respectable citizens of Europe, was commissioned by Moscow and the Third International to organize the postwar *putsches* in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain and Lithuania. For relaxation Radek read detective stories before going to bed; he once told me that he had to escape the pressure of politics for at least one hour in every twenty-four. The day after each important event of the war he had a pamphlet ready, but only rarely did it find a publisher. Martov, the best stylist among the Russian exiles, nicknamed him "Pamphletovich." The Russians, and particularly Radek, liked to be published in German. Just as Hebrew is a sacred language to the Jews because the Lord of Creation spoke it, so German was sacred to the Russians because it was the language of Karl Marx.

Martov for years had been at the opposite revolutionary pole from Lenin. Since the first year of the twentieth century he had been the leading polemicist of the Socialist tendency called Menshevism. This was rooted in the German and French traditions more than in the Russian. He fought the other Socialist faction, the Bolsheviks, because he felt that they and their leader Lenin harbored dictatorial ambitions.

Delicate in build, sickly, somewhat stooping, with a pale face partly covered by a dishevelled beard, with hollow cheeks and kindly, shining eyes, Martov used to sit surrounded by friends in the Café St. Annahof. Every two or three hours he changed tables. At intervals, he would retire to write, returning later to read an extraordinary essay in German, French, Russian or English, according to his audience. Sometimes he vanished for days. Worried newcomers to his circle who asked where he had gone would be told that he had buried himself in some library to study the latest happenings in France, Germany or Russia. Lenin said of him: "Martov studies himself into error."

Lenin had no difficulty in defeating an adversary who refused to understand the necessity of unrestrained violence. Less than two years after Lenin's accession to power, Martov was compelled to leave Moscow, to emigrate once more. A few days before that cruel end, during which his nerves died one by one in a long agony, Lenin, scarcely able to speak, murmured to his wife — they were perhaps his last words — "I hear that Martov, too, is dying?" Martov had died of tuberculosis a few months before.

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In Zurich, during the first months of war, Lenin and Martov had come close to each other, and both were happy about it. But their accord was short-lived and they soon began a furious battle of ink against each other. Martov told me that, in the last analysis, Lenin was only the brigand chief of a party that had no real existence. These harsh words of course only increased my desire to see Lenin. I met him in a restaurant which served home-cooked meals, run by a Frau Prellog on the second floor of a dilapidated, weather-beaten house in a narrow little street near the Limmat Quai. The restaurant was in reality a dimly lit corridor, long and narrow, with bare walls and a long, unpainted wooden table that took up most of the space. The place smelled more like a moldy cellar than a restaurant. One door served as the entrance; another, always open, led to the kitchen. Around the table sat six to eight guests on wooden chairs; an equal number of chairs were usually empty. Frau Prellog was extremely busy, as she both cooked the meals and served her customers. She had lived in Vienna for a long time and spoke a peculiar Swiss-Austrian dialect. She was a plump blonde in her early forties, far more appetizing than her thin soups, dried-out roasts and cheap desserts.

When I reached the restaurant Lenin had not yet arrived, and I sat down with Kharitonov, a friend who had undertaken to introduce me to him. The company fascinated me. The men were all young, bold-looking, enigmatic figures. The only lady at the table was not enigmatic at all. She was called Red Maria, not because of her political opinions, but because of her red-blond hair. Maria had a regular, oval face like a Madonna, big blue eyes, long eyelashes and a bass voice which contrasted strangely with her delicate appearance. She immediately asked us, in a voice which drowned out all the men, who we were, what we wanted, who had given us Frau Prellog's address and whether we intended to become regular customers. We could see that the whole group were rather suspicious of us. I explained that I wanted to speak with Mr. Ulyanov — Lenin was known here by his true name. At that Maria became voluble. She said, among other things, that the Ulyanovs were excellent people.

When Lenin arrived with his wife, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, he took a seat near Red Maria. She found in him a willing listener, indeed he listened to her so attentively that it did not occur to me to interrupt. Moreover, her tale of woe interested me. Her troubles were of a worldly, material kind. She said that

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she had had two lovers; now one was a soldier in Italy, the other in Germany. This war, she continued, was nothing but a robbery of men, a dirty trick invented by the rich. Then she went on to tell the favorite story of ladies of her kind: that she had to support her old mother and younger sisters and brothers. Nadezhda Konstantinovna, too, listened with interest.

Gradually, the other guests left the restaurant. Only Lenin, his wife, Kharitonov, Maria, Frau Prellog and I remained at the long table. Shortly before our arrival Frau Prellog had quarreled with Maria. Lenin tried to effect a reconciliation between them, and succeeded. Frau Prellog was not too stubborn; like Maria, she loved any opportunity of telling her troubles. She complained that some of her guests had failed to pay their bills, that meat was expensive, that soon it would be rationed. This, she said, was a measure directed only against the poor. Wealthy people, of course, would always manage to get their steaks. Oh, this accursed war! She could not understand why the soldiers did not shoot their officers and return home without further ado. Lenin's face shone with pleasure at these words. He looked at us with a satisfied air.

When we left the restaurant it was late in the afternoon. I walked home with Lenin.

"You see," he said, "why I take my meals here. You get to know what people are really thinking about. Nadezhda Konstantinovna is sure that only the Zurich underworld frequents this place, but I think she is mistaken. To be sure, Maria is a prostitute. But she does not like her trade. She has a large family to support — and that is no easy matter. As to Frau Prellog, she is perfectly right. Did you hear what she said? Shoot the officers! A magnificent woman. Such opinions are very important."

In front of their house in the Spiegelgasse I took leave of Lenin and his wife.

"I should like to talk with you about things in greater detail," I said. "We can't do it at Frau Prellog's."

"Yes, with pleasure," he said. "I read an article you wrote about disarmament. That reminds me: Radek told me you were friendly with Martov. Do you sympathize with the Mensheviks?"

"I am neither Menshevik nor Bolshevik," I replied. "We in the Werdstrasse are the most radical group of all and we have our own theory."

"I see, I see," Lenin nodded. "That is very interesting." Then,

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after a short silence: "Come to see me tomorrow at 4 o'clock; I'll keep that time open for you."

My friend Kharitonov had not walked to the Spiegelgasse with us. The next day when I went to see Lenin there, I asked him to go with me. As soon as we entered the room, I began to speak. After about half an hour I noticed something like an expression of boredom on Lenin's face and stopped.

"What you have just said," he declared, "is false; completely, utterly false. We cannot be against every war. We must instead learn to distinguish the character of each particular war. We admire, for instance, the French revolutionary wars against old Europe, we admire Cromwell's campaigns, we admire Washington's war against London.

"We are against this particular war, which began in August 1914, because its aim is the further enslavement of the five continents, the promotion of the export of capital. This war is the continuation of the policies pursued between 1898 and 1914. Every war is an instrument of politics. This war is an instrument in the hands of the Russian Tsar, the German Kaiser, the Berlin, Paris and London bankers. I am against these people, and for that reason I hope that my country suffers a cruel and crushing defeat. It is my duty to hope so. Do you know the real meaning of this war?"

"What is it?" I asked.

"It is obvious," he replied. "One slaveholder, Germany, who owns one hundred slaves, is fighting another slaveholder, England, who owns two hundred slaves, for a 'fairer' distribution of the slaves."

"How can you expect to foster hatred of this war," I asked at this point, "if you are not, in principle, against all wars? I thought that as a Bolshevik you were really a radical thinker and refused to make any compromise with the idea of war. But by recognizing the validity of some wars, you open the doors for every opportunity. Every group can find some justification for the particular war of which it approves. I see that we young people can count only on ourselves. We refuse to accept a new justification of war even in the name of science."

Lenin listened attentively, his head bent toward me. He moved his chair closer to mine, while Krupskaya, who until this moment had been sitting on her bed like an impassive ghost, broke into a broad smile. She seemed suddenly interested and pleased. This

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irritated me, because I took it as a sign that she was against me. There was a short silence in the room. Lenin must have wondered whether he should continue to talk with this boy or not. I, somewhat awkwardly, remained silent.

"Your determination to rely upon yourselves," Lenin finally replied, "is very important. Every man must rely on himself. Yet he should also listen to what informed people have to say. I don't know how radical you are or how radical I am. I am certainly not radical enough. One can never be radical enough; that is, one must always try to be as radical as reality itself, and then let the devil and the fools worry about whether one is radical enough. War, however, does not ask me, nor the other Bolsheviks, nor you, whether we accept it."

He looked at me intently, as though trying to read my thoughts, and then went on in a hard voice: "At any rate, one thing is astonishing to me: you and your friends want to transform this entire world which reeks from every pore with baseness, slavery and war, and yet you renounce the use of violence in advance."

"Not at all," I explained, deeply offended. "We do not renounce violence, because that would mean that we renounce the revolution."

"Well, well," said Lenin, "what then is war? What is it but a form of violence? The twentieth century and modern imperialism have mobilized the masses. Every rebellion, every revolution is only a form of war. You can't separate war from revolution or revolution from war. The line of demarcation between them is indefinite and shifting. You cannot say where war ends and revolution begins. Those who expect the revolution to grow out of a peaceful situation, from so-called orderly conditions, do not desire it at all. Revolutions arise in the most complicated situations; most often they result from so-called transitional situations, which contain the sharpest contradictions. I took part in one revolution in Russia, in 1905. It consisted of a number of struggles in which all the discontented classes, groups and elements of the population took part. Among them were large groups who harbored the wildest prejudices and pursued the vaguest and most fantastic aims. There were little groups in the pay of Japan. There were profiteers and adventurers."

I listened with growing curiosity and interest. An hour, perhaps two, went by. Calmly but persistently he tried to convince

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me. Now and then he raised his finger and pointed at me. He spoke slowly and searchingly, in German with a Russian accent. Sometimes he could not find the word he wanted, and I would suggest one to him. He would nod his head almost imperceptibly and thank me. I became so interested in his ideas that I wanted to ask him not to stop. And my mistrust vanished. This man, who spoke so seriously about the revolution, I thought, was certainly no counter-revolutionary. I felt ready to reconcile myself with him. From an innate inclination to friendship, and also from my fear of being seduced by arguments that I was unable to answer at that moment, I said suddenly, without apparent reason: "Comrade Lenin, will you give me your word of honor never to betray the revolution, like the other leaders of Socialism who are pro-war?"

He had to collect himself before he could understand my question. Kharitonov, who until now had not said a word, burst out laughing, and so did Krupskaya. Their laughter seemed to me an expression of bad taste, and on the part of Kharitonov a direct betrayal, the beginning of an enmity. Lenin did not laugh. My question surprised but did not seem to displease him.

"Distrust," he said, "is a good quality in a revolutionary. I shall always try to do my best. But you must promise me to do the same."

"What must I do?" I asked eagerly.

"Learn," said he. "Stop talking so wildly and vaguely. I say that not only to you but to your friends. You always talk of revolution in general. This is just as false as to talk about war in general. Nothing can be more dangerous for young people than to know the names of things, but not their real meaning. Only a traitor or a stupid person can speak today of revolution without war, or of total disarmament."

"We shall correct our thesis on disarmament," I said, quite shaken.

"There won't be much left of it once it is corrected," he said, "or else our conversation has been in vain."

He rummaged in a drawer for a piece of paper and said: "In my article for your magazine I wrote: 'An oppressed class which does not strive to learn the use of weapons, to practice the use of weapons, to own weapons, deserves only to be mistreated. If the war today creates only fear in the petty bourgeoisie, only reluctance to make use of weapons, only terror before blood and

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death, we on the contrary say in answer to this feeling: capitalist society has always been terror without end. If an end by terror is not being prepared for this society, we have no reason to despair. The demand for disarmament in the present-day world is nothing but an expression of despair.'"

He was silent for a while and then concluded, with emotion: "Study and re-study war and revolution. Great things are going to happen soon, they are bound to happen. Yes, everything may be changed from top to bottom, overnight."

To be treated as an equal, despite all the sharp criticism, was a new experience for me. The other Russians, with all their patience and friendliness, had always been distant. They contented themselves with expounding their own ideas. They never said: go home, open your mind, try to understand things for yourself, learn. With Lenin I had the impression that I was an important ally, and that I had to study hard to pass the real test of revolution. I did not know then that Lenin spoke seriously to everyone who was interested in serious questions.

"Do you think," I asked him excitedly, dropping my theoretical preoccupations, "that the revolution will break soon?"

"Perhaps in two, perhaps in five, at the latest in ten years."

Lenin's plan was unparalleled in comprehensiveness and boldness, covering all the continents and seas and containing all the elements of the future "total" strategy. He set himself up in opposition to all the warring powers as the representative of another power, and declared relentless war of annihilation against them. He did this not abstractly, not in principle only. He had a definite, concrete strategic scheme according to which he organized the struggle against the warmakers in Berlin, Paris, London and St. Petersburg.

He started from the premise that every war does away with the outworn conventions, shatters the protective shell of a given society, sweeps away everything that has outlived its value, and brings into play the profound drives and forces of that society. He regarded it as his chief task to get into contact with these emerging drives and forces, to organize them in the service of his movement and to direct his action according to their development.

The official strategists of the warring powers used a strategy that may be called horizontal; Lenin had his own "vertical" strategy. Horizontal strategy is in general based on things as they

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exist, on known facts. A given number of regiments, brigades or divisions move on such and such roads, in such and such directions. They fight such and such engagements, all integrated and directed by the general staff so as to accomplish the broad purpose of the war. Lenin's vertical strategy was based on the powerful forces latent in man. At first these are potential forces; they become actual only as the result of a long political process. Once developed, these forces must be directed by the engineers of revolution, by a small, lucid revolutionary minority. Vertical strategy must cautiously mobilize these changing, still indeterminate, still indefinable forces, and concentrate them for the achievement of its political purposes.

In wartime, political opposition is conceivable only in connection with revolutionary activities. Lenin did not plan invasions from the outside, but from the inside. Every revolutionist must work for the defeat of his own country. To bring about this defeat, the discontented classes in each country must seize the barracks, government offices and other centers of the belligerent imperialists. The main factor was the violence, the force of the attack. The chief task of vertical strategy was to coördinate all the moral, physical, geographical and tactical elements of the universal insurrection, to join together all the hatreds aroused by imperialism on the five continents.

Lenin noted these potential elements of struggle with painstaking exactitude. Every day he commented at length on those little news items published from time to time in obscure sheets, which, to his mind, indicated latent popular unrest. Every day he wrote articles which formed a sort of political diary. He wrote as though thousands awaited his comment, as though a typesetter were standing outside the door. In reality there was only a leaden, echoless silence.

Lenin was always absorbed in the map of the world. He had an extraordinary feeling for the composition of social bodies, for their political specific gravity, so to speak. To him, the little states were an important element in the anti-imperialist fermentation, a means to be utilized in the total strategy. "The little nations," he wrote, "though powerless as independent factors in the struggle against imperialism, can play an important part in it." For that reason, according to the ever-changing requirements of an all-comprehensive strategy, he was for the right of nations to self-determination. Though an internationalist to the marrow

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of his bones, he could be nationalistic as a means to the end. He was not only for Irish equality in a common parliament with the English, for Czech and Ukrainian representation in the Austrian and Russian parliaments, but for the right of complete separation.

He advocated colonial uprisings as a revolutionary instrument and a strategic requirement, in order to set in motion simultaneously all the anti-imperialist forces. "In the colonies and semi-colonies there live nearly a billion persons, more than half of the population of the planet. Movements of national liberation in these countries are either very strong already, or are continuing to grow and mature." To coördinate all these elements and link them up with the revolutionary upsurges in the cities was for him the prerequisite of the revolution. The uprising of the industrial workers, the peasants and the lower middle class must be merged with the aspirations of the oppressed nations and colonies. Sooner or later, he thought, an international alliance between the oppressed nations and the revolutionary proletariat would take place.

Sooner or later? Yes, for should Lenin not triumph during this war, should his Third Front, which was just coming into being, not be victorious, then one of the two warring coalitions would win the war — Germany's or England's. An imperialist peace of plunder would be concluded, and twenty years later, he wrote on October 1, 1916, a war would break out between Japan and the United States. That war "will mean for Europe a retrogression for several decades. History often makes gigantic leaps backward."

Lenin did not communicate to me his grandiose, complex and many-sided conception of war in one short conversation. I visited him frequently under pretext of asking his advice on lesser matters, but really to create opportunities for drawing him into conversation. I often went with him to meetings of Swiss workers which he sat through silently, listening with interest.

He was completely absorbed in the war. He tried to show its economic necessities, its internal laws, in his book "Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism." Every day he went to the library and brought home statistics and reports of the international cartels. He often spoke of his book. He worried about having to compress a gigantic mass of material into 120 pages. (According to his contract with the publishers his book could not exceed that length.) He was a strange sort of scholar, as nervous as a young student before an examination. He also suffered from not being

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allowed to use strong language in his book, for his publisher was a neutral, and the contract forbade personal attacks on the "opportunists," as Lenin called them. One day I asked him why he worked so hastily and nervously and spent so much time in the library. He replied: "A work that is not completely checked to the last word, cannot be regarded as even begun."

When Lenin discussed politics, one had the feeling that he spoke not as an individual, but as the leader of a great unknown power, whose very spirit was as strong as territories, armies and bureaucracies. This feeling was correct; he was the unknown Caesar of all the tendencies at work against the world of that time. He was the brain of the inner changes in the social body, the forces and elements set free by the war, the process of remolding and recasting the political structure of the world. In him these unconscious changes found their conscious expression. "Only from the changes that take place in the soil of the spirit," says Hegel, "can the new arise."

These reflections on Lenin are not retrospective. They were not brought forth by the fact that he finally succeeded in becoming the head of a Great Power, and that his Russian venture, for better or worse, will challenge the world for centuries to come. The thing that surprised us least about Lenin was that he achieved power. The ten to twelve people who saw him regularly several times a week were convinced of his destiny, firmly convinced that, should there be a revolution in Russia, he would become the successor of the Tsars.

He himself suffered from depression and felt fettered; all he had was the prospect of wider horizons. Sometimes, particularly in the last months of his exile, it seemed to him that his circle was growing smaller and smaller, the life around him less and less intense. So many tested friends of his youth, so many old comrades deserted him. The whole Bolshevik Party at that time consisted of a few friends who corresponded with him from Stockholm, London, New York and Paris. In addition, he had financial worries and was overworked. In 1914, his wife had inherited 2,000 rubles. They lived on this sum for two years. Lenin made efforts to obtain work on an encyclopaedia that was being published in Russia. He finally obtained it toward the end of his exile, but his fee was insignificant. He was at the end of his resources.

But for all his troubles, he roared like a wounded lion when the Tsar's emissaries in Switzerland tried to do what he himself was

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to do at Brest-Litovsk two years later: negotiate a separate peace. "Russia," he wrote, "intends, with the help of Japan and that very same Germany with which she is now at war, to defeat England in Asia, so that she may annex all of Persia, complete the partition of China and so forth. . . . In 1904–1905 Japan, with the help of the British, defeated Russia; now she is cautiously preparing to defeat England with the help of the Russians. . . . There is a Germanophile party in Russian government circles, among Tsar Nicholas' courtiers, among the nobility and the army."

Lenin knew that if the Russian diplomats succeeded in pulling their wounded and bleeding country out of the war his chances would vanish for many years. He now directed all his fury against the Socialists of the different countries. Every Socialist who spoke of peace was a traitor, a scoundrel, a charlatan. Just as they had up until now handled all the war business of their rulers, he said, so they would take care of their peace business also and save them from bloody catastrophe. "In brief," he told me one day, "the rôles are brilliantly distributed. The government and the military clique wage war. The liberals talk about freedom and democracy. The Socialists talk about peace."

Lenin's hidden, yet ever-growing impatience during this period found an outlet in his persistent and stimulating explanations to us. Krupskaya in her memoirs complains of her husband's depression in those trying days and says: "Young people from Germany, Italy and other countries were then in Zurich and Ilich wanted to share his revolutionary experience with them as much as possible."

It is often said that the past is distorted in our minds and turned into a paradise, that everything in it is seen in a softer light. But those impressions of our encounters with people and events which remain alive, which are in profound harmony with our own innate natures and which shape our perceptions and intellects, are not more and not less an idealization of reality than is our appreciation of our daily bread. At a later period, Leninism, raised to the rank of a state religion, thoroughly disgusted and horrified me. The revolution worn as a lackey's livery with Lenin's picture on the buttons seemed to me an absolute negation of life itself. But I have never forgotten Lenin's approach to things and his manner of seeing them, although he later turned his face in a direction completely different from mine.

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TENSION IN THE FRENCH WEST INDIES

By Jean Cazenave de la Roche

THERE are explosive possibilities in the French West Indies. For three years the predominantly Negro populations of Martinique and Guadeloupe have been stirring restlessly under the heavy hand of Admiral Robert and the French Navy. During that time these French authorities have been able to invoke the love which all West Indians feel for France in support of their policies. The Allied occupation of North Africa and the end of the fiction that Vichy was independent have removed that moral prop; there no longer is a legitimate or quasi-legitimate French Government on which the Admiral can depend for authority. The only factor except naked force which has kept the latent dissatisfaction of the population from bursting forth in action is gone.

II

Throughout the West Indies, the fertility of the soil and the difficulties which Europeans experience in doing hard physical work in the tropics, early prompted the importation of Negro slaves from Africa. In the French islands, the living conditions of the slaves certainly were not happy. But thanks to the influence of the clergy and to the family organization of French life, the French Negroes were less miserable than those of some neighboring colonies. In the rural regions, especially, masters acted as natural protectors of their slaves. Some were granted their freedom; the most intelligent and reliable were given positions of trust on the plantations or in commerce; a black militia was created. These were decisive steps in the improvement of the masses, and they drew the whites and Negroes unusually close together.

Many wrongs still existed, nevertheless. Nor could the Negroes forget that Christian doctrine taught the equality of all men before God. By the eve of the Revolution of 1789, their desire for liberty and for better living conditions had become general. The whites themselves were influenced by the liberal philosophies of the eighteenth century and opposed the freeing of the slaves only because it would ruin the whole economic system of the islands.

The suppression of slavery by the Constituent Assembly marked the beginning of a long period of unrest in the French Antilles. This humane gesture was made without the accompaniment of any precautionary measures to insure social order and keep the economic balance. As a result, work stopped altogether on the plantations and there was much political agitation, especially in the cities. The unrest continued through the revolutionary period and the British occupation which followed. It should be said, however, that in the fighting between the British and the Creoles on Guadeloupe, mulattoes and Negroes could be found on both sides; and many faithful slaves died beside their former masters. Slavery was reëstablished under Napoleon I, who regained the islands for France, and the unavoidable uprisings that followed were repressed by the Imperial troops.

It was not until the Revolution of 1848 that slavery was definitely abolished.

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Again the Negroes were freed en masse without any preparatory measures having been taken, and again this led to a complete stoppage of all activity in the islands. The National Assembly granted the planters 126 million francs as compensation in 1849, but it could do nothing to remedy the lack of manpower, except to introduce into the country workmen more docile than the emancipated Negroes. Between 1852 and 1859, 13,000 African blacks were sent to the Antilles; but a sufficient number of volunteers could not be found and France could not, with any decency, establish another form of slavery. Under agreement with England, about 65,000 Hindus were brought into the French West Indies. The local Negroes resented this intrusion and disliked the ambitious and hard-working Hindus, but the desired result was achieved: the Negroes went back to work, often on the same plantations on which they had labored as slaves. Now, however, they were free workers enjoying all the rights of men and citizens.

From 1848 to 1870 Guadeloupe and Martinique had 20 years of peace and relative prosperity. They were rapidly becoming real French provinces, tropical reflections of metropolitan France. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1870. From that date, whites and Negroes enjoyed civil and political rights equal to those of Frenchmen in the mother country; they were represented in the French Parliament, they had local self-government, and all French laws applied to them.

From 1870 to the present day, the Antilles have managed fairly well, considering the heavy inheritance of the past, the handicap of climate and the almost total absence of a middle class. There have been occasional strikes, burnings of sugar-cane fields and other excesses, which have been greatly exaggerated by those who wished to see colonial representation abolished; but they have been no more serious than similar troubles in France herself, and far less significant. In general, anyone who makes a careful examination of the evolution of these two French islands in this period must develop a good deal of admiration for the accomplishments of the Third Republic. A handful of former white masters who owned all the wealth of the islands, and a mass of former slaves who owned nothing, were placed side by side, on a footing of absolute political equality. Without shock and without violence, both groups adapted themselves to the new conditions of life.

III

The white populations of both Martinique and Guadeloupe are small. There are at most 5,000 whites out of a population of 250,000 in Martinique, although they own all the large estates and control all commerce. A few thousand doctors, lawyers, officials, professors, manufacturers and merchants make up a colored élite. The rest of the inhabitants are blacks, workers on sugar-cane or banana plantations, fishermen or small tradespeople.

The island of Guadeloupe is twice the size of Martinique, with an area of nearly 772 square miles, including the dependencies of Marie-Galante, Les Saintes, Désirades, Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélémy.[1] Its population is, however, about the same as that of Martinique. The white element is very

[1] The charming little island dependencies of Guadeloupe are still inhabited by the white descendants of the Normans and Bretons who came there two or three hundred years ago. They live removed from the world, in patriarchal families of shipbuilders, fishermen and small farmers.

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small, numbering perhaps some 1,500 inhabitants. The colored élite is likewise limited in size. Officially, the frictions of the past are forgotten, and blacks and whites rub elbows in friendly fashion in political campaigns, in daily work and occasionally on a Sunday hunt. There are, nevertheless, marked social distinctions. The whites have their clubs to which no colored man may belong. A colored person is never received in a white family, and intermarriage means estrangement from the whites. Relations between the races are not, of course, perfectly harmonious. Many of the blacks still remember the bad old days and some men of mixed blood are bitter. This causes a certain amount of dissatisfaction which is intensified by the haughty attitude and behavior of some of the whites.

The political organization of the islands, under the Third Republic, was like that of France. By the terms of the 1854 Senatus-Consulte, the Governor enjoyed more extensive powers than those of a prefect, but these powers were granted him only for the defense of the territory and the maintenance of public order. In no way did they impede the free exercise of the political rights of West Indian citizens. The counties were organized as in France and the municipal councils were elected by universal suffrage. The General Council, which voted the budget and managed the interests of the country, enjoyed more extensive powers than did its counterpart in France; it was able to oppose the Governor and the Minister of Colonies. Parliamentary representation by a senator and two deputies for each island, elected as in France, completed the political pattern.

The Administration always tried, in principle, to keep an equal balance between the various elements of the population. Maintenance of order was not too difficult. Tension appeared only during elections, when it sometimes developed out of the lively political campaigning of the Negroes. Care had to be taken not to let the masses get the impression that their political rights, of which they were extremely jealous, were being interfered with in any way. Public life was, on the whole, left to the Negroes; the whites interfered only in case of absolute necessity and then indirectly, through the power of their money. The most intelligent among the colored people, who were often educated by the white planters and were sometimes their illegitimate offspring, soon became the heads of municipalities; later they took their seats on the General Council and finally became deputies or senators.

The exercise of political freedom on a par with that of the French served as an outlet for Negro energies and made it possible for the West Indies to live in order, peace and prosperity for almost a century. The Negroes made no attempt to interfere with the economic and social privileges of the whites. The voter's certificate, together with freedom of speech and of the press, were their most precious possessions. They valued them as symbols of their freedom, of the great distance they had come since the days when they had not even the right to call themselves men.

The whole modern history of the islands has been marked by this jealous concern with political liberty. Governors paid with their lives for attempts to violate what the people considered to be their rights. Gendarmes or sailors were never able to impose on the West Indians anything that, in their view, was unjust or illegal. The average town councillor of the smallest village knew all the electoral and legal rules; he knew his rights as well as any metropolitan

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lawyer. And the political rights and privileges which they enjoyed inspired in the black population of the West Indies a feeling of love, amounting almost to idolatry, for Republican France.

IV

The people of Martinique and Guadeloupe had no doubts about ultimate victory over Germany when France went to war in 1939. Village monuments to the dead show how great a contribution they made in the last war. They were ready to do as much this time, and the departure of the first contingents for France brought enthusiastic demonstrations of attachment to the mother country. The defeat, the invasion, the armistice came like bolts from the blue.

Admiral Robert, who had been appointed High Commissioner at the beginning of the war, immediately aligned himself with the Pétain Government. His authority was strengthened by the arrival of several thousand European sailors on the *Emile Bertin*, the *Béarn*, the *Jeanne d'Arc*, and other warships. He proceeded at once, though by careful stages, to tear down the structure which the Third Republic had patiently erected. He eliminated individuals who protested too violently against his changes and awakened the privileged classes to the fact that they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by opposing him. Supported by them and by the sailors, Admiral Robert introduced a counterpart of the Vichy régime.

The General Council, fruit of a slow evolution which had begun with the colonial assemblies, was suppressed. Governor Nicolle, assisted by Secretary-General Bernier in Martinique, and Governor Saurin, assisted by Secretary-General Poirier in Guadeloupe, were made rulers of the Antilles under the watchful eye of the Navy. The mayors — colored men except for four or five out of a total of 36 in each island — were asked to give up their office and were replaced by mayors, mostly white, appointed by the Administration. The mayors, of course, no longer express the will of elected municipal councils, but receive and execute orders from above.

Martinique used to have 2,500 civil servants of all kinds; Guadeloupe had 1,800. All but two or three dozen of these were colored. The higher officials were thoroughly weeded out. Those who were affiliated with the Masonic Lodges, or who were suspected of sympathy with de Gaulle, or of pro-Allied sentiments, were removed; some were imprisoned. They were replaced by "reliable" agents from France, by sailors or by policemen. The police and the information service were put under the direct supervision of the Navy. The number of gendarmes was increased in both islands, and sailors replaced the easy-going policemen of prewar days. Rounds and patrols reminded the population at all times that the Navy was on the alert against a possible attack — an American attack, for instance, like the one which was rumored last July, and for which the whole population hoped and prayed in vain.

Criticism of the policies of the Vichy Government, Marshal Pétain, Pierre Laval or Admiral Robert was absolutely forbidden; so was the expression of anti-collaborationist sentiments. The people were not permitted to listen to English or American radios, for they were the voices of the odious Anglo-Saxon imperialism. They were forbidden to pronounce the name of the "traitor" de Gaulle or to display a V. Every day, at noon, the official information service of the Navy at Fort de France issued the latest news — the news

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most unfavorable to the Allies was always chosen — and carried on a violent anti-Anglo-Saxon campaign. "The Voice of France in the Antilles" was nicknamed, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, "The Voice of Germany in the Antilles."

Anyone who aroused any sort of suspicion was summoned to Police Headquarters. All legal formalities were suppressed and all personal guarantees suspended. Death sentences were pronounced, although there do not appear to have been any executions. Many unfortunate individuals, however, who were guilty of being pro-British or pro-American, were sent to Guiana like ordinary criminals, or else confined in prison. The *Béarn* was transformed from an airplane carrier into a penitentiary for anti-collaborationists. All personal liberties likewise were suppressed; censorship of the press made the newspapers unreadable; domestic correspondence was closely watched and censored. Shortages of gasoline and tires drove most public conveyances from the streets. Spies abounded everywhere. Even in churches one could hear the New Order being praised. School exercises in the two *lycées* and the approximately 130 Creole grade schools were always opened with a prayer and the Hymn to the Marshal.

So it was that the colored population of Martinique and Guadeloupe was deprived of its liberties in the name of what it revered above all else: France. Before 1940, life in the West Indies was so easygoing, so gay, so extraordinarily simple, that these islands were in truth *le pays des revenants*, the land to which one always returned. Today the atmosphere is stifling.

The result of all this, in a country where freedom of conscience and opinion has come to be considered sacred, has been to stiffen the population in its opposition. But one cannot fight with knives against rifles and machine guns. That is the only reason why there is a surface calm in the West Indies. It should deceive no one. A plebiscite is said to have shown that 90 to 95 percent of the population supports General de Gaulle. This is quite understandable, since he has proclaimed the continuation of the Third Republic and its liberties. The population can only be patient, conceal its feelings, and wait.

The economic situation of the islands is almost desperate. In normal times, rice and dried codfish were the basic foods of the population; they were imported, of course. Cattle came from Venezuela and from other West Indian islands; flour, canned goods, vegetables and fruit were brought from Europe. Oils and fats, clothing, shoes and all petroleum products and building materials were also imported. The islands could pay for these large imports with their exports. In 1938, the last normal year, Martinique sent to France 52 million kilos of sugar and 10 million liters of rum. The sharp reduction of exports to France since 1940 has caused widespread unemployment.

For the past two years the mass of the people have been living in misery. They are reduced to eating tropical fruit and vegetables and, along the coasts, some fish; but even fishing was curtailed by the Navy to prevent escapes from the islands. Some food could be brought in from Santo Domingo until the three Dominican ships used in this trade were sunk, leaving only schooners available. Since then, the steamship *Guadeloupe* has been sent to New Orleans once a month for essential supplies. As soon as these arrive the authorities requisition what they consider necessary for the officers and men of the Navy and their families. Some privileged civil servants are also taken care of. The populace

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receives what remains. Some counties were without flour or butcher's meat for several months.

Economic misery on top of brutal interference with the political life of the people made the situation dangerous enough. Yet the authorities adopted still another ill-advised policy — namely, anti-British propaganda. This was bound to cause resentment, for many families of the French Antilles are related by marriage to Creoles of the British West Indies and the relations between the French and English colonists, including the colored people, have always been excellent.

Before Hitler swallowed up all of France one might have believed that Admiral Robert — a soldier who is not expected to know the political game — merely executed the orders which he received from Vichy. But the fiction that Vichy is independent can no longer be kept up and Admiral Robert can no longer hide behind the Chief of State. He must change his objectives and his methods, and do so at once. One cannot deprive 500,000 colored people of a liberty which they love as much as life itself without running the risk of a terrible explosion. If that comes, neither religion nor feelings of humanity will be able to prevent dreadful violence. For three years feelings of revenge have been allowed to ferment in West Indian souls. Those in the Navy who are mainly responsible may leave, but the West Indian whites will still be there. The tragedy can be foreseen. Nor is it likely that the upheaval would be confined to the French West Indies. The history of the past 150 years has shown that all of the West Indies stand together and that when Martinique and Guadeloupe begin to move, the rest of the archipelago is likely to follow.

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POSTSCRIPT TO THE SIXTUS AFFAIR

By William de Hevesy

Editor's Note: The following article describes a hitherto unrevealed incident in the secret peace parleys which the Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary had with the Allies shortly after his accession to the throne on November 23, 1916.

The best known of these was the so-called Sixtus Affair, in which the Empress Zita's brothers, Prince Sixtus and Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma, served as intermediaries. On March 23, 1917, the Bourbon Princes, who always considered themselves Frenchmen, met the Emperor and Empress at Laxenburg, near Vienna, and presented a four-point proposal which Poincaré and Briand had approved as the basis for a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and the Allies. The terms were that Austria-Hungary should: 1, recognize France's right to Alsace-Lorraine; 2, agree to the reëstablishment of Belgian sovereignty and the restoration of the ruling Belgian house; 3, agree to re-establish the Serbian monarchy, give it an outlet to the Adriatic and transfer to it those portions of Albania then occupied by Austrian troops; and 4, disinterest itself in Russia's claims to Constantinople. Foreign Minister Czernin received these proposals coldly. The Emperor, however, seemed pleased at such relatively easy terms. He gave the Princes an autograph letter in which he accepted the first three points but reserved his decision on the fourth because of the unsettled state of affairs in Russia.

Later in March, Briand was replaced in the French Foreign Office by Ribot, who held more uncompromising views regarding French war aims. He informed Lloyd George of the negotiations and they agreed that Italy must also be sounded out. Sonnino insisted that the promises of the Treaty of London be adhered to literally in any settlement. The Emperor Charles on May 9 wrote a second autograph letter disposing of possible Italian objections. But on June 3 Italy proclaimed a protectorate over Albania, thus infringing the third of the original French proposals. In a speech before the Chamber on June 5, Ribot hinted that he was through with secret diplomacy.

There were other proposals which Count Armand, a French officer, presented about this time to Count Revertera, an Austrian diplomat, on behalf of the French Army. These suggested treating Germany so harshly that Charles did not even communicate them to the German Kaiser, and the negotiations broke off.

There followed, between August and September 1917, the attempt from the Austro-Hungarian side to get into touch with French authorities which Major de Hevesy describes in the article below.

AFTER the secret peace negotiations carried on with France by Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma failed in April 1917, the Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary made still another attempt to end the war. The Sixtus Affair is well known. The second attempt has not been revealed until now. The Archduke Otto of Habsburg, writing in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for January 1942, has stated that his father, the Emperor Charles, would have accepted a separate peace if Germany had refused to negotiate. I can confirm that statement, as the Emperor charged me with negotiating such a peace.

My contact with His Majesty was brought about by the war. In the spring of 1916 I was a Captain of cavalry and aide-de-camp to the chief of the 11th Army in the Tyrol. In this capacity I had to deal often with the commander of the 20th Corps, the Archduke Charles, then heir to the throne. He knew that I had spent more than ten years of my life in France and that it was only

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my military oath which led me to serve under the Austro-Hungarian flag. By the end of 1916 the former commander of the 20th Corps had become Emperor. My duties also had changed. The post which I held in the spring of 1917 obliged me to keep awake every night. Those sleepless night hours under the wonderful bright sky of the South Tyrol induced reflections.

Then came an order calling me out of the trenches of the Brenta Valley for staff work at the War Ministry in Vienna. When I entered the restaurant of the old Bristol Hotel for the first time, a friend who was sitting alone invited me to his table. Count Joseph Hunyady, like myself, was a Captain of Hussars; he was also aide-de-camp to the Emperor. But his relationship to His Majesty was very different from that of the three or four other aides-de-camp. In the Emperor's youth Count Hunyady had been a kind of mentor to him and his position now was quite exceptional.

I was on sufficiently friendly terms with Hunyady to talk to him with complete frankness. I recalled how we all disliked the Germans. I spoke of how much peace would mean to our country. And I expressed the belief — I had, of course, no knowledge whatsoever of the Sixtus Affair — that nothing was being done to bring it about simply because those who could have initiated such a movement feared that they might be compromised. It was strange, I said, that men who were ready to risk life and limb in battle were not willing to endanger their reputations in the slightest degree even for such great issues as war and peace. I remember that I added, without much reflection, that if I, for instance, were charged with a peace mission to my friends in France, I would certainly be prepared to be disavowed and repudiated if that proved necessary. Hunyady and I lived near each other and we discussed this theme of a separate peace several times afterward.

On the evening of July 27 Hunyady surprised me by saying: "His Majesty orders you to see him tomorrow. Be ready at 7.30. I will take you to Reichenau." This was the summer residence of the Court, about 40 kilometers from Vienna. The next day when the time came Hunyady took care of everything. Among other things, he kept me concealed on the trip so that I should not be seen by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Maurice Esterhazy, and his Secretary of State, Bárczy, who were returning from Reichenau and with both of whom I was acquainted. I do not believe that anyone noticed my arrival. The aide-de-camp *du jour*, Major Ledochowsky, who was walking with the Emperor in the pine forest surrounding his villa, may have had instructions, for he disappeared promptly when our car approached.

The Emperor Charles was only 30 years old, but he possessed a vein of calm, delicate humor which is usually acquired at a much later age. He received me with a faint smile, saying, "Well, you want at any price to make peace for me?" I answered that an attempt to secure peace should be made, even though its result might be uncertain. This was all the more desirable because the Germans were giving us false information. I recalled that they had always assured us that America was preparing only against Japan and would never turn on us, yet that very thing had just happened. The fact that the Emperor Charles could not be held responsible for a war which had started prior to his reign was a favorable circumstance, I said, calculated to appeal particularly to the strong Anglo-Saxon sense of justice. If His Majesty ordered me

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to do so, I would try, with the help of French friends whom I could certainly find in Switzerland, to convey his views to the French Government and to lay the groundwork for further confidential contacts. I would also find out whom the Allies would agree to accept as our plenipotentiaries.

The Emperor was strongly in favor of peace. Perhaps I may be permitted to quote in the original what he said at the outset: "*Ich bin gewiss bundestreu. Aber, das darf nicht so weit gehen, dass wir deshalb zu grunde gehen.*" (I am certainly faithful to my alliances. But that should not reach the point of our being annihilated.) He added that he did not want "any gain from the war." On the other hand, "it was his duty to keep what had been entrusted to him." These views were as normal as they were clear. In response to my suggestions, His Majesty agreed on the proposals to be presented to the Allies. As, for military reasons, an armistice was out of the question, the Swiss Government might suggest simply a 24-hour suspension of hostilities to permit delegates to gather around a conference table. The Allies could then declare solemnly that they would not, under any circumstances whatever, enter into peace negotiations with a ruler who had started the war (meaning the German Emperor), but that, as the Emperor Charles had had nothing to do with the outbreak of hostilities, they were ready to negotiate with him and "perhaps, through him, with the others." Such an arrangement would put us in an advantageous situation. Finally, the Emperor said that he would give orders in the proper quarters to enable me to reach Switzerland.

The first recipient of such orders would be the War Minister, as no officer was allowed to enter a neutral country without his written consent. The Minister, General Stöger-Steiner, called me to his office by telephone the next day. "I have to let you go to Switzerland," he said, "and without arousing attention. How shall we manage that?" It is unnecessary to repeat my reply here, but the matter was arranged. Incidentally, the Minister was simply executing an Imperial order and was unaware of the purpose of my journey. Such was his discretion that he did not once mention the Emperor in our conversation.

In the second place, it was necessary to make arrangements with an important inter-ministerial office, the so-called *Kriegsüberwachungsamt*, or Office of War Supervision, which had to deal, among other things, with passports. Things were easier here, since Colonel Horváth, chief of the office and at one time our military attaché in Great Britain, was an old personal friend with whom I could talk more openly. Another favorable circumstance was that he was also head of the censorship and so was one person whose letters nobody would dare open. We agreed that I would send my reports under double cover to him, and he would deliver the inner envelope to Count Hunyady. The vocabulary at the end of a well-known English grammar was selected as a code. This meant that I had not even to carry the code in my trunk, for the grammar could be purchased from any Swiss bookseller.[1]

His Majesty did not want Count Ottokar Czernin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to know anything about this undertaking, at least at the beginning. He felt, and rightly, that Czernin, an arrogant and conceited man, had obstructed his previous effort made through Prince Sixtus. But though it was

[1] Colonel Horváth has since been good enough to write down his reminiscences of this part of the affair and the paper is in my possession. Count Hunyady has confirmed their accuracy.

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unwise to let Czernin know about my expedition to Switzerland, I felt there were certain advantages in warning our Minister in Berne, Musulin, about it. Furthermore, I knew Musulin well enough to be sure that when he promised me that not a soul would hear anything from him, he would keep his word.

I crossed the border on August 2, 1917. I had once studied in Zurich so I was aware that the newspapers there were accustomed to record the names of visitors to the Swiss summer resorts. Immediately I made a fortunate discovery. The wife of a prominent French diplomat was staying at Montfleuri, above Montreux. The two sons of these people had been intimate friends of mine and they had often received me in their Paris home. It seemed wise, therefore, to leave my luggage at the station and go to Montreux immediately. By walking straight to Montfleuri I could lessen the risk of being watched. The lady started back when she saw me: the poor mother's two sons had already fallen. But my first words: "The Emperor —" sufficed to make this very clever woman listen to me. I asked to see her husband. "That will not be possible," she said. "He is in Salonika. But I will write immediately to Minister Léon Bourgeois and will myself take the letter to Berne for our Embassy's diplomatic bag. Bourgeois was my guardian. I shall suggest that he meet you in Geneva." *Alea jacta erat!*

But time pressed. Some weeks later, as I was crossing the lobby of the Palace Hotel in Berne, I noticed another French personage whom I had known since 1908. I disliked the man, but he was an influential Deputy and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament; it would have been a mistake to neglect this opportunity. A meeting was arranged between us by a Swiss friend, Dr. Mende, son-in-law of the American Ambassador, General Horace Porter. Dr. Mende helped me wholeheartedly after I had given him my word of honor that I had not come to Switzerland as a spy. The Deputy was just leaving for Paris. He promised me to report immediately to Premier Ribot as well as to Bourgeois. It was particularly important that he see Bourgeois, a former Premier and the most influential member of the Cabinet, to give him verbal information in support of the letter which he had received from his ward. I know with absolute certainty that the Deputy did not keep his promise. He saw only Ribot, and the Premier refused to discuss any suggestion which might have come from the ruler of Austria-Hungary. The fact that a few months before the Allies had refused to accept the proposals of Prince Sixtus may have influenced him. Old people are often stubborn, and Ribot was over 75. The French, moreover, feared dissension with their Italian allies, who had not yet experienced their tremendous defeat at Caporetto. Both the Ministers trembled at the thought of being compromised. The French diplomat's wife informed me that Léon Bourgeois would not come to Geneva. My attempt had failed. I reported this to the Emperor from Switzerland. I added that perhaps His Majesty would now judge it advisable to make an attempt with the British. I took the liberty of humbly suggesting that, in this case, Baron Rudolph Slatin be sent to them. Count Hunyady answered: "Your suggestion has been accepted. He will join you."

Slatin, better known as General Slatin Pasha, had left Austria for the Sudan in his youth, and there, after thrilling adventures, he took service with the British. The outbreak of the war found him a *Sirdar* (General) and

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Inspector of the British troops. But he elected to resign and return to his homeland where, at the age of 60, he asked to be given fighting service in the infantry. Emperor Francis Joseph made him a Baron and put him at the head of the Austrian Red Cross in Vienna. Once when I was visiting him I saw a letter from his successor in Africa, General Sir Reginald Wingate, who addressed him as "Dear old chap," although their countries were at war. The British appreciate fairness and courage. Slatin would be *persona grata.*

Some time after my arrival in Switzerland I had heard a secret which was not so well kept as mine — namely, that one of our diplomats, Count Revertera, was there for the purpose of getting in contact with the French military. I had immediately questioned Hunyady about Revertera. He had answered: "This belongs to the past. You are alone." But now Slatin was coming.

I learned in a peculiar way that Slatin would soon arrive. The Swiss papers reported that the Emperor Charles had had a motor accident while at the Italian front; he and his companion, Baron Slatin, had nearly been drowned in a flooded river. Slatin had no job at the front. It was therefore clear that the Emperor had summoned him from Vienna to give him instructions for his mission. Shortly thereafter we met in the train which brought him to Switzerland and after we had had a talk we separated.

In Berne everyone supposed that Slatin, head of the Austrian Red Cross, had come in connection with some Red Cross problems. This made it possible for him to have direct contact with the British representatives, who, of course, welcomed the former British General and Knight of the Bath cordially. But Slatin had no luck either. It was too late. Austria-Hungary's destruction had already been pledged.

Baron Slatin and I left Switzerland on December 19 and returned together to Vienna. We were both terribly saddened. I could not report to the Emperor at once because he was inspecting the eastern front; my arrival there might have given rise to comment. I had my audience with him on January 2 at Laxenburg. The aide-de-camp on duty, Lieutenant-Colonel Brougier, an acquaintance of mine, said to me when he opened the door of the audience room, "Please! Above all, do not excite him against the Germans." I was amazed. But the Emperor was already standing in the background; it was impossible for me to tell Brougier what I thought. Obviously the Germans had done much, since my departure, to influence the young monarch. This was proved when he asked me, among other things, "What do you think? When will the French Army become Bolshevized?" They nevertheless did not succeed in really winning him over. I found him at least as strongly imbued with the wish to have peace restored as when I left him — and this in spite of the great victories gained over the Italians in the meantime. This shows that he was not only well intentioned and humane but that he was courageous also. He wanted the best, and tried honestly to obtain it.

Having failed in my mission, my only desire was to leave Vienna and, therewith, all politics. Not long after my return I obtained the command of an infantry battalion in the distant Ukraine. The men that I found there were still of excellent heart, and although half of them were Hungarians and half Rumanians, they were always in perfect accord. The old Monarchy could at least claim that achievement.

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THE PRINCES AND INDIA'S FUTURE

By K. M. Panikkar

IN discussions of the Indian problem, which looms so large because of India's position in the strategy of the United Nations, it should not be forgotten that India is divided politically into two parts, one ruled by the Government of India and one ruled by Princes who are in treaty relationship with the British Crown. The problem, therefore, is not concerned solely with the adjustment of political power between Britain and British India, as outsiders often suppose. There is a third important factor.

The territory ruled by hereditary Princes amounts to practically two-fifths of the whole of India and the population involved is nearly 80 millions. It includes States which by reason of their size and resources and the progressive character of their administration challenge comparison with many of the nations of Europe and the Americas. There are, altogether, 562 Indian States, but this figure by itself is misleading, for many of them are very small. The principal states, whose rulers are members of the Chamber of Princes in their own right, are 135 in number, total 572,997 square miles in area and had a population of 75,109,344 in 1931.

These States, contrary to widely prevalent notions, are not the creations of British policy nor are they the haphazard outcome of political exigencies. Most of them were in existence long before the Europeans came to India. The State of Cochin, for example, is ruled today by the descendants of the Maharaja who welcomed Vasco da Gama on his first voyage to India. The first political treaty made by the East India Company in 1737 was with the ruler of Travancore, whose States date back to the early centuries of the Christian Era. The Nizam of Hyderabad was an ally of the Company in its struggle with Tipu and the Marathas. The ancient States of Rajputana were never conquered by the British, while the Maratha States of Baroda, Gwalior, Kolhapur and Indore represent a power which contested with the British for supremacy in India.

Though the States vary greatly in size and importance, they have the common feature that they are not British possessions. While the Princes are bound in subordinate alliance with the British Crown, their territories are not parts of British India nor are they subject to British authority. The British Parliament cannot legislate for them and their people are not subjects of the Crown, although they are entitled to British protection. The relationship between the British Government and the Indian States is based on treaties and agreements, entered into at various times, under which the Crown of England undertook to protect their independence and sovereignty on condition they gave up control of their foreign relations. Most of these alliances were entered into voluntarily and not as the result of military defeats inflicted on the States.

The Crown's undenied obligation under these treaties to protect the territorial integrity and political rights of the States has been solemnly reaffirmed by successive British sovereigns. The Proclamation of Queen Victoria, for example, declared unequivocally that: "We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honorable East India Company are by Us accepted,

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and will be scrupulously maintained. . . . We shall respect the Rights, Dignity and Honor of Native Princes as Our own." The late King George V said in his proclamation of 1921: "In My former Proclamation I repeated the assurance given on many occasions by My Royal predecessors and Myself, of My determination ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India. The Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable." It can be seen, therefore, that the idea prevalent in some quarters that the States are the creations of British Indian policy and that their rights and authority are derived from outside is not warranted either by the facts of history or by present-day relationships.

It is obvious, for this reason, that any political settlement that affected India as a whole, whether it were the withdrawal of British power or the grant of Dominion status, would require the voluntary consent of the States. The British Government is fully aware of this. Viscount Halifax, a former Viceroy of India and now British Ambassador in the United States, made the point clear in a recent speech in which he said: "They (the Princes) and their States do not fit easily into the picture of India as the Congress Party would like to draw it. Yet the independence of the Princes is enshrined in solemn treaties with the King-Emperor and as such are only alterable *by negotiation*. To scrap these or any other treaties unilaterally would be to scrap one of the principles for which we went to war with Germany." Nor do the Princes' pledges of "subordinate coöperation" with the British Government bind them to abide by what the Crown decides for them, as is sometimes argued. The Princes are undoubtedly pledged to coöperate with the British Government in matters of general international policy and other affairs of importance to the Commonwealth as a whole, but only when these are not covered by treaty. The object of the treaties is to guarantee the independence of the Princes. The argument that under them the Princes can be compelled to surrender their authority is, therefore, contrary to their spirit as well as their letter.

If, then, the Princes must give their consent to any settlement of the Indian problem as a whole, their attitude toward the proposed solutions must be considered. They have made it clear beyond the possibility of doubt that they have no desire to stand in the way of India's political freedom. It was the willing acceptance of the principle of federation by the Princes that persuaded the British Government to agree, at the First Round Table Conference in London in 1930, to a large measure of autonomy for India.

The first part of the Government of India Act of 1935, which came into force in 1937, provided for the autonomy of the 11 Provinces of British India under popularly elected ministries. The second part provided for a federation of the British Provinces with the Indian States. This section of the Act was strongly criticized by the leading parties in British India because it sought to solve the problem of the minorities by giving them weighted representation; the Hindus would have had the largest representation, but they would not have been able to form a government without the support of one or more of the minorities. The Congress Party argued that all seats should be contested and that the candidates who received the most votes should be elected; the Moslems and the other minorities objected that this would enable the Hindu majority to override permanently the minority interests; they complained, also, that the representation given them by the Act was insufficient.

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While these points were being debated in British India, the British were also negotiating with the Indian States for the implementation of the federal provisions of the Act. These negotiations were inevitably shelved at the outbreak of war. The Princes have declared repeatedly since then their willingness to help India in every way possible to attain full Dominion status. They insist, however, that the future of the country is not a matter to be settled by negotiations with the parties of British India alone. The States, as integral parts of India, are entitled to their full share in political power, and the rights and authority which they enjoy under their treaties with the British Crown cannot be annulled or modified without their free consent.

But whatever their legal rights may be, it is sometimes suggested, the States are mediaeval autocracies which have no moral claim to continued existence in a progressive and democratic world. This kind of criticism is wholly unrealistic. The States of India are not mere survivals of a reactionary mediaevalism. It cannot be argued that all the States are equally progressive or that their standards of public administration are uniformly high. The fact remains that many of the larger ones are in advance of British India in such matters as education, public health, social welfare and other activities which benefit the people. The State of Baroda, for example, has been a pioneer not only in all social reform movements and modern social legislation but in the field of popular education as well. During the past quarter of a century the State of Mysore, with a population of over 7 million, has followed a policy of industrial development which has given it a position of unique importance in the life of India as a whole. The State of Travancore, which has more than 6 million inhabitants, is famous for its educational policy; it claims the highest percentage of literacy in India. The progress in public health, education, communications and development of material resources which Hyderabad State has witnessed during the past two decades compares favorably with anything that has been done in British India, while the transformation of a vast area of desert land in Bikaner into fertile soil, and the efforts made by the Government of that State to eliminate the recurring scourge of famine, are unmatched in India.

The contribution of the States to the successful prosecution of the war has been particularly notable. While large elements in British India have hesitated, squabbled and even resorted openly to non-coöperation, all the States have devoted their entire resources and energy to furthering the war effort.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill stated in the Atlantic Charter that "they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; that they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." This is what the States of India claim for themselves. They desire nothing more than freedom to live and develop according to their own ideas, and to contribute their share to the general progress of India. The insistent claims of political parties in British India may have obscured for a time the important part that the India of the States has to play in the future, but this cannot be ignored permanently, both because the Princes and States are deep-rooted in Indian history and because of the immense sacrifices in men, money and materials which they are making willingly for the cause of the United Nations.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

PERMANENT REVOLUTION. By SIGMUND NEUMANN. New York: Harper, 1942, 388 p. $3.00.

Professor Neumann has no simple monistic pattern for explaining the present sorry pass to which the world has come through the rise of the total state and its will to wage total war. But quietly and with a fine feeling for reality, he gives us one of the best analyses of the current world scene and of the forces that dominate it, particularly those which we are now engaged in destroying.

WORLD IN TRANCE: FROM VERSAILLES TO PEARL HARBOR. By LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942, 445 p. $3.50.

An attempt to reinterpret the history of the two inter-war decades in terms of the progressive disintegration of Allied resistance to Germany's military revival.

WAR IN OUR TIME. By HARRY B. HENDERSON AND HERMAN C. MORRIS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 416 p. $3.75.

Taking the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 as the beginning of the Second World War, the authors give a circumstantial, illustrated account of the world's history during the eleven years up to the middle of 1942.

RIP TIDE OF AGGRESSION. By LILIAN T. MOWRER. New York: Morrow, 1942, 247 p. $2.50.

A good introduction to the story of how the world reached its present state, by the wife of Edgar Ansel Mowrer.

MODERN WORLD POLITICS. By THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI AND OTHERS. New York: Crowell, 1942, 843 p. $5.00.

A symposium of numerous experts covering the principal areas and political problems of the world today.

ON BORROWED PEACE. By PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 344 p. $3.00.

A passionate anti-Nazi, Austrian by birth and strongly Christian, recounts his efforts during the last decade to stem the Nazi deluge and to warn the Western World of the danger that threatened it.

REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT. By ERNEST BARKER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 424 p. $6.00.

One of the more profound books on political theory and the nature of liberty that have appeared in recent years.

A DEMOCRATIC MANIFESTO. By EMERY REVES. New York: Random House, 1942, 144 p. $1.50.

A cogent, tightly reasoned exposition of what the future world order must be like if it is to be truly democratic and pacific.

TIME TO INQUIRE. By SAMUEL CROWTHER. New York: Day, 1942, 353 p. $2.75.

A frequent writer on political and economic subjects explains how we can "restore the freedom, opportunity, and dignity of the average man" in a world where he finds things going from bad to worse.

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OUR SIDE IS RIGHT. By Ralph Barton Perry. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 153 p. $1.75.

A distinguished philosopher, professor at Harvard, states the case for an absolute moral code, and relates this code to current international issues.

STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT. By G. P. Gooch. New York: Longmans, 1942, 373 p. $5.00.

Ten essays by a noted British diplomatic historian of which five concern the background of the First World War and one deals with "British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939."

HOW TO WIN THE PEACE. By C. J. Hambro. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1942, 384 p. $3.00.

A prominent Norwegian parliamentarian, former President of the League of Nations Assembly, analyses the structure and operations of the League and offers numerous pertinent suggestions for making that body more effective.

VICTORY IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRATEGY FOR A LASTING PEACE. By Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer. New York: Norton, 1942, 322 p. $3.00.

A former German official in the League of Nations, at present professor of international relations at the American University, believes that an Allied victory can be made effective only if the German people are re-educated along civilized lines by an administration from outside, largely American. He cannot, of course, answer the question: Would the American people assume this task?

THE WORLD AFTER WAR. By Henry Bamford Parkes. New York: Crowell, 1942, 240 p. $2.50.

Interesting and challenging ideas on postwar organization in which stress is placed on the necessity for maintaining overwhelming Anglo-American military strength.

PEACE PLANS AND AMERICAN CHOICES: THE PROS AND CONS OF WORLD ORDER. By Arthur C. Millspaugh. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1942, 107 p. $1.00.

A summary and critical appraisal of some of the more significant peace plans now before the public.

A BASIS FOR THE PEACE TO COME. By Francis J. McConnell and Others. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, 152 p. $1.00.

Lectures delivered at Ohio Wesleyan University in 1942 by Bishop McConnell, J. F. Dulles, William Paton, Leo Pasvolsky and C. J. Hambro.

A CHRISTIAN BASIS FOR THE POST-WAR WORLD. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, 123 p. $1.00.

Eleven prominent British writers lay down ten principles which they feel should guide a Christian settlement.

VICTORY — AND AFTER. By Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers, 1942, 256 p. $2.00.

The leader of the American Communists discusses the problems of the present war and the peace to come.

PLANS FOR A POST-WAR WORLD. Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942, 238 p. $1.25.

Material illustrating various points of view.

GENERALS AND GEOGRAPHERS: THE TWILIGHT OF GEOPOLITICS. By Hans W. Weigert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 273 p. $3.00.

The adepts and critics of the pseudo-science of geopolitics are now legion in this country — and their number is still growing. Dr. Weigert, one of the most trenchant of the critics, propounds several new interpretations. Some of them will meet general approval, while others will be regarded as heterodox.

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AN OUTLINE OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By J. F. Horrabin. New York: Knopf, 1942, 157 p. $1.50.

This thoroughly revised edition of the author's "Outline of Economic Geography" emphasizes the impact of geography on history.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA WORLD ATLAS. Prepared by G. Donald Hudson. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1942, 260+128 p. and 223 maps, $20.00.

A new atlas is especially welcome in these days when our European supply of good maps is cut off. Unfortunately, few of the maps give topography, and there is a rather lop-sided emphasis on American states which leaves too little space for detailed maps of the rest of the world. Moreover, many will quarrel with the fact that certain of the maps seem to accept the results of recent totalitarian aggression without proper explanation. The gazeteer and the extensive statistical summaries will be found most useful.

NEW WORLD HORIZONS. Edited by Chester H. Lawrence. New York: Duell, 1942, 92 p. $2.75.

A fairly useful book, combining maps and texts, for the general reader who wants to brush up on his geography, especially the new geography of the air age.

VOICES OF HISTORY. Edited by Franklin Watts. New York: Franklin Watts, 1942, 669 p. $3.50.

"Great Speeches and Papers of the Year 1941," reproduced without comment and arranged chronologically regardless of subject matter or author.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1938. Volume I. Edited by Monica Curtis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 518 p. $10.00.

The documents in this volume deal with all important international negotiations and events in 1938 except the Anschluss and the Czechoslovak crisis, which will be covered in Volume II.

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR. By Giulio Douhet. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942, 394 p. $4.00.

The first edition in English of the writings (four volumes) of the Italian general who is usually regarded as having given the best formulation of the strategy of modern aerial warfare.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR. By Carl von Clausewitz. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942, 82 p. $1.00.

A reprint of the famous memorandum prepared for the Crown Prince of Prussia, later King Frederick William IV.

SILENT ENEMIES. By Justina Hill. New York: Putnam, 1942, 266 p. $2.50.

A bacteriologist connected with Johns Hopkins University puts into language comprehensible to laymen the story of man's efforts to check diseases associated with war.

MODERN CAMOUFLAGE. By Robert P. Breckenridge. New York: Farrar, 1942, 280 p. $3.50.

An account of the new science and art of camouflage as practised in modern war.

WORLD GOVERNMENT. By Oscar Newfang. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942, 227 p. $2.00.

The author goes into considerable detail concerning the nature of the world government which he believes should be — must be — set up if mankind is to survive.

RÉPERTOIRE DES QUESTIONS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL GÉNÉRAL POSÉES DEVANT LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS, 1920-1940. Compiled by Walter Schiffer. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1942, 390 p. Fr. 15.

An annotated catalog of over one thousand questions, with necessary references for further study.

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General: Economic and Social

FOREIGN TRADE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES. By Grover G. Huebner and Roland L. Kramer. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 554 p. $4.00.

A standard text revised to take account of the rapid course of events during the last decade.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. By John Parke Young. New York: Ronald, 1942, 714 p. $4.50.

A systematic treatise on the theory, historical development and current practices of international economic intercourse.

PATENTS FOR HITLER. By Guenter Reimann. New York: Vanguard, 1942, 316 p. $2.50.

An exposé of the close relationship between American and German corporations, particularly in regard to patents and secret processes, which, the author holds, worked to Hitler's advantage by retarding technological advances and thus war production in the United States.

BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER. By Robert A. Brady. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 340 p. $3.00.

A hard-hitting, fact-laden treatise on the economic and political power exercised by manufacturing associations in Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Britain and the United States. The author is associate professor of economics at the University of California.

THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN: A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH. By Peter F. Drucker. New York: Day, 1942, 298 p. $2.50.

An analysis of the weak points in our existing political and social institutions and an attempt to chart a way out that will avoid both the compulsion of collectivization and the anarchy of old-fashioned laissez-faire.

THE EARTH AND MAN. By Darrel Haug Davis. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 675 p. $4.25.

An up-to-date and well-organized source of information for the human geography of the world.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VS. INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM. By Edward Tenenbaum. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, 127 p. $1.00.

The Undergraduate Prize Essay at Yale University for the year 1942.

THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. By Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 398 p. $4.00.

A fair statement of the basic principles of Marxist economics.

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY. By Joseph A. Schumpeter. New York: Harper, 1942, 381 p. $3.50.

A provocative analysis of Marxian doctrines, a prediction of "the inevitable decomposition of capitalist society," an appraisal of the practicability of Socialism as an alternative, and a review of the history of the Socialist parties in the principal countries. The author is professor of economics at Harvard.

AN ESSAY ON MARXIAN ECONOMICS. By Joan Robinson. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 121 p. $1.75.

A theoretical approach in which several new interpretations are put forth.

SLAVES NEED NO LEADERS. By Walter M. Kotschnig. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 284 p. $2.75.

Challenging and constructive ideas on education under the Fascists and Nazis, and what it can — and should — be if democratic institutions are to revive after the war.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULATION. By Radhakamal Mukerjee. London: Longmans, 1942, 467 p. 7/6.

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This scholarly work by a noted Indian economist and sociologist is based on lectures delivered at Cambridge University in 1937.

OUR AGE OF UNREASON. By Franz Alexander. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1942, 371 p. $3.00.

A wide-ranging analysis of the psychological and institutional maladjustments of our day, especially in Europe, by the director of the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis.

MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE. By M. F. Ashley Montagu. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 216 p. $2.25.

An analysis and criticism of current racial ideologies and a statement of the scientific truth about the problems of race.

ACROSS A WORLD. By John J. Considine, with the collaboration of Thomas Kernan. New York: Longmans, 1942, 400 p. $2.50.

Chapters on Catholic missionary activities in many parts of Africa and Asia, by the Assistant General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America.

The Second World War

DIARY OF WORLD EVENTS. Compiled by J. A. H. Hopkins. Baltimore: National Advertising Company, 1942, 10 v. $18.75.

"A chronological record of the Second World War as reported day by day in American and foreign newspaper despatches, reproduced photographically." Maps and cartoons are also included. These ten volumes carry the account up to the end of May 1941.

THE WAR IN MAPS. By Francis Brown and Emil Herlin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 159 p. $1.50.

Maps, with descriptive text, illustrating the various campaigns and theaters of war.

DECEMBER 7: THE FIRST THIRTY HOURS. By the Correspondents of *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*. New York: Knopf, 1942, 229 p. $2.00.

This is a scrapbook made up of reports, and fragments of reports, sent to *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune* by their scores of correspondents all over the United States and in London and Manila during the first thirty hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

MEN BEHIND THE WAR. By Johannes Steel. New York: Sheridan, 1942, 447 p. $3.50.

Short, incisive pen portraits of some seventy-six political, military and other figures in many countries.

THE WAR: THIRD YEAR. By Edgar McInnis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 347 p. $2.00.

The third volume in a series giving a good running account of the course of the war.

FOOD: A WEAPON FOR VICTORY. By Bertram Fowler. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 185 p. $1.50.

This account of the gigantic problem of feeding the liberated peoples of Europe combines a fine sense of idealism and a wealth of practical suggestions. The author makes it quite clear that planning for this task cannot begin too soon.

NEWS IS A WEAPON. By Matthew Gordon. New York: Knopf, 1942, 268 p. $2.50.

The techniques by which our enemies employ news as a means of waging psychological warfare, exposed and analyzed by a former news editor of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF WAR. Edited by George A. Steiner. New York: Wiley, 1942, 692 p. $4.50.

Thoughtful contributions on a wide variety of topics by over two dozen American experts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DUEL FOR EUROPE: STALIN VERSUS HITLER. By John Scott. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 381 p. $3.50.

An illuminating account of the contest between Russia and Germany before, during and after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.

THE UNCONQUERED: EUROPE FIGHTS BACK. By Robert Carse. New York: McBride, 1942, 225 p. $2.50.

A dramatic account of the underground struggle against Hitlerism being waged in the Nazi-occupied countries of Europe.

THEY FIGHT FOR POLAND. Edited by F. B. Czarnomski. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1941, 284 p. $2.50.

Personal accounts by Polish soldiers and sailors of experiences on many fronts.

BELGIUM UNVANQUISHED. By Roger Motz. London: Drummond, 1942, 135 p. 6/. (Forest Hills: Transatlantic Arts, $1.80.)

A factual account of the Nazi conquest of Belgium and of the growing resistance of the Belgian people against German oppression, written by a member of the Belgian Parliament.

R.A.F.: THE SECOND YEAR. London: Black, 1942, 16 p. +110 photographs, 7/6.

A photographic record, with illustrative commentary. This book is a sequel to "The R.A.F. in Action."

"FREELY TO PASS." By Edward W. Beattie, Jr. New York: Crowell, 1942, 372 p. $3.00.

A United Press correspondent records the highlights of his remarkably varied assignments during the last few years: Shanghai at the time of the "Incident," the occupation of Prague, the Polish campaign, the Blitzkrieg in the West, and other critical and exciting matters.

NOR ANY VICTORY. By Ray Brock. New York: Reynal, 1942, 351 p. $3.00.

A vivid picture of Jugoslavia — or more exactly, Serbia — just before and during the Nazi invasion, by the Balkan correspondent of the *New York Times*.

DESERT WAR. By Russell Hill. New York: Knopf, 1942, 310 p. $2.75.

An account of the Libyan campaign during the latter part of 1941 and up to March 1942, by a young American correspondent with the Imperial forces.

BEHIND BOTH LINES. By Harold Denny. New York: Viking, 1942, 209 p. $2.50.

Mr. Denny, veteran correspondent of the *New York Times*, was captured in Libya while reporting the war with the British forces. This interesting book tells of his experiences before and after his capture.

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. By Max Werner. New York: Viking, 1942, 360 p. $3.00.

The author's high reputation for military analysis and prophecy rests primarily on his appraisal of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union. His discussion of the Russian campaign occupies the bulk of this first-rate book and will be found to be the most interesting part, for in his discussion of other theaters of war he reveals a tendency to underrate the importance of sea and air power.

SUEZ TO SINGAPORE. By Cecil Brown. New York: Random House, 1942, 545 p. $3.50.

After reading this very forthright book the reader will conclude that the author must have inherited some of the characteristics of that other Brown known as "God's Angry Man," for he thunders mightily against stupidity and complacency in men who exercise authority, especially if they be censors. After making allowance for this, the reader will find that Mr. Brown, correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System, has a remarkably vivid and moving story to tell of events in Egypt, India and Malaya during 1941 and early 1942. Over half of the book concerns the disastrous Singapore campaign, on which the author sheds a lurid light.

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JOURNEY INTO CHINA. By Violet Cressy-Marcks. New York: Dutton, 1942, 324 p. $3.75.

An adventurous English lady explores much of the back country of free China and visits the front along the Yellow River.

THE FLYING TIGERS. By Russell Whelan. New York: Viking, 1942, 224 p. $2.50.

The inspiring story of the American Volunteer Group — the AVG — that fought for China to keep the Burma Road open before this country entered the war.

REPORT FROM TOKYO. By Joseph C. Grew. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942, 88 p. $1.00.

In this little book Mr. Grew has taken the substance of the speeches he has been delivering around the country and, with suitable additions, made it into a "report" to the American people concerning the nature of the Asiatic enemy they are fighting. The former Ambassador seeks to disillusion his countrymen of any idea that the defeat of Japan can be purchased cheaply — in time, treasure or lives.

I SAW THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES. By Colonel Carlos P. Romulo. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 323 p. $3.00.

A Filipino newspaper publisher gives a vivid, first-hand description of the Japanese attack and of the gallant defense of the islands against hopeless odds on Bataan.

MEN ON BATAAN. By John Hersey. New York: Knopf, 1942, 313 p. $2.50.

This is the story of MacArthur, of the men who were with him on Bataan, and of the magnificent fight they put up there. Though not an eyewitness account, this is a moving and remarkably circumstantial story of the Philippine campaign.

GUADALCANAL DIARY. By Richard Tregaskis. New York: Random House, 1943, 263 p. $2.50.

A colorful, first-hand account of the landing and early stages of the Marine campaign on Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

QUEEN OF THE FLAT-TOPS. By Stanley Johnston. New York: Dutton, 1942, 280 p. $3.00.

The thrilling story of the exploits of the aircraft carrier *Lexington* not only in the Battle of the Coral Sea where she was sunk, but in other less publicized but highly effective raids on several Japanese-held harbors.

CAPTAIN BRYAN'S PACIFIC WAR ATLAS. By Edwin H. Bryan, Jr. Honolulu: Tongg Publishing Company, 1942, unp. 75 cents.

This booklet contains some seventy-five maps in large format, with index.

BLUEPRINT FOR VICTORY. By Homer Brett. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 215 p. $1.75.

An American with long experience in the consular service proposes that we put Japan out of commission, before she has time to organize and exploit her newly-won and nearly self-sufficient empire. He suggests that this be accomplished by large-scale aerial attacks on her communications and her great industrial cities, to be delivered by way of Alaska and the Aleutians.

The United States

THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. By Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 696 p. $5.00.

In this fourth volume of their monumental work on "The Rise of American Civilization" the Beards analyze the qualities of American culture which have made it unique.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE. By Harry Elmer Barnes and Others. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942, 802 p. $5.00.

American social problems described and interpreted in relation to the present war.

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OUR FIGHTING FAITH. By James Bryant Conant. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 105 p. $1.25.

Five wartime addresses by the President of Harvard College.

THE RIDDLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. By Robert Bendiner. New York: Farrar, 1942, 231 p. $2.00.

One of the editors of the *Nation* explores American diplomacy and its practitioners and concludes that all is not good. He does not hesitate to name names and dissect personalities. Some of his criticisms are naïve or prejudiced, while others would seem shrewd and well taken.

THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE NEUTRALS, 1917–1918. By Thomas A. Bailey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942, 520 p. $3.50.

The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History at Johns Hopkins University for 1941, by a leading authority on the history of American foreign policy.

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1920. By Wilfrid Hardy Calcott. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942, 524 p. $3.50.

The Albert Shaw Lectures for 1942.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. Volume IV: JULY 1941–JUNE 1942. Edited by Leland M. Goodrich and Others. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942, 899 p. $3.75.

The fourth annual issue of this valuable compilation of documents.

ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1933–1941. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1942, 634 p. $3.75.

Programmatic speeches and messages of the President, arranged chronologically.

THE UNGUARDED FRONTIER: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS. By Edgar W. McInnis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 384 p. $3.00.

A scholarly review of Canadian-American relations which clearly reveals that things have not always been tranquil between the two countries.

BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By F. W. Howay and Others. Toronto: Ryerson, 1942, 408 p. $3.50.

A history of the relations between Canada's westernmost province and its southern neighbor since the eighteenth century.

SABOTAGE! THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AMERICA. By Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn. New York: Harper, 1942, 266 p. $2.50.

Chapter and verse on the record of German sabotage in the United States since 1914, together with an exposé of the rôle played, wittingly or otherwise, by various American organizations and individuals in the Nazi campaign to break down our national solidarity and morale.

AMERICA AND THE AXIS WAR. By Denys Smith. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 424 p. $3.00.

An English correspondent, who has worked in the United States since 1929, reviews our recent foreign policy and finds much to criticize in it.

SEA LANES IN WARTIME. By Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Jennie Barnes Pope. New York: Norton, 1942, 367 p. $3.50.

A scholarly history of the experience of the United States with merchant shipping in time of war since 1775.

DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE U.S.A. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Harper, 1942, 416 p. $4.00.

A well-known British military writer reviews the principal American campaigns from the Revolution up through World War I. There are sketches and annotations.

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THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY. By Colonel William Addleman Ganoe. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 640 p. $5.00.

A revised edition of a standard account, brought up to the spring of 1941.

MacARTHUR OF BATAAN. By Helen Nicolay. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 188 p. $1.75.

A popular biography of the American commander.

FOR PERMANENT VICTORY: THE CASE FOR AN AMERICAN ARSENAL OF PEACE. By Captain Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., and Charles T. Haven. New York: Morrow, 1942, 246 p. $2.50.

After a rapid review of American military history the authors describe what they feel should be the future policy of this country toward permanent preparedness and industrial mobilization.

WARTIME CENSORSHIP OF PRESS AND RADIO. Compiled by Robert E. Summers. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942, 297 p. $1.25.

Selected materials illustrating the problems of the United States.

RADIO IN WARTIME. By Sherman H. Dryer. New York: Greenberg, 1942, 384 p. $3.00.

A critical examination and appraisal of the function of American radio during the present war, with suggestions for increasing its usefulness. The author is director of radio production at the University of Chicago.

FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR. By William L. Crum and Others. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942, 358 p. $3.00.

A competent, technical examination of current American policies by expert economists.

WAR WITHOUT INFLATION. By George Katona. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 213 p. $2.50.

A thoughtful little book showing the importance of public opinion and popular psychology in the effort to prevent runaway inflation.

THE A B C OF INFLATION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PRESENT-DAY CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Edwin Walter Kemmerer. New York: Whittlesey, 1942, 174 p. $1.75.

A noted American economist who has served as financial adviser to numerous foreign governments discusses the lessons of experience and points out the dangers in our present economic situation.

LOOKING AHEAD FIFTY YEARS. By Roger W. Babson. New York: Harper, 1942, 234 p. $2.00.

An American economic analyst predicts what our economic and social conditions will be half a century from now.

GOALS FOR AMERICA. By Stuart Chase. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942, 134 p. $1.00.

The second in the author's proposed series of six volumes entitled "When the War Ends." In this installment Mr. Chase enlarges upon the theme of his first volume — that the American economy, having become mature, no longer offers the same scope for individual enterprise as formerly and that the government will hence have to assume an ever-increasing responsibility for keeping the economic machine in operation.

PERMANENT PRICE CONTROL POLICY. Compiled by Julia Emily Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942, 113 p. $1.25.

Material illustrating current policies and practices in the United States.

DEMOCRACY, EFFICIENCY, STABILITY. By Arthur C. Millspaugh. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1942, 522 p. $4.00.

A sober analysis of American political history and constitutional practices in terms

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of the conflicts caused by our not always successful attempts to harmonize democratic procedures with administrative efficiency.

A NEW CONSTITUTION NOW. By Henry Hazlitt. New York: Whittlesey, 1942, 297 p. $2.50.

The suggestion of the author, editorial writer for the *New York Times*, is that we make the legislative and executive branches of our federal government into a more harmonious and better integrated team by adopting Britain's system of Cabinet government.

THE TECHNIQUES OF DEMOCRACY. By Alfred M. Bingham. New York: Duell, 1942, 314 p. $3.00.

An American liberal, editor of *Common Sense*, explores the possible methods by which democratic processes and results can be preserved in the face of the ever-growing centralization of political and administrative authority.

THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. By Joseph P. Chamberlain and Others. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1942, 258 p. $3.00.

A coöperative work on an increasingly important phase of American government.

AMERICANS ON GUARD. By Colonel O. R. McGuire. Washington: American Good Government Society, 1942, 361 p. $5.00.

Addresses in defense of the conservative interpretation of our constitutional system.

I WRITE FROM WASHINGTON. By Marquis W. Childs. New York: Harper, 1942, 331 p. $3.00.

Impressions and observations gleaned from Mr. Child's eight years of journalistic experience in the nation's capital.

THE AMERICAN JEW. Edited by Oscar I. Janowsky. New York: Harper, 1942, 322 p. $2.50.

A symposium by a dozen writers on various aspects of Jewish life and problems in the United States.

ALASKA UNDER ARMS. By Jean Potter. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 200 p. $2.00.

A readable, first-hand survey of our Far North territory: its resources, its people, its military problems and how they are now being solved.

Western Europe

FRANÇAIS, VOICI LA VÉRITÉ! By Henri de Kerillis. New York: Maison Française, 1942, 318 p. $2.00.

Energetic interpretations of the history of French foreign policy and domestic politics during recent years, by a prominent publicist of the patriotic Right.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ AND THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY. By Gordon Wright. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942, 271 p. $3.50.

A scholarly history of Poincaré's attempt to exert an active influence on French policy while President of the Republic from 1913 to 1920.

THE ROAD TO VICHY, 1918–1938. By Yves R. Simon. New York: Sheed, 1942, 207 p. $2.25.

A translation of "La Grande Crise de la Republique Française," reviewed in our October 1942 issue.

THE TWILIGHT OF FRANCE, 1933–1940. By Alexander Werth. New York: Harper, 1942, 368 p. $3.50.

Professor D. W. Brogan has whittled Werth's three books on the last decade of French history down to the size of one volume, thus giving us one of our best interpretations of the declining days of the Third Republic.

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WITH LOVE FOR FRANCE. By Helen Mackay. New York: Scribner, 1942, 139 p. $2.00.

A poignant book about France during her last months of freedom, by a writer who has lived in Paris for some thirty-five years and is more French than the French.

I REMEMBER, I REMEMBER. By André Maurois. New York: Harper, 1942, 310 p. $3.00.

The reminiscences of a popular French novelist, biographer and political writer.

THE SPEECHES OF ADOLF HITLER: APRIL 1922–AUGUST 1939. Edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 2 v. $15.00.

Translations of the Führer's speeches delivered between April 1922 and August 1939, with extensive bibliographical notes and indices. Volume II is devoted to foreign policy. These volumes were prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THIS IS THE ENEMY. By Frederick Oechsner and Others. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 364 p. $3.00.

The United Press staff in Berlin, repatriated last year along with the other American journalists and foreign service officers, manage to give a number of new slants on the Nazi régime, its hierarchs and its manner of waging war.

WHAT ABOUT GERMANY? By Louis P. Lochner. New York: Dodd, 1942, 395 p. $3.00.

Lochner was chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press for a decade and a half. In this book he has synthesized the impressions and knowledge concerning contemporary Germany which he gained from this incomparable experience.

LISTEN, HANS. By Dorothy Thompson. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 292 p. $2.50.

The first part of this book consists of an acute analysis of the elements, historical and psychological, which have gone into the making of the German people as they are today. The second part is composed of broadcasts aimed at German listeners open to the appeal of reason.

THE SELF-BETRAYED: GLORY AND DOOM OF THE GERMAN GENERALS. y Curt Riess. New York: Putnam, 1942, 402 p. $3.00.

A sensational account of the German officer caste in recent years, of their intrigues and ambitions, and of the present decay of their power under the Nazi régime.

HITLER: MAN OF STRIFE. By Ludwig Wagner. New York: Norton, 1942, 331 p. $3.50.

A readable, balanced biography that, however, adds little to our knowledge of Hitler's character or career.

UNTIL THAT DAY. By Kressmann Taylor. New York: Duell, 1942, 314 p. $2.75.

The story of Hitler's war on the churches, told in the first person.

BLOOD AND BANQUETS. By Bella Fromm. New York: Harper, 1942, 332 p. $3.50.

A former Berlin society reporter of Jewish ancestry lifts the curtain on many behind-the-scenes events in the Nazi *haut monde.*

ALFRED NOBEL: DYNAMITE KING — ARCHITECT OF PEACE. By Herta E. Pauli. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942, 325 p. $3.00.

This biography of the Swedish explosive manufacturer and founder of the famous prizes is placed in the wider setting of the history of his time.

GREENLAND. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 338 p. $3.50.

A sequel to the author's authoritative work on Iceland which gives us a good comprehensive picture of the history, geography and present status of Greenland.

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BETWEEN HITLER AND MUSSOLINI. By Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg. New York: Harper, 1942, 281 p. $3.00.

Considering the important rôle played by Prince Starhemberg in the postwar history of Central Europe this is a disappointing book. Some of its omissions and distortions are due, as the Prince himself intimates, to the fact that it was "dictated but not read." Yet, despite its blemishes, it is an historical document of considerable value for the light it throws on the machinations of Hitler and Mussolini in Austria. One has but to read this book to understand the utterly irreconcilable interests of Germany and Italy.

BALCONY EMPIRE. By Reynolds and Eleanor Packard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 380 p. $3.00.

This is one of the better journalistic accounts of contemporary Italy. The authors were in charge of the United Press Bureau in Rome during the three and a half years prior to their repatriation along with American diplomatic officers in Italy in June 1942. Though they can hardly be described as pro-Fascist, they show here and there a certain lack of those critical powers which one associates with journalism at its best. They feel, for instance, that Mussolini's régime was not so bad as long as it confined itself primarily to domestic "reform." They are also silent about the use of gas by the Fascists in Ethiopia, where they observed the war from the Italian side.

ITALY FROM WITHIN. By Richard G. Massock. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 400 p. $3.00.

The author was head of the Associated Press Bureau in Rome during the years just prior to Italy's declaration of war against the United States. His book has more historical perspective than that of his colleagues, the Packards of the United Press, but it is written with less zest and color. It will, however, be found to contain many interesting sidelights on the Fascist régime.

CHURCH AND STATE IN FASCIST ITALY. By D. A. Binchy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 774 p. $9.00.

This scholarly and painstaking study of the relations of Church and State in Italy during the two decades of Fascist rule is one of the better books on modern Italy. The author, professor of legal history and jurisprudence in University College, Dublin, approaches his subject in an objective yet sympathetic manner. He shows clearly the complications created for the Church by the rise of Fascism and reviews the story of how the Vatican has sought to come to terms with Mussolini without sacrificing any of its essential principles — an attempt almost inevitably doomed to ultimate failure. This book is published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

KING ALFONSO. By Robert Sencourt. London: Faber, 1942, 295 p. 12/6.

A friendly but not uncritical biography of the late monarch woven into the fabric of modern Spanish history. The author's outlook on life is Rightist.

Eastern Europe

SOVIET RUSSIA. By K. Gibberd. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 77 p. 75 cents.

This fact-crammed little book describing the recent history and current affairs of the Soviet Union was prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE RED ARMY. By Michel Berchin and Eliahu Ben-Horin. New York: Norton, 1942, 277 p. $3.00.

Two Russian journalists describe the origins, growth, organization and controlling ideas of the Soviet Army.

THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. New York: Longmans, 1942, 128 p. $1.50.

The Webbs ask and answer a number of pertinent questions about Russia.

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SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1939–1942. By David J. Dalin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, 452 p. $3.75.

Considering the meagerness of any sort of official and first-hand documentation, the author has succeeded rather well in his effort to give a balanced account of Soviet diplomacy during recent years.

WRACAMY NAD ODRE. By Antoni Błoński. London: Mildner, 1942, 128 p.

An historical and geographical analysis of Poland's western frontiers.

I ELLAS STO STAURODROMI. By B. I. Marketos. New York: National Herald, 1942, 331 p. $2.00.

A collection of material illustrating Greece's resistance to Fascist aggression and the rôle played by Greek-Americans in the history of both their native and adopted lands.

TA HELLINIKA DODECANISA. By Iakovos N. Kazavis. New York: National Herald, 1941, 163 p. $1.25.

A history of the Dodecanese Islands intended to show that they should be returned to Greece.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE UNRELENTING STRUGGLE. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 371 p. $3.50.

Mr. Churchill's speeches for the period from November 1940 to the end of 1941.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By R. Victor Langford. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 226 p. $3.25.

A scholarly, documented study of the processes and agencies by which British foreign policy has been formulated during the contemporary era.

SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES. By Sir William Beveridge. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 299 p. $1.00.

This is the famous "Beveridge Report" which may not seem to many Americans as revolutionary as they had been led to believe. It will, nevertheless, reveal how much farther Britain has already progressed toward real social security than has the United States. Sir William's principal object, as set forth in his terms of reference from the government, was to expose discrepancies and inadequacies in Britain's existing social security legislation. His recommendations are aimed at correcting these faults.

CRIPPS: ADVOCATE EXTRAORDINARY. By Patricia Strauss. New York: Duell, 1942, 423 p. $3.00.

A sympathetic portrait of Sir Stafford Cripps, independent Laborite and war leader.

THIS GREAT JOURNEY. By Jennie Lee. New York: Farrar, 1942, 298 p. $2.50.

The autobiography of a leading political representative of the British working class and onetime M. P. The author, wife of the Independent Labour M. P. Aneurin Bevin, is not yet forty, but has already had a remarkable career.

CANADA TODAY AND TOMORROW. By William Henry Chamberlin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 338 p. $3.00.

A competent bird's-eye view of contemporary Canada and its problems, in particular its relations with the United States.

RÉFLEXIONS SUR L'AVENIR DES CANADIENS FRANÇAIS. By Edmond Turcotte. Montreal: Valiquette, 1942, 165 p.

Thoughtful chapters on the less isolated rôle which the author believes the French Canadians must play in Canadian and world affairs.

AUSTRALIAN FRONTIER. By Ernestine Hill. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 332 p. $3.50.

A lively, readable account of life in the back country of Australia by one who has explored it rather extensively.

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WARNING TO THE WEST. By Shridharani. New York: Duell, 1942, 274 p. $2.50.
A protagonist of — and facile publicist for — Indian nationalism presents the case for the immediate abandonment of Western imperialism in India.

A WEEK WITH GANDHI. By Louis Fischer. New York: Duell, 1942, 122 p. $2.00.
An American journalist, well known for his works on Soviet Russia, spends a week with the Mahatma and discovers some of the things that make the Indian leader tick.

WHAT DOES GANDHI WANT? By T. A. Raman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 117 p. $1.25.
Mr. Raman, a proponent of British policy in India, has here collected a number of excerpts from Gandhi's writings and public statements as a means of outlining the Mahatma's policy and objectives. One may wonder, however, if Gandhi's views as here expressed still guide the Indian Nationalist movement as closely as formerly.

INDIA AND FREEDOM. By L. S. Amery. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 122 p. $1.25.
The texts of a dozen speeches delivered by the Secretary of State for India and Burma between June 1940 and March 1942.

ROYAL INDIA. By Maud Diver. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 317 p. $3.50.
An account of fifteen of India's most important "native states" and their rulers.

PAGEANT OF INDIA. By F. Yeats-Brown. Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith, 1942, 304 p. $2.50.
An excellent example of the old-school ultra-imperialistic attitude toward the "backward" peoples of the world, by the author of "The Bengal Lancer."

The Near East

THE NEAR EAST: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Philip W. Ireland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 265 p. $2.50.
Addresses delivered by several noted authorities, American and foreign, at the Harris Institute in June 1942.

WHY A JEWISH STATE? By Leon I. Feuer. New York: R. R. Smith, 1942, 94 p. $1.00.
A statement of the Zionist case in Palestine.

BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM. By Louis D. Brandeis. Washington: Zionist Organization, 1942, 156 p. $1.50.
Addresses and statements by the late Justice of the Supreme Court.

DOV HOS. Edited by Y. Yaziv. Tel Aviv: Histadruth, 1942, 99 p.
The biography of one of the leaders in the labor movement in Palestine, onetime mayor of Tel Aviv.

IN THE HIGH YEMEN. By Hugh Scott. London: Murray, 1942, 260 p. 18/. (Forest Hills: Transatlantic Arts, $5.40.)
A profusely illustrated and highly informative account of explorations in the Yemen highlands and the Aden Protectorate.

Africa

A DOCTOR CARRIES ON. By Thomas A. Lambie. New York: Revell, 1942, 173 p. $2.00.
An American medical missionary describes his experiences in the Sudan and in Ethiopia during and after the recent campaign for the liberation of Haile Selassie's realm.

The Far East

BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE FAR EAST. By Nathaniel Peffer. New York: Harper, 1942, 277 p. $2.50.
Mr. Peffer, a leading American writer on Far Eastern matters, lays down what he

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believes to be the essentials of a sound peace settlement in that part of the world — the complete destruction of Japan's military and political power, accompanied by an assurance to her people that once her political ambitions have been forsaken they can have access to the raw materials and trade outlets of the Orient; the recognition of the complete international equality of China; a reform in the administration of the colonial areas in southeastern Asia; and independence for India.

FIRE IN THE PACIFIC. By Simon Harcourt-Smith. New York: Knopf, 1942, 236 p. $2.00.

The author served in the British diplomatic service in China and in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. He is very critical of British policy towards Japan since 1930. Much of his criticism would seem to have been justified by the course of events, though his book would have profited by a careful checking of some of its facts.

TWO PACIFIC DEMOCRACIES: CHINA AND AUSTRALIA. By W. Y. Tsao. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1941, 157 p. 8/6.

An interpretation of the histories of China and Australia and of the relations between the two countries.

I FLEW FOR CHINA. By Captain Royal Leonard. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 295 p. $2.50.

For six years the author was a flyer in China, and the story he has to tell will be read with interest not only by lovers of adventure but by students of Far Eastern affairs.

MEN AND IDEAS. By Lin Mousheng. New York: Day, 1942, 256 p. $2.50.

A history of Chinese political philosophy.

GOVERNMENT BY ASSASSINATION. By Hugh Byas. New York: Knopf, 1942, 369 p. $3.00.

The author spent the last quarter century in Japan, where he was correspondent for the *New York Times*, and is thus in a position to give a long-range view of Japanese conditions and institutions. Mr. Byas lays stress on the rôle of political assassination and the terrorism of ultra-patriotic groups in Japanese political life.

SIBERIA. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Random House, 1943, 416 p. $3.75.

The author spent two years in Siberia during the First World War as an Austrian prisoner, and has now recently revisited the area to observe the changes wrought by the Soviet régime. As in the case of his other books — "The Danube," "Turkey" and "Dakar" — one could wish for less impressionism and more concrete information about factories, mines, railroads and other rather dull but highly important things.

THE PHILIPPINES CALLING. By Louis C. Cornish. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1942, 313 p. $2.00.

A statement of the strategic importance of the islands in the defense of America.

PACIFIC TREASURE ISLAND: NEW CALEDONIA. By Wilfred G. Burchett. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1942, 230 p. $2.50.

A readable, illustrated description of the history, ethnography and resources of a strategically and economically important island. The author includes an account of the overthrow of the Vichy Governor in New Caledonia and the establishment of the De Gaulle régime there.

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A study of the human geography of the Indian population in the Fiji Islands.

Latin America

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1941. Edited by Arthur P. Whitaker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 240 p. $3.00.

The first of a projected series planned to give a comprehensive survey of political, economic and social affairs in the Western Hemisphere.

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THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: A CANADIAN VIEW. By John P. Humphrey. Toronto: Macmillan, 1942, 329 p. $3.50.

An interesting appraisal by a professor of law at McGill University who favors Canadian participation in the Pan American organization.

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A completely revised version of a well-known survey of Latin American affairs.

A LATIN AMERICAN SPEAKS. By Luis Quintanilla. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 268 p. $2.50.

Forthright, challenging ideas on Inter-American problems expressed in a vigorous manner by a Mexican diplomat.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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